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Abstract  
In the UK, recent advances in data linking and matching have enabled education 
economists to shed new light on old questions. This thesis builds on these data 
developments to investigate three separate questions in the economics of education. The 
chapters all have a geographical focus on the UK and all touch upon issues related to 
higher education in some capacity or other. 
The first chapter deals with the determinants of subject choice and attainment.  More 
specifically, it estimates the effects of an education policy (Triple Science) in England 
aimed at increasing the take-up and attainment of young people in science subjects. The 
results suggest some large and significant effects of the policy on later subject choice 
and attainment, and these appear to be particularly strong for boys and pupils from more 
deprived backgrounds. 
The second chapter considers the question of whether it pays to attend more selective 
universities in the UK. I compare students who indicated preferences for, and were 
conditionally accepted to, the same universities - but who attended different ones 
because some failed to meet the conditions of their preferred offer. The results suggest 
that the university you attend matters to your earnings, with one standard deviation in 
selectivity leading to a 7% increase in earnings three and half years after graduation.  
The third and final chapter explores the effect changes in university rankings have on 
applicant and institution behaviour in the UK. Universities that fall down the rankings 
experience small but statistically significant drops in the number of applications 
received, as well as in the average tariff score of applicants and accepted applicants.  
Although the effects found are stronger for certain types of students and institutions, 
they tend to be modest overall, and suggest that other factors play a more important role 
in attracting applicants to universities.  
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1. Introduction 
In the UK, recent advances in data linking and matching have enabled education 
economists to shed new light on old questions. Data on secondary school students has 
been matched to higher education records, allowing us to investigate the transition from 
school to university. Administrative records on applications and acceptances to 
university can be linked, through unique identifiers, to higher education data, permitting 
investigations of who is accepted to university, and who is not. These datasets can then 
be further linked to surveys of graduates, allowing us to study labour market outcomes, 
including employment, earnings and job satisfaction.  
This thesis builds on these new developments in data linking and matching to 
investigate three separate questions in the economics of education. The chapters share a 
few more commonalities: all three have a geographical focus on the UK; and all touch 
upon issues related to higher education in some capacity or other.  
The first chapter looks at the issue of subject choice and attainment. More specifically, 
it estimates the effects of an education policy (Triple Science) in England aimed at 
increasing the take-up and attainment of young people in science subjects. It uses 
secondary school census data matched to higher education records. The effect of the 
policy is identified by comparing two adjacent cohorts of pupils in schools that offer 
Triple Science to one cohort, but not to the other. The results suggest some large and 
significant effects of the policy on later subject choice and attainment, and these appear 
to be particularly strong for boys and pupils from more deprived backgrounds. This 
chapter is forthcoming in Education Economics.  
The second chapter estimates the returns to university selectivity in the UK using 
administrative data on applications and admissions to university, linked to a survey of 
graduates three and a half years after graduation. It compares students who indicated 
preferences for, and were conditionally accepted to, the same universities - but who 
attended different ones because some failed to meet the conditions of their preferred 
offer. The results suggest that the university you attend matters to your earnings, with 
one standard deviation in selectivity leading to a 7% increase in earnings. This chapter 
has been submitted to the Economics of Education Review.  
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The third and final chapter explores the impact of university rankings on applicant and 
institution behaviour in the UK, using data on applications and acceptances to university 
linked to league table information and to surveys of fees charged to students. The results 
obtained offer fairly consistent evidence of a relationship between rank changes and 
applicant behaviour in the UK. Although the effects are stronger for certain types of 
students and institutions, they are modest overall and suggest that other factors may 
play a more important role in attracting applicants to institutions. This chapter is being 
re-submitted to the journal Education Economics.  
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2. Does Offering More Science at School Increase the Supply of 
Scientists? The Impact of Offering Triple Science at GCSE on 
Subsequent Educational Choices and Outcomes 
2.1. Introduction 
In the UK (as elsewhere in the world) the scientific and business communities 
frequently bemoan the shortage of science graduates and its potential negative impact 
on economic growth and international competitiveness: “Skills shortage is getting 
worse, bosses warn” (The Guardian, 2010); “Science teacher shortage will leave Britain 
lagging warn scientists” (The Mirror, 2010); “Lack of top researchers could harm UK 
plc” (BBC, 2011).  
The alleged reasons for the shortage of scientists are many and complex, however at 
least some of the blame is put on the school curriculum which many commentators 
argue does not place enough emphasis on teaching scientific skills: in the UK, the 
Council for British Industry and the Royal Society regularly attack the Government’s 
track record on education and argue that more needs to be done to increase the number 
of pupils studying science and mathematics (CBI, 2010b; Royal Society, 2010). In 
particular, it has been argued that the way science is usually taught at GCSE (the most 
common qualification taken by 15-16 year olds in England) is not sufficiently rigorous 
and demanding to prepare young people to study science at A Level (the most common 
qualification taken at ages 17-18) or, indeed, in higher education. The science lobby has 
strongly argued (CBI, 2008; CBI, 2010a; HMT, 2007) that more pupils should study 
Biology, Chemistry and Physics as three separate sciences at GCSE (called “Triple 
Science”1) because this is deemed to be the best preparation for the study of science 
later on. Yet statistics provided by the Department for Education for 2008 suggest that 
the majority of schools did not offer Triple Science and that merely 10% of pupils 
followed this option. These same statistics suggest that most students (53%) in England 
took Double Science - which is the combined study of Biology, Chemistry and Physics 
resulting in just two GCSEs2.  
                                                 
1
 From 2006 onwards, Triple Science was renamed “GCSE Separate Sciences” although the term Triple 
Science itself continues to be used.  
2
 These figures are for all schools, including independent ones. Many independent school pupils will enter 
iGCSE science rather than a GCSE qualification. In addition, the figures are based on pupils achieving a 
grade in a science subject, and not all do. Together, these two categories account for around 7% of the 
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In response to this pressure, the Government announced in 2007 that it would allow 
every pupil who had reached a certain standard (Level 6) in their Key Stage 3 science 
examinations at age 14 to continue to study Triple Science at GCSE (DCSF, 2007). The 
stated intention of the policy was to increase the number of young people taking Physics 
and Chemistry at A Level and their attainment in those subjects. Ultimately, the policy 
aimed to increase the number of people taking science subjects in higher education, as 
well as the quality of the scientists entering the labour force. The announcement of the 
policy went hand-in-hand with the setting of a Government target to get 14% of all 
pupils in maintained schools in England studying Triple Science by 2014 - which was 
increased to 17% in 2009. This corresponds to approximately 100,000 pupils and, in 
2007, around 53,000 pupils took Triple Science. 
Many in the business and science communities are convinced of the effectiveness of 
Triple Science and have argued that it should be made compulsory for high achieving 
pupils (e.g. CBI, 2008; and CBI, 2010a). Yet, in the absence of experimental data with 
well-defined treatment and control groups, it is difficult to say anything conclusive 
about the effectiveness of Triple Science in raising the uptake of, and attainment in, 
science subjects. One particular problem is that the pupils who take Triple Science are 
different from those who do not: they tend to be high-attaining and they are likely to 
differ in terms of unobservable characteristics (e.g.: preferences, ambition, etc...) as 
well. As a result, it remains unclear to what extent the programme itself raises the 
uptake of, and attainment in, science subjects – or whether pupils who take Triple 
Science would have studied science subjects (and done well in them) even in the 
absence of the programme.  
In this chapter, I try to retrieve the causal impact of Triple Science on later subject 
choice and attainment by exploiting the fact that some schools have dropped Triple 
Science from their curriculum, and others have taken it on. Adjacent cohorts of young 
people going through these schools will share similar characteristics (observable and 
unobservable) and will have been subjected to a similar school environment (observable 
and unobservable). By comparing the outcomes of two cohorts within the same school, 
one of which was offered Triple Science and one of which was not, I am able to address 
                                                                                                                                               
cohort. The remaining 17% will take a variety of other science qualifications, mainly vocational ones like 
“Additional Applied”, BTEC/OCR, Double Applied (VGCSE) and GNVQ.  
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at least part of the selection bias associated with selection into the programme, thus 
providing a better estimate of its true impact. 
This chapter presents the first attempt to estimate the causal effect of Triple Science on 
later subject choice and attainment. More generally, I am not aware of any economic 
studies which have looked at the effect of curriculum structure and offer on later 
educational subject choice and attainment. In this sense, I believe the current study is 
the first of its kind3.  
The results indicate that pupils who are offered Triple Science are 8.3% more likely to 
take A Level Chemistry; 13.4% more likely to take A Level Mathematics; and 15.0% 
more likely to achieve a grade A in A Level Physics. In addition, the effects of Triple 
Science are restricted to males only, and pupils from more deprived backgrounds appear 
to benefit most. More deprived pupils who were offered Triple Science were 13.7% 
more likely to choose Chemistry at A Level and 19.6% more likely to take Engineering 
and Technology in higher education.  
The remainder of this chapter is set out as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data and 
provides some descriptive statistics. Section 2.3 discusses the methodology and section 
2.4 provides the basic results. In section 2.5 the analysis is extended to certain sub-
groups to test for heterogeneity in the treatment. Section 2.6 offers some discussion and 
concluding remarks. 
2.2. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this chapter consists of matched administrative data: the National Pupil 
Database (NPD) for England matched to data from the Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (HESA).  
The NPD is a longitudinal database of children in England holding detailed information 
on attainment (for pupils in both the maintained/state and independent/private sector) at 
all the Key Stages (KS24, KS35, KS46, and KS57), as well as pupil characteristics 
                                                 
3
 Annex 2A contains a review of the literature on subject choice in schools and in higher education. There 
is also a wider literature which has looked at the effect of curriculum effects on earnings. See, for 
example: Altonji (2005) and Dolton and Vignoles (2002). 
4
 Key Stage 2 refers to the four years of schooling in maintained schools in England, normally known as 
Year 3, Year 4, Year 5 and Year 6, when pupils are aged between 7 and 11. At the end of this stage, 
pupils are tested as part of the national programme of National Curriculum Tests, colloquially known as 
SATs. These tests cover English, Mathematics and Science.  
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(gender, ethnicity, mother tongue, Special Educational Needs (SEN), eligibility for Free 
School Meals (FSM), postcode deprivation indicators, and month of birth). Because 
pupil characteristics are generally not available for young people in the independent 
sector8, the analysis is restricted to young people who were in the maintained sector at 
the time they sat their GCSEs. 
These individual pupil records have been matched by the Department for Education to 
HESA data, which holds information on all people attending UK higher education 
institutions, including what subjects they study and which institutions they attend.  
HESA data matched to the NPD provides us with information on whether pupils entered 
higher education or not. 
In addition, data from the Annual School Census (ASC) is merged on, which contains 
some information on staffing resources available to each school in England. Although 
the ASC does not contain information about the subject specialism of teachers, it does 
provide information on the number of qualified teachers, “other” teachers, technicians, 
as well as on the size of the school. 
The dataset contains information on two cohorts: one consists of young people born in 
1985 (who would have sat their GCSEs in 2001/02), the other of those born in 1986 
(and who would have sat their GCSEs in 2002/03).  The 1985 cohort could have been in 
higher education at the age of 18 in 2004/05 (19 in 2005/06), and the 1986 cohort could 
have been in higher education at the age of 18 in 2005/06 (19 in 2006/07).  
As mentioned above, only young people who were in a maintained (state) Year 11 
school are kept in the analysis in order to have socio-demographic information for most 
pupils in the dataset. In addition, only those pupils who were of the right academic age 
(i.e. those aged 15 at the end of KS4)9 were retained. This leaves 547,924 individuals in 
                                                                                                                                               
5
 Key Stage 3 is the legal term for the three years of schooling in maintained schools in England, 
normally known as Year 7, Year 8 and Year 9, when pupils are aged between 11 and 14. At the end of 
this stage, pupils aged 14 - in Year 9 - are assessed as part of the national programme of National 
Curriculum assessment, including in English, Mathematics and Science. 
6
 Key Stage 4 corresponds to the two final years of compulsory education when pupils are aged 15-16 and 
at the end of which they sit their GCSEs. 
7
 The dataset holds detailed information on the Advanced Level General and Vocational Certificates of 
Education (GCE A Level and VCE A Level, respectively). These are the main qualifications sat by young 
people in England in Key Stage 5 (the two years of post-compulsory education for students aged 16-18. 
Unfortunately, the dataset does not hold any information on other, equivalent qualifications such as 
National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs), BTEC, or other vocational qualifications. 
8
 Unless they have had a spell in the maintained sector. Around 7% of school children in England are 
educated in the independent sector. 
9
 This gets rid of 144 observations in the 1985 cohort, and 227 observations in the 1986 cohort. 
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the 1985 cohort and 562,089 in the 1986 cohort – giving a total of 1,110,013 
observations in the entire dataset.  
Table 2-1 provides some basic socio-demographic descriptive statistics for the pupils in 
the dataset. Just under half the sample is female and almost 19% of pupils are from an 
ethnic minority background. Nearly 14% of pupils were on Free School Meals (FSM) at 
the age of 15, around 16% had special educational needs (SEN), and 9% had a mother 
tongue other than English. Table 2-1 also indicates some issues with the ethnicity and 
SEN variables. Both of these were affected by a change in classification systems 
between 2002 and 2003 and, although in theory it should be possible to match one 
system up to another, teething problems with the introduction of the new classification 
clearly led to some inconsistencies in these variables over time. To deal with this 
problem in the econometric models, a list of dummies will be included for all ethnicities 
and SEN, as well as interactions of these dummies with a cohort indicator. 
Table 2-2 and Table 2-3 provide some information on the key measures of prior 
attainment used throughout this analysis: attainment on the KS2 and KS3 tests in 
English, Mathematics and Science. In practice, young people are awarded a “level” 
(taking discrete integer values from 1-6 at KS2 and from 1-9 at KS3), depending upon 
the difficulty of the paper they sat (“tier”) and the score they achieved in it. I use the 
method employed by Chowdry et al. (2008) to transform these discrete levels into a 
continuous measure on a similar scale10. This allows the use of much more fine-grained 
measures of prior attainment, as well as comparisons of pupils who sat papers of 
different difficulties.  
Table 2-2 provides an idea of what these variables look like. The KS2 attainment 
variables range from zero to a maximum of around seven, with a mean of just over four 
and a standard deviation ranging between 0.70 and 0.85. KS2 attainment information is 
missing for 9-10% of the sample. The KS3 attainment variables also have a minimum 
value of zero, but reach maxima of just under ten. Standard deviations range from 1.08 
to 1.28 and attainment information is missing for 5-8% of the sample11. 
  
                                                 
10
 I am grateful to the authors for providing me with their Stata syntax to derive these continuous KS2 and 
KS3 measures of prior attainment. 
11
 I have also experimented with standardising these prior attainment variables, and this makes no 
substantial difference to the results presented in this chapter.  
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Table 2-1: Pupil Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
    85 Cohort   86 Cohort   Total 
  # % # % # % 
Female 270,404 49.35 277,930 49.45 548,334 49.40 
White, UK 452,403 82.57 450,438 80.14 902,841 81.34 
White, Other 14,298 2.61 10,150 1.81 24,448 2.20 
Asian, Indian 13,944 2.54 13,823 2.46 27,767 2.50 
Asian, Pakistani 13,771 2.51 13,142 2.34 26,913 2.42 
Asian, Bangladeshi 5,119 0.93 5,307 0.94 10,426 0.94 
Asian, Other 115 0.02 2,970 0.53 3,085 0.28 
Black, Caribbean 7,794 1.42 8,293 1.48 16,087 1.45 
Black, African 6,962 1.27 7,673 1.37 14,635 1.32 
Black, Other 4,352 0.79 2,367 0.42 6,719 0.61 
Chinese 2,016 0.37 2,017 0.36 4,033 0.36 
Mixed 266 0.05 9,879 1.76 10,145 0.91 
Other, Unclassified, Missing 26,884 4.91 36,030 6.41 62,914 5.67 
FSM 76,596 13.98 76,931 13.69 153,527 13.83 
FSM Missing 1,177 0.21 0 0.00 1,177 0.11 
SEN 95,896 17.50 82,214 14.63 178,110 16.05 
Foreign Language 48,806 8.91 50,485 8.98 99,291 8.95 
Language Missing 925 0.17 467 0.08 1,392 0.13 
Notes: Table shows the number and proportion of each cohort with respective characteristic. E.g. 13.98% of the cohort born in 1985 were eligible for 
(and claimed) Free School Meals at the age of 15. FSM=Free School Meals. SEN=Special Educational Needs.
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Table 2-2: Continuous Measures of KS2 and KS3 Attainment 
  
Mean S.D. Min. Max. % Missing 
KS2 English Score 4.25 0.73 0.00 6.58 10 
KS2 Mathematics Score 4.21 0.85 0.00 6.90 9 
KS2 Science Score 4.33 0.70 0.00 6.89 9 
     
KS3 English Score 5.40 1.15 0.00 9.73 8 
KS3 Mathematics Score 5.71 1.28 0.00 9.95 5 
KS3 Science Score 5.41 1.08 0.00 9.78 5 
 
Notes: Table shows mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values, as well as % with missing 
information for the key measures of prior attainment used. Figures are for both 1985 and 1986 cohorts 
pooled. KS=Key Stage. 
 
Panel B of Table 2-3 shows how attainment on these tests varies by: (i) whether or not 
the pupil took Triple Science at GCSE; and (ii) whether or not the pupil attended a 
school which offered Triple Science in that particular year. It is clear that: (i) pupils who 
took Triple Science had, on average, higher prior attainment than pupils who did not 
take Triple Science; and (ii) pupils attending schools where they were offered Triple 
Science had, on average, higher prior attainment than pupils whose schools did not offer 
Triple Science. As the p-values in this table show, these differences are all highly 
statistically significant. 
Table 2-3 (Panel A) provides information on the number of pupils who took Triple 
Science, as well as on the number of pupils who attended schools where Triple Science 
was offered to them. Between 2002 and 2003, the proportion of pupils taking Triple 
Science increased from 4.3% to 4.6% of the cohort – i.e. the equivalent of 23,423 young 
people in 2002, and 25,822 in 2003. The number of people who attended schools where 
they were offered Triple Science increased by 1.5 percentage points, from 142,321 in 
2002 (or 26.0% of the cohort) to 154,399 in 2003 (or 27.5% of the cohort). 
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Table 2-3: Number and Proportion of Pupils Taking and Being Offered Triple Science, and KS2 and KS3 Attainment by Triple Science Status 
PANEL A 
 
  Took TS   
 
  Was Offered TS   
N (1985 Cohort) 23,423 142,321 
N (1986 Cohort) 25,822 154,399 
N Total 49,245 296,720 
% (1985 Cohort) 4.27 25.97 
% (1986 Cohort) 4.59 27.47 
% Total 4.44 26.73 
PANEL B 
  
  Did Not Take TS Took TS Difference  (p value)   Was Not Offered TS Was Offered TS 
Difference  
(p value) 
KS2 English Score 4.22 4.85 0.64 4.20 4.37 0.18 
(0.00) (0.00) 
KS2 Mathematics Score 4.17 5.04 0.87 4.15 4.36 0.21 
(0.00) (0.00) 
KS2 Science Score 4.30 4.97 0.67 4.28 4.45 0.17 
(0.00) (0.00) 
KS3 English Score 5.35 6.42 1.07 5.31 5.63 0.32 
(0.00) (0.00) 
KS3 Mathematics Score 5.63 7.26 1.63 5.60 6.00 0.40 
(0.00) (0.00) 
KS3 Science Score 5.34 6.75 1.41 5.31 5.66 0.35 
       (0.00)      (0.00) 
Notes: Panel A shows the number and percentage of pupils who (i) took Triple Science; and (ii) were offered Triple Science in both the 1985 and 1986 cohorts, as well as the total 
for both cohorts together. Panel B shows the average Key Stage 2 and 3 attainment in English, Mathematics and Science for pupils who: (i) took Triple Science; and (ii) were offered 
Triple Science. Panel B also tests the statistical significance of the difference in prior attainment between these groups. 
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Table 2-4 summarises some key statistics for the schools in the dataset. There were 
3,125 schools in 2002 and 3,103 in 2003. 24.2% of schools in 2002 offered Triple 
Science (n=755), compared to 25.8% of schools in 2003 (n=802) – an increase of 6.2%.  
As will be shown later, however, there is considerable movement in both directions as a 
large number of schools apparently stop offering Triple Science over this two-year 
period. Table 2-4 also provides information on the size of the schools and on some of 
the resources at their disposal (number of qualified teachers, number of other teachers, 
and technicians). As will be shown in the next section, schools that offer Triple Science 
have more qualified teachers but also tend to be larger, so that their pupil-teacher ratio is 
not very different from that of schools that did not offer Triple Science. 
Table 2-4: School Characteristics 
  
No Triple Science 
(s.d.) 
Triple Science 
(s.d.) 
Average School Size 972 1,089 
(342.4) (321.7) 
Average Number of Qualified Teachers 57.7 64.7 
(20.1) (19.5) 
Average Number of Other Teachers 3.4 3.3 
(3.9) (3.6) 
Average Number of Technicians 5.2 5.7 
  (2.2) (2.3) 
 
Notes: Table shows school characteristics at the end of KS4 for both the 1985 and 1986 cohorts (the 
relevant years being 2001/02 and 2002/03). Standard deviations (s.d.) in parentheses. 
 
Finally, Table 2-5 summarises some of the key outcome variables looked at in this 
chapter, including: proportion attaining two A Level passes; subject choice at A Level 
(proportion entering examinations in Biology, Chemistry, Physics and Mathematics A 
Levels - conditional on entering any A Level examinations at all); attainment in those 
subjects at A Level (i.e. proportion attaining a grade A – conditional on having entered 
an examination in that subject12); the likelihood of being: in higher education13; in a 
Russell Group institution14 (conditional on being in higher education); doing a STEM15 
                                                 
12
 A Level examinations are nationally set and assessed, so endogeneity is not an issue. 
13
 Higher education in this chapter is defined as 1st Degree courses in Higher Education Institutions only. 
In other words, it excludes “other” undergraduate programmes such as Foundation Degrees, as well as 1st 
Degree courses at Further Education Colleges offering higher education courses. 1st Degree courses are 
the main type of course taken at undergraduate level and are considered the “traditional” form of higher 
education. 
14
 The Russell Group is an association of 20 major research-intensive universities of the United Kingdom. 
These include the universities of: Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, 
Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Sheffield, Southampton, as well as Imperial 
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degree (conditional on being in higher education); as well as the likelihood of studying 
certain STEM subjects in higher education (again conditional on being in higher 
education)16. The table breaks this down by whether: (i) pupils took Triple Science or 
not; and (ii) pupils attended a school that offered Triple Science or not.  
It is apparent that students who took Triple Science at GCSE are much more likely to 
take science courses at both A Level and in higher education, and they are more likely 
to do well at them. They are also more likely to achieve A Levels in the first place, to be 
in higher education at the age of 19, and to be attending a Russell Group institution. 
Similarly, pupils who attended a school that offered Triple Science are more likely to 
have a positive outcome on all these variables than pupils who attended schools that did 
not offer Triple Science – except when it comes to studying Mathematics and Computer 
Science17. 
                                                                                                                                               
College London, King’s College London, the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Queen’s University Belfast and University College London. For more information, see: 
http://www.russellgroup.ac.uk/.  
15
 STEM stands for Science, Technology and Engineering, and covers the following subject groupings of 
the Joint Academic Coding System (JACS): Medicine and Dentistry, Subjects Allied to Medicine (which 
includes Nursing), Biological Sciences, Veterinary Sciences, Agriculture and Related Subjects, Physical 
Sciences, Mathematical and Computer Sciences, Engineering, Technologies, and Architecture, Building 
and Planning. For more information about the JACS, see 
http://www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=158&Itemid=233.  
16
 Note that many of the outcome variables are conditional on having attained another outcome first. For 
example, the likelihood of attaining a grade A in A Level Physics is conditional on having entered an 
examination in that subject. There may be some selection issues which could bias the results. The 
standard way to circumvent this issue would be to model the selection procedure separately and then 
adjust for selection in the outcome equation. However, this procedure relies on finding a credible 
exclusion restriction which should appear in the selection equation, but not in the outcome equation. 
Unfortunately, such variables were not available in the dataset. 
17
 This is due to the fact that Computer Science is more likely to be taken by students from lower socio-
economic backgrounds with lower prior attainment. 
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Table 2-5: Summary of Key Outcome Variables, by Triple Science Status 
  Did Not Take TS Took TS       
Was Not Offered 
TS Was Offered TS     
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) 
# % # % Difference (iv)-(ii) (p value) # % # % Difference (x)-(viii) (p value) 
Two A Level Passes (1) 325,248 30.7 39,061 79.3 48.7 (0.00) 240,899 29.6 123,410 41.6 12.0 (0.00) 
Took A Level Biology (2) 46,102 13.5 12,508 31.7 18.2 (0.00) 37,234 14.7 21,376 16.8 2.1 (0.00) 
Took A Level Chemistry (2) 30,635 9.0 11,352 28.7 19.8 (0.00) 25,831 10.2 16,156 12.7 2.5 (0.00) 
Took A Level Mathematics (2) 45,592 13.3 14,154 35.8 22.5 (0.00) 36,291 14.3 23,455 18.4 4.1 (0.00) 
Took A Level Physics (2) 22,835 6.7 9,460 23.9 17.3 (0.00) 18,971 7.5 13,324 10.4 3.0 (0.00) 
Grade A in A Level Biology (3) 7,757 16.8 3,965 31.7 14.9 (0.00) 6,498 17.4 5,224 24.4 7.0 (0.00) 
Grade A in A Level Chemistry (3) 6,750 22.0 4,022 35.4 13.4 (0.00) 5,745 22.2 5,027 31.1 8.9 (0.00) 
Grade A in A Level Physics (3) 4,681 20.5 3,313 35.0 14.5 (0.00) 4,040 21.3 3,954 29.7 8.4 (0.00) 
Grade A in A Level Mathematics (3) 13,937 30.5 6,462 45.6 15.1 (0.00) 11,341 31.2 9,058 38.6 7.4 (0.00) 
In HE at 19 (4) 275,162 25.9 34,512 70.1 44.1 (0.00) 204,718 25.2 104,956 35.4 10.2 (0.00) 
In a Russell Group Institution at 19 (5) (6) 50,600 18.4 13,854 40.1 21.8 (0.00) 37,825 18.5 26,629 25.4 6.9 (0.00) 
STEM in HE at 19 (5) (7) 101,507 36.9 18,467 53.5 16.6 (0.00) 78,728 38.5 41,246 39.3 0.8 (0.00) 
Biological Sciences in HE at 19 (5) 25,936 9.4 3,873 11.2 1.8 (0.00) 19,724 9.6 10,085 9.6 0.0 (0.00) 
Medicine, Dentistry and Veterinary Sciences in HE at 19 (5) 6,385 2.3 2,406 7.0 4.7 (0.00) 5,237 2.6 3,554 3.4 0.8 (0.00) 
Physical Sciences in HE at 19 (5) 10,631 3.9 2,970 8.6 4.7 (0.00) 8,552 4.2 5,049 4.8 0.6 (0.00) 
Engineering and Technology in HE at 19 (5) 10,270 3.7 2,465 7.1 3.4 (0.00) 8,109 4.0 4,626 4.4 0.4 (0.00) 
Mathematics and Computer Science in HE at 19 (5) 16,383 6.0 2,474 7.2 1.2 (0.00)   12,768 6.2 6,089 5.8 -0.4 (0.00) 
 
 
Notes: Table shows number and proportion achieving each outcome, by Triple Science (TS) status. For example: 31% of those who did not take TS achieved two A Level passes. (1) 
An "A Level Pass" is defined as obtaining a grade A-E. (2) Conditional on having been entered for A Level examinations (or equivalent). (3) Conditional on having been entered for 
examination in the subject. (4) "HE" includes 1st Degrees at higher education institutions only. (5) Conditional on being in higher education at 19. (6) For list of Russell Group 
institutions see: www.russellgroup.ac.uk (7) STEM stands for Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics. Subject groupings at higher education follow the JACS coding 
system.
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2.3. Methodology 
As was clear from Table 2-3, young people who attend schools that offer Triple Science 
are different from young people who do not. In particular, they tend to have much 
higher prior attainment. Table 2-6 further demonstrates that young people who attend 
schools that offer Triple Science are slightly more likely to be male, less likely to be on 
Free School Meals, more likely to be White UK, and less likely to have either Special 
Educational Needs or English as a second language. Furthermore, as shown by Table 2-
7, the outcomes of interest are correlated with the above student characteristics. Young 
people who choose science subjects and do well at them are more likely to be male, 
from an ethnic minority background, not on FSM, with no SEN and with English as a 
foreign language. Finally, as indicated by Table 2-8, schools that offer Triple Science, 
although having more teachers, tend to be larger than schools that do not offer Triple 
Science. 
Table 2-6: Characteristics of Pupils in Schools Offering Triple Science 
  Was Not Offered TS Was Offered TS     
  % % Difference (p value) 
Female 49.6 48.8 -0.8 0.00 
FSM 14.3 3.9 -10.4 0.00 
White, UK 81.3 82.4 1.1 0.00 
White, Other 2.2 2.7 0.5 0.00 
Asian, Indian 2.5 3.5 1.1 0.00 
Asian, Pakistani 2.5 1.7 -0.8 0.00 
Asian, Bangladeshi 1.0 0.3 -0.7 0.00 
Asian, Other 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.00 
Black, Caribbean 1.5 0.5 -1.0 0.00 
Black, African 1.3 0.8 -0.6 0.00 
Black, Other 0.6 0.3 -0.3 0.00 
Chinese 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.00 
Mixed 0.9 1.0 0.1 0.02 
Other, Unclassified, Missing 5.7 5.5 -0.2 0.09 
SEN 16.6 3.2 -13.5 0.00 
Foreign Language 9.0 7.3 -1.8 0.00 
 
Notes: Table shows the proportion of those who were and those who were not offered Triple Science with 
each characteristic. So, for example, 49.6% of those who were offered TS were female, compared to 
48.8% of those who were not. The third column shows the difference between these proportions, and the 
fourth column shows the statistical significance of the difference. 
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Table 2-7: Selection of Outcomes by Student Characteristics 
  
Took A Level 
Biology 
Took A Level 
Chemistry 
Took A Level 
Physics 
Took A Level 
Mathematics HE at 19 
Russell Group 
at 19 STEM at 19 ALL 
Female 61.1 50.9 19.6 38.1 55.6 54.6 48.1 49.4 
FSM 4.6 5.1 3.1 3.7 6.3 2.9 6.0 13.83 
White, UK 75.9 71.0 80.8 76.1 76.4 80.0 76.3 81.34 
SEN 2.4 2.9 3.7 2.6 4.3 2.4 4.5 16.05 
Foreign Language 13.8 18.0 9.8 13.8 13.1 9.6 13.9 8.95 
 
Notes: Table shows proportion of those who achieve each outcome who are female, on FSM, etc... Last column shows proportions for entire sample (two cohorts combined). 
 
Table 2-8: Characteristics of Schools Offering Triple Science 
    2002   2003 
Schools Offering TS Schools Not Offering TS Schools Offering TS Schools Not Offering TS 
Average Year Size 188 171 192 177 
(63.67) (61.57) (62.26) (61.95) 
Average School Size 1,097 968 1,103 990 
(319.93) (339.65) (319.19) (342.03) 
Average Number of Qualified Teachers 65.1 57.7 65.3 58.6 
(19.27) (20.11) (19.68) (20.32) 
Average Number of Other Teachers 3.4 3.3 3.8 4.1 
(3.60) (3.75) (4.69) (2.60) 
Average Number of Technicians 5.7 5.3 6.0 5.4 
    (2.38) (2.37)   (2.60) (2.39) 
 
Notes: Table shows school characteristics (size and number of staff) for those that offered and those that did not offer Triple Science (TS) in 2001/02 and in 2002/03. These years 
correspond to the year in which the cohorts sat their KS4 examinations.  
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Many confounding factors are therefore at play, which render it difficult to discern the 
effect that Triple Science itself is having on subject choice and attainment. The richness 
of the data will allow us to deal with a large portion of these selection issues, by 
permitting us to include in our models detailed information on observables like prior 
attainment and socio-demographic characteristics. A potential problem remains, 
however, because selection into Triple Science may also be based on unobservable 
characteristics which, if themselves related with the outcomes of interest, would bias the 
estimate of the effect of Triple Science on later subject choice and attainment.  
As way of mitigating this selection problem, school fixed effects are included into the 
model. This will eliminate any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at the school 
level and will allow us to identify the effect of Triple Science by exploring variation 
within schools over time. The attraction of this identification strategy is that we are 
comparing two adjacent cohorts of young people who went through the same school, 
but only one of which was offered Triple Science. Apart from the science curriculum 
offered to them, these two cohorts should be very similar to each other (both in terms of 
observable and unobservable characteristics) and would have been subjected to a very 
similar school environment. This approach essentially amounts to a difference-in-
differences strategy, where changes in outcomes in treatment schools are compared to 
changes in outcomes in non-treatment schools. The difference in these changes is 
attributed to the Triple Science programme.  
For the above methodology to work, however, there need to be a sufficient number of 
schools that change their science curriculum over the period observed in the dataset. 
This is indeed the case: there are 192 schools that did not offer Triple Science in 2002, 
but did offer it in 2003, and there are a further 145 schools that offered Triple Science in 
2002, but stopped offering it in 200318. This compares to 610 schools which offered it in 
both years, and 2,149 schools which offered it in neither years.  
                                                 
18
 I use the same methodology as used by the Department for Education to identify schools that offer 
Triple Science: i.e. as long as at least one pupil in the school enters exams in all three separate science 
subjects, then the school is considered to be offering Triple Science. Using this methodology, there is a 
slight problem in identifying schools that do not offer Triple Science, however. This is because a school 
might be offering Triple Science, but no pupil decides to take it. In this case, a school would be wrongly 
classified as not offering Triple Science. In Annex 2C I describe two robustness checks I carried out to 
test the extent to which the conclusions drawn in this chapter are sensitive to how Triple Science schools 
are identified. First, I check whether in schools that start/stop offering Triple Science there is a 
simultaneous drop/increase in the number of pupils taking Double Science (the next best alternative to 
Triple Science). I find that this is indeed the case. Second, I increase the threshold for identifying schools 
that offer Triple Science from one pupil to two/three/four/five/six pupils, and re-run the analysis. The 
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The impact of Triple Science is therefore estimated using the following Linear 
Probability Model19: 
Yi = β0 + β1TSi + PDiγ+ PAiδ + CDgstθ + CAgstρ + SRstω + υt + σs (2i) 
 
 
Where Y is the outcome of interest for pupil i and TS is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the pupil attended a school which offered Triple Science (so β1 is the 
coefficient of interest). PD is a vector of pupil socio-demographic characteristics 
(including dummies for gender, ethnicity, Free School Meal status, Special Educational 
Needs, English as a foreign language, relative deprivation of the area the pupil lives in, 
and month of birth20) and PA is a vector measuring individual pupil attainment (six 
controls covering continuous KS2 and KS3 scores in each of English, Mathematics and 
Science)21. Both CD and CA capture the make-up of the year group g that the pupil is in 
when taking his/her GCSEs: the socio-demographic composition of the year group (e.g. 
proportion female, proportion on FSM, etc...) and the average KS2 and KS3 attainment 
of pupils in the year group. SR is a vector of school resources in year t, and controls for 
the size of the school (number of full-time equivalent pupils), the number of qualified 
(and other) teachers, and the number of technicians. υt is a dummy for the 1986 cohort 
and captures any time-specific effects, whereas σs represents a full set of school fixed 
effects. Equation (2i) is estimated by Ordinary Least Squares, adjusting for 
heteroscedasticity (as the outcomes are dichotomous) and allowing for clustering of the 
standard errors at the school level. Annex 2B provides more detail on each of the 
dependent and explanatory variables included in the analysis.  
  
                                                                                                                                               
results of this analysis are slightly different from the main results presented in this chapter – and one 
would expect them to be, as they are identified using a different set of schools. However, the overall 
conclusion that offering Triple Science has positive effects on later outcomes still holds.  
19
 The Linear Probability Model was chosen for computational convenience – particularly in the case of 
models with a large number of fixed effects. However, one potential drawback of the LPM is that it 
assumes constant marginal effects. To test the robustness of the results, I have run logit models for each 
dependent variable using the full specification (but without school fixed effects). For each type of school 
(00, 10, 01 and 11) I calculated average school characteristics, and I derived the marginal effects at those 
average characteristics. I found that the marginal effects of Triple Science did not vary hugely across 
school types, and so the LPM results were kept in the main body of the chapter.  
20
 Month of birth has been linked to various educational outcomes, including participation in higher 
education: HEFCE (2005), Crawford, Dearden and Meghir (2007) and Crawford and Dearden (2008). 
21
 These controls may be highly collinear, and so models where just KS3 results were included have also 
been run. The results of these models are almost identical to the ones which include the full set of prior 
attainment controls, and so the latter are reported in this chapter. 
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Although this model should mitigate some of the bias resulting from selection into 
Triple Science based on unobservable characteristics, a few selection issues remain. 
One of these is that, once Triple Science is offered in a particular school, the selection 
of pupils into the programme is non-random. As a way round this, an “intention to treat” 
is estimated rather than the effect of “treatment on the treated” – i.e. the interest is in 
whether or not a cohort that was offered Triple Science is more likely to choose and do 
well in science subjects later on, and not in whether pupils who actually take Triple 
Science are more likely to do so. 
A more difficult issue to address is whether pupils select into/out of schools depending 
on whether Triple Science will be offered or taken off the curriculum in any particular 
year. There are a number of reasons to believe that this type of selection is not a major 
problem. First, there is very little movement of pupils in and out of schools between 
KS3 (which is when pupils start secondary school) and KS4 (which is when they take 
their GCSEs) – fewer than 5% of pupils do so, and the proportion is very similar for 
schools that change their science curriculum and those that do not; in fact, the 
proportion is slightly lower for schools that drop/take on Triple Science (around 4% for 
both types of school).  Re-running the analysis on the subset of pupils who remain in the 
same school between KS3 and KS4 does not alter the conclusions reached in this 
chapter22. Most importantly, although pupils might move in and out of schools in search 
of a better school (or one with a better reputation), it is very unlikely that pupils select 
into and out of schools on the basis of whether or not they offer Triple Science - 
particularly at the time when the pupils in this dataset were observed, when information 
about whether or not the school offered Triple Science was not included in the School 
Profile (which provides information to parents about the school). In addition, the time 
period under observation predates the big drive by Government and stakeholders to get 
Triple Science on the curriculum, so much of the current publicity around Triple 
Science and its supposed benefits did not exist. 
The most fundamental challenge to the identification strategy proposed is whether the 
decision to start or stop offering Triple science at the school level is random or not and, 
in particular, whether the unobserved factors which lead to a change in the science 
curriculum on offer might, in turn, be correlated with the outcomes of interest. Any such 
time-variant unobserved heterogeneity at the school level correlated with the outcome 
                                                 
22
 Results are shown in Annex 2D. 
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variables would bias the estimates of the impact of offering Triple Science on later 
subject choice and attainment. By definition, it is not possible to assess how important 
this type of endogeneity is likely to be. Nevertheless, we can try and demonstrate that 
any changes in the Triple Science offer are unrelated to changes in observable 
characteristics at the school level. A lack of relationship between such observable 
changes and a switch in the Triple Science offer would provide some evidence that there 
are no major changes occurring at the school level which would be driving the results.  
Table 2-9 explores some observable changes at the school level which might have been 
correlated with changes in the science curriculum on offer. One possible reason for 
dropping Triple Science might be staff turnover.  However, the data suggest that the 
number of qualified teachers in schools that dropped Triple Science increased (from 
63.3 to 64.0 full-time equivalents) rather than decreased between the two years covered 
by the dataset. Unfortunately, there is no way of verifying the subject specialism of 
those teachers, so it still possible that science teachers left the school and were 
substituted by non-science teachers (or, indeed, that a good science teacher was replaced 
by a bad one). 
Another possibility is that those schools that dropped Triple Science from their 
curriculum did so because they had been experiencing drops in the average ability of 
their students over time. However, as Table 2-9 shows, even though schools that 
dropped Triple Science saw a drop in attainment in KS2 Mathematics and Science, the 
same was true for schools that took on Triple Science in that year. And, even though 
schools that dropped Triple Science from their curriculum also saw a slight fall in  KS3 
English attainment between cohorts, it is hard to see why that would affect the science 
curriculum on offer (particularly since KS3 Science and Mathematics scores were 
higher for the second cohort than for the first).  
Table 2-9 also shows that there was no drop in the average number of pupils who had 
achieved Level 6 on their KS3 Science tests in those schools that dropped Triple 
Science from their curriculum: the number went from 50 in the cohort that was offered 
Triple Science to 59 in the cohort that was not. This increase is comparable to the one 
that happened in schools which went from not offering Triple Science to offering it: 51 
to 63 pupils. 
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Table 2-9: Observable Changes at the School Level 
    SCHOOL TREATMENT CATEGORY 
  Cohort 00 01 10 11 
Year Group Size 1985 172 176 183 189 
  1986 177 183 187 195 
# of FTE Qualified Teachers 1985 57.7 60.9 63.3 65.7 
  1986 58.3 61.3 64.0 66.5 
Average KS2 English Score 1985 4.15 4.23 4.23 4.43 
  1986 4.19 4.28 4.25 4.45 
Average KS2 Mathematics Score 1985 4.15 4.22 4.24 4.47 
  1986 4.09 4.19 4.16 4.44 
Average KS2 Science Score 1985 4.27 4.34 4.33 4.52 
  1986 4.24 4.33 4.30 4.50 
Average KS3 English Score 1985 5.24 5.38 5.37 5.69 
  1986 5.27 5.44 5.35 5.78 
Average KS3 Mathematics Score 1985 5.52 5.65 5.64 6.14 
  1986 5.56 5.74 5.67 6.18 
Average KS3 Science Score 1985 5.18 5.27 5.27 5.71 
  1986 5.36 5.50 5.42 5.86 
# of Pupils Who Achieved Level 6 in KS3 Science 1985 46 51 50 79 
  1986 54 63 59 90 
# of Schools in Category   2149 192 145 610 
 
Notes: This table shows key school and cohort level characteristics, by cohort as well as by school 
treatment category. “00” indicates schools that never offered Triple Science; “01” indicates schools that 
did not offer it in the first year, but did in the second; “10” indicates schools that initially offered Triple 
Science, and then dropped it from the curriculum; and “11” schools are those that offered Triple Science 
to both cohorts. The bottom line of the table shows the number of schools in each treatment category. 
 
Finally, Table 2-9 shows how changes in absolute cohort size are not driving the 
decision to drop or offer Triple Science either. In all school types, including those that 
stopped and those that started offering Triple Science, the cohort size increased from 
one year to the next.  
The Department for Education also kindly provided me with information on whether the 
schools in the dataset offered Triple Science in the two years following the ones 
observed. Analysis of this information suggests that, for the majority of switching 
schools identified in the dataset, the switch appears to be a permanent one. Of the 
schools that start offering Triple Science in the dataset, 52% continue to offer it in the 
next two years. Similarly, of the schools that stop offering Triple Science in the dataset, 
79% do not offer it in the next two years. This suggests that, for most schools, the 
switch does not depend on the particular characteristics of the current cohort of students.  
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Although the analysis above suggests that the endogeneity of the decision to start/stop 
offering Triple Science may not necessarily be a problem, Table 2-9 does highlight one 
limitation: mover schools are different from non-mover schools and these differences 
are nearly always statistically significant. This matters because, in a model with school 
fixed effects, the identification of the Triple Science effect will come from mover 
schools only, and so this raises an issue about the external validity of the results 
obtained in this chapter. In defence, it is worth pointing out that mover schools are more 
“average” than non-mover schools, both in terms of size and average test scores. So the 
results found in this chapter are not based on some outliers and could still apply to the 
average school in England. Second, there are a relatively large number of mover schools 
(337 or 11% - i.e. just over one in ten schools switch between the two years observed in 
the dataset): so the results obtained apply to a large subset of schools. Finally (and as 
documented in section 2.4 below), the positive effects of offering Triple Science are 
also found in models without school fixed effects – suggesting that the results do not 
apply to mover schools only. 
2.4. Results 
The basic results of the analysis are in Table 2-10, which presents the effect of attending 
a school that offers Triple Science on the outcomes of interest using variants of the 
LPM model specified in equation (2i). Only the coefficients on the “Triple Science” 
variable are shown (i.e. whether or not the student attended a school that offered Triple 
Science). Table 2-11 then translates these coefficients into percentage changes from the 
baseline probability for young people who were not offered Triple Science. Only a 
selection of specifications from Table 2-10 has been included in Table 2-11. 
Column (i) in these tables presents the “raw” effect of attending a school that offers 
Triple Science and corresponds to the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2-5.  
These raw effects of attending a Triple Science school are very large if compared to the 
baseline for young people who did not attend such schools. For example, it increases the 
likelihood that someone will: attain two A Level passes by 40.5%; take A Level Physics 
by 20.8%; attain a grade A in A Level Physics by 39.4%; be in higher education at 19 
by 40.5%; and study Physical Sciences in higher education by 15.2%. 
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Table 2-10: Effect of Being Offered Triple Science – Main Results 
 
    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Two A Level Passes Triple Science 0.120 0.0801 0.0235 0.0168 0.00694 0.00419 0.00180 
(s.e.) (0.00678)*** (0.00511)*** (0.00241)*** (0.00233)*** (0.00214)*** (0.00212)** (0.00260) 
Took A Level Biology (1) Triple Science 0.0209 0.0202 -0.00176 -0.00290 -0.00414 -0.00449 0.00536 
(s.e.) (0.00327)*** (0.00317)*** (0.00257) (0.00260) (0.00263) (0.00264)* (0.00393) 
Took A Level Chemistry (1) Triple Science 0.0249 0.0244 0.00153 0.00118 -0.000309 -0.000156 0.00849 
(s.e.) (0.00307)*** (0.00289)*** (0.00206) (0.00205) (0.00207) (0.00209) (0.00331)** 
Took A Level Physics (1) Triple Science 0.0297 0.0222 0.00522 0.00548 0.00540 0.00538 0.00452 
(s.e.) (0.00272)*** (0.00222)*** (0.00167)*** (0.00165)*** (0.00163)*** (0.00165)*** (0.00267)* 
Took A Level Mathematics (1) Triple Science 0.0409 0.0333 -0.00116 0.000602 0.00367 0.00367 0.0100 
(s.e.) (0.00400)*** (0.00341)*** (0.00234) (0.00229) (0.00225) (0.00225) (0.00348)*** 
Grade A in A Level Biology (2) Triple Science 0.0698 0.0660 0.0112 0.0103 0.00999 0.0112 0.00654 
(s.e.) (0.00762)*** (0.00720)*** (0.00501)** (0.00488)** (0.00475)** (0.00482)** (0.0101) 
Grade A in A Level Chemistry (2) Triple Science 0.0888 0.0799 0.0236 0.0224 0.0191 0.0202 0.0130 
(s.e.) (0.00925)*** (0.00876)*** (0.00647)*** (0.00624)*** (0.00611)*** (0.00616)*** (0.0127) 
Grade A in A Level Physics (2) Triple Science 0.0839 0.0770 0.0133 0.0119 0.0105 0.0115 0.0319 
(s.e.) (0.00908)*** (0.00881)*** (0.00591)** (0.00597)** (0.00585)* (0.00584)** (0.0143)** 
Grade A in A Level Mathematics (2) Triple Science 0.0737 0.0670 0.00536 0.00157 -0.000138 0.000406 -0.00177 
(s.e.) (0.00858)*** (0.00813)*** (0.00554) (0.00555) (0.00569) (0.00571) (0.0115) 
In HE at 19 Triple Science 0.102 0.0722 0.0245 0.0174 0.00439 0.00306 0.00373 
(s.e.) (0.00620)*** (0.00476)*** (0.00239)*** (0.00223)*** (0.00188)** (0.00188) (0.00229) 
In a Russell Group Institution at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.0689 0.0567 0.0183 0.0111 0.00123 0.00140 0.00413 
(s.e.) (0.00595)*** (0.00554)*** (0.00359)*** (0.00333)*** (0.00320) (0.00318) (0.00448) 
STEM in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00842 0.00258 -0.00887 -0.00386 -0.0000477 0.000764 0.00720 
(s.e.) (0.00291)*** (0.00281) (0.00279)*** (0.00274) (0.00272) (0.00273) (0.00548) 
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    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Biological Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science -0.000259 -0.00127 -0.00316 -0.00200 -0.0000879 0.0000464 -0.00173 
(s.e.) (0.00141) (0.00138) (0.00140)** (0.00143) (0.00146) (0.00146) (0.00343) 
Medicine, Dentistry and Veterinary Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00828 0.00802 0.00247 0.00121 -0.000788 -0.000522 -0.000421 
(s.e.) (0.00121)*** (0.00117)*** (0.000933)*** (0.000897) (0.000900) (0.000902) (0.00158) 
Physical Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00633 0.00271 -0.00167 -0.000704 0.000318 0.000395 0.00160 
(s.e.) (0.00110)*** (0.000997)*** (0.000987)* (0.000982) (0.000979) (0.000988) (0.00232) 
Engineering and Technology in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00447 0.000914 -0.000995 -0.000187 0.000385 0.000594 0.00298 
(s.e.) (0.00119)*** (0.000941) (0.000925) (0.000910) (0.000914) (0.000914) (0.00210) 
Mathematics and Computer Science in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science -0.00435 -0.00455 -0.00500 -0.00149 0.000680 0.000723 -0.000457 
  (s.e.) (0.00135)*** (0.00120)*** (0.00121)*** (0.00112) (0.00113) (0.00113) (0.00291) 
 
Notes: Each cell reports the coefficient on the variable “Triple Science” (a dummy indicating whether the individual was offered Triple Science or not) from a different regression 
based on model (2i) discussed in the main body of the chapter. Each row is for a different outcome variable, and more explanatory variables are introduced as we move from left to 
right in the table. Specifically: Model (i) includes an indicator for being offered Triple Science only. Model (ii) adds a cohort indicator and individual socio-demographic 
information. Model (iii) adds individual attainment variables. Year group socio-economic information and attainment are added in Models (iv) and (v), respectively. Model (vi) 
further includes information about school resources and, finally, Model (vii) adds school fixed effects. 
* p<0.10  **<0.05  ***<0.01       
(1)  Conditional on having been entered for A Level or equivalent qualifications; (2) Conditional on having been entered for examination in the subject; (3) Conditional on being in 
HE at 19.  
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Table 2-11: Effects of Being Offered Triple Science – Percentage Increase on 
Baseline  
  
Increased Likelihood According to 
Specification: 
  (i) (iii) (xi) (xii) 
Two A Level Passes 40.5% 7.9% 1.4% 
Took A Level Biology 14.2% 
Took A Level Chemistry 24.5% 8.3% 
Took A Level Physics 20.8% 3.7% 3.8% 
Took A Level Mathematics 54.7% 13.4% 
Took A Level Biology 40.0% 6.4% 6.4% 
Grade A in A Level Chemistry 40.0% 10.6% 9.1% 
Grade A in A Level Physics 39.4% 6.3% 5.4% 15.0% 
Grade A in A Level Mathematics 23.6% 
In HE at 19 40.5% 9.7% 
In a Russell Group Institution at 19 37.3% 9.9% 
STEM in HE at 19 2.2% -2.3% 
Biological Sciences in HE at 19 -3.3% 
Medicine, Dentistry and Veterinary Sciences in HE at 19 32.4% 9.7% 
Physical Sciences in HE at 19 15.2% 
Engineering and Technology in HE at 19 11.3% 
Mathematics and Computer Science in HE at 19 -7.0% -8.0%     
 
Notes: Table shows the percentage increase in the likelihood of achieving each outcome for young people 
who have been offered Triple Science. The baseline probabilities used for these calculations are the ones 
reported in Column (viii) of Table 2-5. Each numbered column in the table above corresponds to the 
effect estimated in the corresponding specification in Table 2-10. Only the effects for specifications (i), 
(iii), (vi) and (vii) are reported. For example, looking at the first row in specification (vi): individuals who 
were offered Triple Science were 1.4% more likely to achieve two A Level passes compared to 
individuals who were not offered Triple Science. Blanks signify that the coefficient of the "Triple 
Science" dummy was insignificant at the 5% level. 
 
In subsequent columns, additional controls are added. Column (ii) adds an indicator for 
which cohort the individual belonged to (υt in equation (2i)) as well as controls for 
individual socio-demographic characteristics (PDi); column (iii) adds individual prior 
attainment variables (PAi); column (iv) adds socio-demographic characteristics of the 
individual’s year group (CDgst); column (v) adds the average attainment of the year 
group (CAgst); column (vi) adds some information on school resources (SRst); and, 
finally, column (vii) adds school fixed effects (σs). 
As column (iii) shows, the addition of controls for individual prior attainment 
considerably reduces the effect of attending a school that offers Triple Science. Taking 
the same examples as above, the effect on the likelihood of attaining two A Level passes 
is reduced from a “raw” 40.5% to 7.9%; the effect on the likelihood of taking A Level 
Physics is reduced to 3.7%; the effect on the likelihood of achieving a grade A in A 
Level Physics is reduced to 6.3%; and the effect on the likelihood of being in higher 
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education at 19 is reduced to 9.1%. The effect on the likelihood of studying Physical 
Science in higher education is now negative and no longer statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  
The inclusion of cohort and school characteristics (specification (vi)) further reduces the 
effect of having attended a school that offered Triple Science. None of the effects on 
higher education outcomes are now any longer statistically significant, and there have 
been further reductions in the effects on A Level outcomes. Individuals who attended 
schools that offered Triple Science are: 1.4% more likely to achieve two A Level 
passes; 3.8% more likely to choose A Level Physics; 6.4% more likely to choose A 
Level Biology; 9.1% more likely to achieve a grade A in A Level Chemistry and 5.4% 
more likely to achieve a grade A in A Level Physics. 
Specification (vii) adds in school fixed effects. Whereas in previous columns the effect 
of offering Triple Science was identified using variation across all schools, in 
specification (viii) we rely on variation within schools. This changes the results 
somewhat – suggesting that controlling for unobserved school characteristics is 
important. According to this (preferred) model, offering Triple Science to pupils 
increases their likelihood of: taking A Level Chemistry by 8.3%; taking A Level 
Mathematics by 13.4%; and achieving a grade A in A Level Physics by 15.0%23. 
2.5. Heterogeneous Effects 
This section explores whether the effect of offering Triple Science varies depending on 
the characteristics of the pupils it is offered to. Differential effects are shown for: (a) 
pupils who were in schools that dropped Triple Science as opposed to those who were 
in schools that took on Triple Science; (b) pupils who had and did not have high prior 
attainment in science; (c) males v. females; (d) more versus less deprived pupils; and (e) 
young people who attended schools with sixth forms, and those who did not. The results 
of this analysis are summarised in Table 2-12. 
  
                                                 
23
 As a falsification exercise, I estimated the effect of offering Triple Science on English at A Level. The 
full analysis is presented in Annex 2E. In brief, I find no positive effect of offering Triple Science on the 
likelihood of taking up English at A Level – which is what one would expect. 
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Table 2-12: Heterogeneity in the Effects of Being Offered Triple Science 
 
    
  (i) (ii)   (iii) (iv)   (v) (vi)   (vii) (viii)   (ix) (x) 
Treatment Type Level 6 in KS3 Science Gender Deprivation Schools with Sixth Form 
    Take on TS Drop TS No Yes Male Female 50% Most 50% Least No Yes 
Two A Level Passes Triple Science 0.00256 0.000404 0.00259 -0.000436 0.000446 0.00341 0.00189 0,00248 0.00356 0.000731 
(s.e.) (0.00368) (0.00445) (0.00275) (0.00483) (0.00330) (0.00370) (0.00314) (0.00384) (0.00420) (0.00330) 
Took A Level Biology (1) Triple Science 0.0101 0.00292 0.00354 0.00850 0.0150 -0.00155 0.00396 0,00626 0.00401 0.00482 
(s.e.) (0.00553)* (0.00639) (0.00379) (0.00576) (0.00651)** (0.00493) (0.00608) (0.00483) (0.00676) (0.00476) 
Took A Level Chemistry (1) Triple Science 0.0102 0.00462 0.00363 0.00953 0.0128 0.00445 0.0130 0,00633 0.00976 0.00743 
(s.e.) (0.00431)** (0.00571) (0.00308) (0.00493)* (0.00520)** (0.00393) (0.00526)** (0.00409) (0.00681) (0.00379)** 
Took A Level Physics (1) Triple Science -0.000435 0.00687 0.00449 0.00310 0.00698 0.000163 0.00624 0,00458 0.000225 0.00576 
(s.e.) (0.00340) (0.00500) (0.00193)** (0.00410) (0.00549) (0.00221) (0.00368)* (0.00337) (0.00447) (0.00329)* 
Took A Level Mathematics (1) Triple Science 0.00866 0.0117 0.000934 0.0131 0.0173 0.00202 0.00974 0,0107 0.0104 0.0103 
(s.e.) (0.00508)* (0.00521)** (0.00313) (0.00508)*** (0.00549)*** (0.00417) (0.00501)* (0.00451)** (0.00672) (0.00401)** 
Grade A in A Level Biology (2) Triple Science -0.00573 0.0227 0.0234 0.0000977 0.0309 -0.0107 0.0131 0,000093 0.0391 -0.00167 
(s.e.) (0.0153) (0.0152) (0.0205) (0.0109) (0.0163)* (0.0140) (0.0160) (0.0128) (0.0182)** (0.0120) 
Grade A in A Level Chemistry (2) Triple Science -0.00586 0.0328 0.0211 0.00439 0.0396 -0.0192 0.0375 -0,0103 0.0488 0.00134 
(s.e.) (0.0173) (0.0226) (0.0348) (0.0134) (0.0199)** (0.0182) (0.0227)* (0.0157) (0.0252)* (0.0149) 
Grade A in A Level Physics (2) Triple Science 0.0182 0.0645 0.129 0.0173 0.0264 0.0688 0.0466 0,0281 0.000245 0.0377 
(s.e.) (0.0192) (0.0232)*** (0.0502)** (0.0146) (0.0151)* (0.0419) (0.0283)* (0.0176) (0.0290) (0.0163)** 
Grade A in A Level Mathematics (2) Triple Science -0.00307 0.00141 -0.0327 -0.00423 -0.00720 0.00103 0.00869 -0,00881 -0.00136 -0.00267 
(s.e.) (0.0160) (0.0186) (0.0354) (0.0126) (0.0158) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0146) (0.0206) (0.0139) 
In HE at 19 Triple Science 0.00390 0.00475 0.00305 0.00574 0.00456 0.00304 0.00481 0,00353 0.00405 0.00316 
(s.e.) (0.00322) (0.00414) (0.00242) (0.00480) (0.00304) (0.00326) (0.00281)* (0.00356) (0.00332) (0.00304) 
In a Russell Group Institution at 19 (3) Triple Science -0.0000133 0.0113 -0.00281 0.00806 0.00508 0.00286 0.0118 0.000945 0.0156 -0.000753 
(s.e.) (0.00606) (0.00745) (0.00489) (0.00646) (0.00649) (0.00601) (0.00634)* (0.00573) (0.00761)** (0.00538) 
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  (i) (ii)   (iii) (iv)   (v) (vi)   (vii) (viii)   (ix) (x) 
Treatment Type Level 6 in KS3 Science Gender Deprivation Schools with Sixth Form 
    Take on TS Drop TS No Yes Male Female 50% Most 50% Least No Yes 
STEM in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00799 0.00322 0.0106 0.00521 0.0171 -0.00125 0.0139 0.00515 -0.00488 0.0110 
(s.e.) (0.00764) (0.00908) (0.00853) (0.00701) (0.00920)* (0.00705) (0.00966) (0.00662) (0.0112) (0.00625)* 
Biological Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science -0.000299 -0.00110 -0.00144 -0.00153 0.00777 -0.00894 0.00131 -0.00292 -0.00239 -0.00179 
(s.e.) (0.00497) (0.00576) (0.00505) (0.00448) (0.00482) (0.00497)* (0.00520) (0.00436) (0.00602) (0.00425) 
Medicine, Dentistry and Veterinary Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science -0.00208 0.00281 0.0000207 -0.00128 0.00156 -0.00190 -0.00127 -0.0000883 0.00130 -0.00163 
(s.e.) (0.00214) (0.00287) (0.00197) (0.00234) (0.00229) (0.00241) (0.00259) (0.00208) (0.00258) (0.00195) 
Physical Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00277 0.00121 0.00333 -0.000659 0.000946 0.00178 0.00477 -0.000172 -0.0000220 0.00225 
(s.e.) (0.00333) (0.00375) (0.00237) (0.00336) (0.00413) (0.00261) (0.00337) (0.00296) (0.00449) (0.00270) 
Engineering and Technology in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00469 -0.00219 0.00584 0.000997 0.00572 0.000334 0.00727 0.000584 -0.00113 0.00452 
(s.e.) (0.00287) (0.00373) (0.00315)* (0.00283) (0.00448) (0.00122) (0.00335)** (0.00266) (0.00406) (0.00248)* 
Mathematics and Computer Science in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science -0.00254 0.000833 0.000987 -0.000709 0.00000705 -0.000661 -0.00231 0.000678 -0.00553 0.00153 
  (s.e.)   (0.00405) (0.00473)   (0.00423) (0.00349)   (0.00602) (0.00212)   (0.00466) (0.00343)   (0.00533) (0.00341) 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the “Triple Science” variable for variants of specification (vii) in Table 2-10 where the sample has been restricted to: (i) young people in schools 
that never offer Triple Science and schools that take on Triple Science; (ii) young people in schools that always offer Triple Science and schools that drop it; (iii) young people who 
did not achieve Level 6 in their KS3 Science exams; and (iv) young people who did; (v) males; (vi) females; (vii) the 50% most deprived pupils; and (viii) the 50% least deprived; 
(ix) young people in schools that do not have their own sixth form; and (x) young people who are in schools that do.  
* p<0.10  **<0.05  ***<0.01      
 (1)  Conditional on having been entered for A Level or equivalent qualifications; (2) Conditional on having been entered for examination in the subject; (3) Conditional on being in 
HE at 19. 
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Columns (i) and (ii) compare the effect of dropping Triple Science as opposed to taking 
it on. So far, it has been assumed that the effect of Triple Science is symmetrical – i.e. 
that it is the same in schools that drop it as in schools that take it on. However, there are 
reasons to believe that this may not be so. It may be the case that setting up a Triple 
Science programme is a costly investment and that it takes a while before it is up and 
running properly. As a result, effects may only be discernible once the programme has 
been running for a number of years. By contrast, one might expect the effect of taking 
Triple Science off the curriculum to be more sudden and marked. Column (i) shows the 
coefficient on the Triple Science variable in a regression run on the subsample of 
schools that either never offered Triple Science, or those that started offering it in the 
second year of the dataset. So this column explores the effect of taking on Triple 
Science. Column (ii), on the other hand, does the same on the subsample of schools that 
always offered Triple Science and those that initially offered it, but then dropped it. So 
here we look at the effect of discontinuing a Triple Science programme. The results 
provide no evidence for the asymmetry hypothesis. 
In columns (iii) and (iv), we check whether the Triple Science effect varies depending 
on the aptitude for science of the pupils who are offered it. As mentioned in the 
introduction to this chapter, the Department for Education’s policy applies mainly to 
those young people who achieved Level 6 (or higher) on their KS3 Science test. So far, 
the analysis presented has covered all young people (regardless of their KS3 Science 
attainment). The analysis is therefore rerun separately for young people who achieved 
Level 6 or higher on their KS3 science test, and those who did not. Of the 1985 (1986) 
cohort, 30% (34%) achieved Level 6 or higher in their KS3 Science test and, of these, 
34% (35%) attended schools that offered Triple Science. The results suggest that there 
are positive effects of offering Triple Science for pupils who did not achieve Level 6, as 
well as for pupils who did achieve Level 6. This indicates that it might be useful to 
encourage take-up of Triple Science even in lower attaining schools.  
Columns (v) and (vi) explore whether there are any gender differences in the effect of 
offering Triple Science. The results are striking and suggest that the effect of Triple 
Science is restricted to males only. This is because, if on offer, males are considerably 
more likely to take up Triple Science than females: in 1985 (1986), 5.0% (5.3%) of 
males took Triple Science, compared to 3.5% (3.9%) of women. These findings suggest 
that policy-makers concerned about raising the proportion of females taking science in 
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higher education should think about other ways of making science more attractive and 
interesting to women.  
Columns (vii) and (viii) explore whether more deprived pupils stand to gain more from 
being offered Triple Science than less deprived pupils. Again, this is an important 
policy question, because there is now ample evidence to demonstrate that there is a 
labour market premium for holding a science degree24.  To answer this question, the 
sample is split in two: the 50% most deprived pupils (as defined by the Income 
Deprivation Affecting Children Index (IDACI25)) and the 50% least deprived pupils. 
The regressions are then rerun on the two samples separately. As in the case of gender, 
the results are remarkable: most of the effects of Triple Science are found for the 50% 
most deprived pupils. Deprived pupils who were offered Triple Science were 13.7% 
more likely to choose Chemistry at A Level and 19.6% more likely to take Engineering 
and Technology in higher education. In addition, pupils from more deprived 
backgrounds who were offered Triple Science were more likely to: take A Levels in 
Physics and Mathematics; achieve a grade A in A Level Mathematics and Chemistry; be 
in higher education at 19; and be in a Russell Group institution at 19 – although all of 
these latter effects are only significant at the 10% confidence level. These results are 
strongly supportive of the drive to make Triple Science available to all those pupils who 
could benefit, but are currently not offered it.  
Finally, columns (ix) and (x) explore whether or not the effects found are restricted to 
schools that have their own sixth form. In those schools, the Triple Science effect might 
be caused simply by teachers and headmasters having an incentive to get pupils to 
progress to (science) A Levels and do well in them, in which case the Triple Science 
effect would in fact be a sixth form effect. In the dataset, out of 192 schools that took on 
Triple Science, 73 did not have their own sixth form. Similarly, out of 145 schools that 
dropped Triple Science, 55 did not have their own sixth form. The results in columns 
(ix) and (x) of Table 2-12 suggest that the effect of Triple Science can be detected in 
both types of schools. 
  
                                                 
24
 See, for example, O’Leary and Sloane (2005), PWC (2005) and Chevalier (2009). 
25
 IDACI measures the proportion of children under the age of 16 in an area living in low income 
households. It is a supplementary index to the Indices of Multiple Deprivation and is given at super 
output area level. Further information is available from http://www.communities.gov.uk/. 
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2.6. Conclusion 
This chapter offered an attempt at evaluating an English Government policy which aims 
to increase the number of pupils taking A Levels in Physics and Chemistry, their 
attainment in those subjects and, ultimately, the number of young people studying 
science in higher education. The policy consists in offering pupils a more intensive 
option of studying science when they are aged 15 (Triple Science), in the hope that this 
will better prepare them for the study of science at a higher level. I argued that one can 
make use of the fact that some schools changed the intensity of their science offer to 
study the causal effect of offering Triple Science on pupil subject choice and attainment 
by exploring within-school variation.  
The results indicate that pupils who are offered Triple Science are 8.3% more likely to 
take A Level Chemistry; 13.4% more likely to take A Level Mathematics; and 15.0% 
more likely to achieve a grade A in A Level Physics. In addition, it was found that the 
effects of Triple Science are restricted to males only and that pupils from more deprived 
backgrounds appear to benefit most. In particular, more deprived pupils who were 
offered Triple Science were 13.7% more likely to choose Chemistry at A Level and 
19.6% more likely to take Engineering and Technology in higher education.  
These effects appear very large. However, these are increases on a very small baseline. 
For example, the proportion of pupils taking A Level Mathematics was only 5.4% (or 
around 30,000 pupils) a year. So, if Triple Science were made available to all pupils 
achieving Level 6 at KS3 Science (i.e. an additional 145,000 students in the first cohort 
in the dataset and an additional 174,000 in the second cohort – over and above the 
18,000 (19,000) who already received it in the first (second) cohort), then this would 
lead to an estimated increase in the number of young people with an A Level in 
Mathematics of around 2,150 in the first cohort of the dataset, and around 2,500 in the 
second cohort of the dataset. These represent increases in the number of young people 
with A Level Mathematics of 7.2% and 8.4%, respectively. 
Given these small numbers, it is perhaps not surprising that very few statistically 
significant effects of offering Triple Science on subject choice in higher education were 
found. In addition, there are a number of potential benefits of Triple Science this chapter 
was not able to explore. For example, even if offering Triple Science does not have a 
vast impact on subject choice in higher education, it may still produce scientists of a 
higher “quality” – which could be reflected, for instance, in the proportion of graduates 
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who achieve a 1st class degree, or the proportion of students taking more difficult 
optional modules. Only further data-linking to trace these students through to 
graduation (and possibly into the labour market) could bring an answer to these 
questions.  
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3. University Selectivity and Earnings: Evidence from UK Data 
on Applications and Admissions to University 
3.1. Introduction 
All around the world, students compete to gain admission to the best universities. 
Although the reasons are likely to be complex and multifaceted, the expectation of 
higher earnings in the labour market is at least one important motivating factor. Despite 
a substantial and growing body of research, however, it is still unclear to what extent a 
causal relationship exists between attending a more selective institution and earning a 
wage premium in the labour market. The complicating factor is that selection into 
universities is non-random and students with higher earning potential tend to attend 
better institutions.  
Non-random selection into universities can be based on observable characteristics (e.g. 
prior attainment, gender, ethnicity, etc...) and a large number of papers26 have credibly 
controlled for such selection, sometimes using matching methods. Almost without 
exception, this research has found a positive relationship between university 
selectivity/“quality”27 and earnings.  
In addition, non-random selection may be based on unobservable characteristics, like 
motivation, networks, etc... which may themselves be correlated with higher earnings. 
Failure to adequately control for such selection would bias upwards estimates of the 
impact of university selectivity on wages.  
A number of techniques have been employed in the literature to deal with the problem 
of selection on unobservable characteristics, including: twin studies (Behrman et al, 
1996a), sibling fixed effects (Lindahl and Regner, 2005), instrumental variables 
                                                 
26
 Some recent examples include: Datcher, Loury and Garman (1995), Monk (2000), Black and Smith 
(2004), Black and Smith (2006) for the US; Naylor et al (2000), Chevalier and Conlon (2003), Hussain et 
al (2009) and Chevalier (2010) for the UK. 
27
 This chapter looks at institutional selectivity rather than “quality” because the latter is considered to be 
a complex and multidimensional concept, and hence difficult to measure. The measures of institutional 
“quality” traditionally used in the literature (and advocated by Black and Smith, 2006) are identical (or 
similar to) the kind of indices used in university league table publications – and there is a vast literature 
criticising these as indicators of university quality (Provan and Abercromby, 2000; Clarke, 2002; Eccles, 
2002; Yorke and Longden, 2005; Turner, 2005; Dill, 2006; Birnbaum, 2007). Using the term university 
“quality” also implicitly suggests that the higher earnings associated with attending better “quality” 
institutions must be attributable to something the institution itself does (e.g. better teaching, or better 
support facilities, etc...) – whereas the true cause of higher earnings may purely be a signalling or network 
effect. A measure of selectivity leaves these possibilities wide open. 
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(Behrman et al, 1996b), selection models (Brewer et al, 1999), within-group estimates 
of students who applied and were accepted to similar colleges (Dale and Krueger, 2002) 
and, more recently, regression discontinuity designs (Hoekstra, 2009; Saavedra 2009; 
Öckert, 2010). Most of these studies have found that estimates that ignore the problem 
of selection on unobservables are biased upwards and some find no evidence of a 
selectivity/“quality” premium at all (Dale and Krueger, 2002; Öckert, 2010; Dale and 
Krueger, 2011) - leaving ambiguity as to the true effect of university selectivity on 
earnings.  
The present chapter adds to this debate by exploiting data on applications and 
admissions to university in the UK. In the UK, all full-time undergraduate students 
apply to university through a centralised applications system (Universities and Colleges 
Admissions Service, or UCAS) and are allowed to express a fixed number28 of 
institution/subject choices on their application form. Once institutions have responded 
to these choices, applicants are asked to confirm only one firm (or preferred) and one 
insurance choice from among the offers they received. Importantly, the offers made by 
institutions are often conditional on the candidate achieving certain grades in their 
school-leaving exams, and the offer which is ultimately taken up by the candidate (firm 
or insurance) is determined by his/her performance in those examinations. Individuals 
who fulfil the conditions set out in their firm offer are under a contractual obligation to 
attend their firm offer institution (they cannot decide to attend their insurance institution 
instead). Similarly, individuals who fail to meet the conditions of their firm offer cannot 
attend that institution and have to attend their insurance institution (provided they meet 
the conditions set by that institution). 
The main identification strategy used in this chapter consists in exploiting within-group 
differences in institution attended by individuals who expressed the same firm and 
insurance university choices, where variation in institution attended is driven by 
whether or not individuals meet the conditions set out in their firm offer. By grouping 
individuals with the same firm and insurance choices one is able to capture important 
information about some of the unobservable characteristics which may have contributed 
to a non-random sorting of individuals across institutions: individuals within the same 
firm/insurance group will have been deemed to meet similar minimum requirements by 
the admission tutors who made them the offer (who may have based their decisions on 
                                                 
28
 This was six until 2007/08, and reduced to five thereafter. 
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information unobservable to the econometrician) and these individuals will also have 
expressed the same institution preferences based on a comparable underlying utility-
maximising function.  
Although controlling for firm/insurance group fixed effects will address much of the 
selection on unobservable student ability and preferences at the application and 
admission stages, it does not address the observable selection that occurs within groups 
based on final grades (“tariff score”29): students who make the conditions of their firm 
offer will typically have higher grades than students who did not. Left unaddressed, this 
would leave an important source of estimation bias, because students with a higher tariff 
score would also be expected to have higher earnings in the labour market. By including 
a function of grades in the regression model, I am also able to address this selection at 
the enrolment stage. 
The strategy used in this chapter is closely related to that employed by Dale and 
Krueger (2002) who compare individuals who applied to, and were accepted by, similar 
colleges in the US. As argued by them, this approach addresses “selection on 
observables and unobservables” since “information on the unobservables can be 
inferred from the outcomes of independent admission decisions by the schools the 
student applied to”. Although Dale and Krueger are able to address selection issues at 
both the application and admission stages, they have to assume that students randomly 
select the school they attend from the ones that accepted them (i.e. that there is no 
further selection at the enrolment stage). As they admit themselves, this assumption is 
unrealistic30 and, importantly, they find that take-up of the most selective offer is non-
random, with the brightest students significantly more likely to attend the most selective 
college to which they were admitted.  
In the approach presented here, selection at the enrolment stage can also be addressed 
because: (i) we observe individuals’ institutional preferences; (ii) the institution 
attended is determined by whether or not the applicant meets the conditions set out in 
their preferred offer; and (iii) we can control for the grades achieved by applicants. One 
                                                 
29
 In the UK, the grades achieved by individuals in their qualifications prior to entering higher education 
are converted into a single score called the UCAS tariff.  This is a system which permits different 
qualifications to be compared and can be used by universities in setting entry requirements and making 
conditional offers to candidates.   
30
 One important reason why this assumption will be unrealistic is that in the US institutions use financial 
aid packages to lure high ability students. In the UK, during the period covered by my dataset, the price of 
higher education for an individual was the same, regardless of which institution he or she would have 
attended. 
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drawback of the methodology used in this chapter, however, is that we have to rely on 
functional form assumptions about how tariff scores enter the equation to identify the 
effect of university selectivity on earnings (although robustness checks suggest that the 
results are not sensitive to such functional form assumptions).  
This chapter brings an original contribution to the literature on returns to university 
selectivity in a number of ways. It is the first paper which attempts to tackle the issue of 
selection on unobservable characteristics in the context of the UK. In doing so, it 
exploits a new, previously unavailable dataset and presents a novel methodology for 
evaluating the impact of selectivity on earnings. In addition, the chapter analyses what 
types of bias are important in estimating the returns to university selectivity, and it looks 
at the impact of attending a more selective institution on range of non-pecuniary career 
satisfaction outcomes.   
The results of the analysis indicate that one standard deviation increase in selectivity of 
the institution attended leads to an increase in earnings of around 7.0% three and a half 
years after qualifying. This is in line with previous findings for the UK. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 formally discusses 
the problem of selection on unobservable characteristics. Section 3.3 provides some 
background information on the institutional setup in the UK and explains how its unique 
features can be exploited to provide a new methodology for analysing the relationship 
between university selectivity and earnings. Section 3.4 describes the data and section 
3.5 presents the results. Section 3.6 concludes and contextualises the findings of the 
chapter by comparing them to those obtained by other authors.  
3.2. The Selection Problem 
Estimating the returns to institutional selectivity is non-trivial because students are 
matched to institutions in a non-random way. Selection may occur: (i) at the application 
stage (students choose to apply to certain universities and not to others); (ii) at the 
admissions stage (admission tutors take decisions to accept some students and not 
others); and (iii) at the enrolment stage (applicants decide on the final institution to 
attend from among the offers they received). 
The non-random selection into universities would not be an issue were it to be based 
entirely on observable characteristics. A problem arises because the selection may be 
based on non-observable characteristics and those characteristics might themselves be 
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correlated with earnings. Consider a student who was admitted to a prestigious 
university because of the strong charisma he/she showed at a selection interview. That 
same character trait may also help that individual obtain a better paid job upon 
graduation. An econometrician comparing this student to another with the same 
observable characteristics (e.g. prior attainment, gender, ethnicity, etc...) who attended a 
different university would wrongly attribute the difference in earnings to the institution 
attended when, in fact, the true cause is the difference in charisma (which is 
unobservable to the econometrician).  
The problem can be described more formally as follows. Assume that the true 
relationship between earnings and institutional selectivity is: 
ln Wi = β0 + β1 SELECTu + β2 xi + β3 zi + εi (3i) 
Where ln Wi represents log wages, SELECTu is a measure of the selectivity of the 
institution attended31, xi and zi are vectors of applicant characteristics, and εi is an 
individual error term. In this equation, the coefficient of interest is β1, which represents 
the return to institutional selectivity. However, if because of data limitations the 
researcher is forced to estimate the following equation (which omits part of the 
applicant characteristics, zi), then the estimates of β1 will be biased and inconsistent if zi 
is also correlated with SELECTu: 
ln Wi = β0 + β1 SELECTu + β2 xi  + εi (3ii) 
As mentioned in the introduction, a range of techniques have been proposed in the 
literature to address the issue of selection on unobservable characteristics – without 
clear conclusion emerging so far on the true relationship between earnings and 
university selectivity.  In the next section, I describe how the peculiarities of the UK 
university system can be exploited to provide a novel approach for looking at this 
problem.  
  
                                                 
31
 In practice, I will define institutional selectivity as the average tariff score of entrants to full-time 
undergraduate courses in the years 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05, respectively. The choice of years 
coincides with the time period during which the undergraduates in the dataset were at university. The 
final measure of institutional selectivity is then arrived at by taking the average of the figures for the three 
years, and standardising it to have mean zero and standard deviation one. 
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3.3. Methodology 
All applicants to full-time undergraduate courses in the UK must apply through a 
centralised application system (UCAS), of which nearly every university is a member. 
Applicants complete a standardised application form and are allowed a fixed number of 
institution/course choices, in no particular order of preference. UCAS then processes 
these applications and sends them on to the relevant institutions. All choices expressed 
by the candidate are confidential during the application process, so universities 
considering an application cannot see any of the candidate's other choices. Institutions 
then proceed to decide whether or not to make the candidate an offer. These offers can 
either be conditional (i.e. dependent on future examination performance) or (more 
rarely) unconditional. In the data used for this analysis (described in section 3.4 below), 
69% of all choices expressed by candidates received a conditional offer, and only 10% 
received an unconditional offer. 18% of applications were rejected by the institution, 
and another 2% were withdrawn by the candidate before the institution took a decision. 
Once applicants have received responses from all the institutions applied to, they must 
reply by accepting up to two choices: one firm acceptance and one insurance 
acceptance. The remainder are declined. The firm acceptance is the candidate’s first 
choice – i.e. their preferred choice out of all of the offers they have received. If 
candidates accept an unconditional offer, then they are agreeing that they will attend the 
course at that university or college, so they have to decline any other offers. If they 
accept a conditional offer, they are agreeing that they will attend the course at that 
university if they meet the conditions of the offer.  
When accepting a conditional offer, candidates can also accept another offer as an 
insurance choice. The insurance choice can be conditional or unconditional and acts as a 
back-up to the firm choice. So if the candidate does not meet the conditions for his/her 
firm choice, but meets the conditions for his/her insurance choice, he/she is committed 
to that course. If candidates get the grades for both their firm and insurance acceptances, 
they cannot choose between them: their insurance choice is automatically declined and 
offered to someone else. So candidates can no longer choose which institution they 
want to attend after they have received their grades.  
This institutional set-up provides an interesting avenue for exploring the effect of 
university selectivity on graduate earnings because, once universities have made their 
admission decisions and individuals have declared their institutional preferences, the 
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university that an applicant ultimately attends will depend exclusively on the grades 
he/she obtains at the end of secondary school – i.e. selection at the enrolment stage can 
be addressed. Moreover, a meaningful comparison can be made between individuals 
who expressed the same firm and insurance offers because they will share a range of 
common characteristics: admission tutors will have deemed them to be of similar 
potential and the fact that these individuals have expressed the same institutional 
preferences suggests overlap in their underlying utility-maximising functions. In fact, 
by pooling individuals with the same firm and insurance offers and exploiting within-
group differences in university attended, we are able to remove a considerable portion 
of the selection on unobservable characteristics which might otherwise bias the 
estimates of institutional selectivity on earnings. The model estimated is then: 
ln Wi = β0 + β1 SELECTu + β2 f(TARIFFi)+ β3 xi + ∑gδgDgi + εi (3iii) 
Where, as before, ln Wi represents log wages, SELECTu is a measure of the selectivity 
of the institution attended, TARIFFi is the tariff score achieved by the individual in 
his/her secondary school examinations, xi is a vector of (observed) characteristics of the 
individual, and εi is an individual error term. Finally, the dummy variables Dgi indicate 
groups of individuals who expressed identical firm and insurance offers. So the model 
exploits variation in selectivity of institution attended within groups of individuals with 
the same firm and insurance offers, where this variation is driven by whether or not 
candidates achieved the grades required by their preferred institution.  
Although conditioning on the firm/insurance groups will tackle selection on 
unobservable characteristics at the application and admission stages to university, it will 
not address the final selection which occurs at the admission stage and which is driven 
exclusively by grades achieved. This is why we include in our model a function of tariff 
score. This inclusion is crucial, and it is what enables us to say something about the 
counterfactual. By definition, individuals who fulfil the conditions set out in their firm 
offer will have higher grades than those who fail to do so. By conditioning on tariff 
score, however, we are able to make inferences about what someone who attended a less 
selective university would have earned had he/she attended a more selective one.  
Because we do not observe the actual offers made by institutions, the above set-up is 
not a regression discontinuity design. It can, however, be thought of as a difference-in-
differences strategy. In essence, we are comparing two individuals with the same 
firm/insurance offers, one enrolling at the first choice university and the other at the 
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insurance choice institution, to two other students with the same tariff score (or score 
difference) who had different offers, but both enrolled at the first choice institution. 
Under the assumption that the selection bias is the same for these two control students, 
this identifies precisely the university selectivity effect.  
Although this setup provides a novel way to explore the effect of university selectivity 
on earnings, it does suffer from a number of caveats. One, already mentioned, is the 
reliance on functional form assumptions to identify the effect of selectivity on earnings. 
To test the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions, a number of functional forms 
are experimented with including: linear, quadratic and cubic – but higher level terms 
(quadratic and cubic) are found to be small in magnitude and never statistically 
significant.  
A second limitation is that individuals apply not just to an institution, but also to a 
particular department/course at that institution. The identification strategy groups and 
compares individuals with identical institutional preferences but, within those groups, 
individuals may still make different course choices. Previous papers have rarely been 
able to address this issue. Although it does not tackle the potential problem of selection 
into subjects based on unobservable characteristics, subject studied is included as a 
right-hand side variable to control for earnings differentials related to course of study.  
A third issue is that the tariff score is not a perfect measure of prior attainment. 
Although some courses simply ask for a generic combination of grades (e.g. an A and 
two B’s) regardless of the subject these are in, many (particularly languages, sciences or 
those with a strong mathematical content) will also require the candidate to achieve a 
certain grade in a specific subject (e.g. an A and two B’s, with a B in mathematics)32. 
Although the dataset contains the overall tariff score achieved by the individual, it does 
not provide information on the subject of qualifications taken, nor on the specific grades 
achieved in them. This creates a potential problem because two candidates might have 
obtained the same point score, but one might have achieved a B in mathematics, 
whereas the other did not. If a condition of acceptance to the course was a B in 
mathematics, then the tariff score on its own would fail to capture the difference 
between the candidate who was accepted onto the course and the candidate who was 
                                                 
32
 To provide the reader with a sense of the types of offers made by universities, Annex 3A contains a 
summary of entry requirements to full-time degree courses at Royal Holloway, University of London, as 
recorded on the UCAS website.  
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rejected. This would be a problem in particular if students with better mathematics skills 
earn more in the labour market regardless of the institution attended (see Dolton and 
Vignoles, 2002). In this case, the inability to control for specific subject grades could 
lead to some upward bias in the in the estimate of returns to selectivity.  
Going in the other direction, however, some downward bias is likely to be introduced 
into the estimates by the fact that most undergraduates who go on to do doctoral studies 
will be excluded from the analysis33. Recent research (Sutton Trust, 2010) has shown 
that students from leading research universities make up the majority of PhD students 
and that postgraduates completing a PhD earn on average 23% more than a university 
graduate.   
There are two further sources of potential bias:  
(1) We do not observe the actual offer made by the institution and, in particular, 
whether individuals applying for the same course at the same university receive 
different offers or not. This would be a problem because the identification 
strategy relies on the variation in institution attended to be driven by differences 
in tariff scores, and not by differences in offers received. Take two 
observationally identical individuals, where one is more motivated than the 
other, and where this higher motivation also leads to higher wages in the labour 
market. If the more motivated individual receives a lower offer from the 
institution and is accepted, whereas the second individual (with identical tariff 
score but with a more difficult offer) is not, then the estimate of the effect of 
attending that institution will be biased upwards. Note, however, that this would 
not present a threat to the identification strategy if offer-making behaviour were 
similar across institutions and, in particular, across institutions of different 
selectivity. In addition, institutions publish detailed information about the 
typical grades required for particular courses. Although this is no guarantee that 
the offers themselves do not vary by candidate, it does at least suggest the 
existence of a minimum threshold for each course/institution which will limit 
the extent of gaming by institutions. 
                                                 
33
 A handful of students may have completed a PhD in between the time of graduation (2004/05) and the 
time of the survey (2008/09). However, these students would have had to go straight on to doctoral 
studies and have completed within three years. It was not possible to check the exact number of students 
in this situation as the only information we have is whether they have completed a “higher degree by 
research” which does not necessarily have to be a PhD. There are 25 such students in the main sample 
used. 
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(2) A second potential source of remaining bias is that individuals who fulfil the 
conditions set out in their firm offer are somehow different from those that do 
not: they may be more motivated or better at performing under exam pressure – 
and these unobservable characteristics may themselves be correlated with 
earnings. Because candidates self-select into institutions and admission tutors 
base decisions on detailed information including personal statements, references 
and (in some cases) interviews, there is some reason to believe that differences 
between candidates who actually received an offer will be marginal34.  
Given the data available, it is not possible to test for the extent and/or seriousness of the 
remaining sources of potential bias mentioned above. However, if such bias were 
important, then, conditional on tariff scores, we would expect some students to be more 
likely than others to enrol at their preferred institution. To test for this, the likelihood of 
enrolment in the preferred university is regressed on a range of observable 
characteristics, including tariff score. The full results are presented in Table 3B-1 in the 
annexes, and they are reassuring. The only strong and highly significant predictor of 
whether or not individuals end up attending their firm offer institution is the tariff score 
– which is exactly what we would expect/want. Two other indicators (out of a total of 
50) are marginally significant: older people appear to be marginally less likely to have 
to take on their insurance offer. Similarly, individuals who attended a further education 
college in the two years prior to entering higher education were slightly more likely to 
enrol in their preferred institutions. In a similar but separate OLS regression (second 
column of Table 3B-1) I regress earnings on observable characteristics (including 
institutional selectivity) and do not find any evidence that those who attended further 
education colleges earn more - which suggests this type of selection is not a major 
source of bias. Older people, however, do have slightly higher wages. Re-running the 
analysis on young graduates only does not significantly alter the results obtained in this 
                                                 
34
 A variation of this problem is related to the fact that offers are more often than not based on predicted 
rather than actual grades. Research by UCAS (BIS, 2011) has found that the reliability of predicted 
grades is around 50%, with 41.7% of all predictions being over-predicted by at least one grade. In 
addition, the UCAS analysis suggests that over-prediction is more likely for those from lower socio-
economic classes. If, as a result, these applicants are less likely to make the conditions set out in their 
offer, and they have unobservable characteristics which mean they are likely to earn less in the labour 
market, than the effect of selectivity on earnings would be over-estimated. Elsewhere, however, I find that 
those from lower socio-economic classes are no more likely to attend their insurance institution than those 
from higher socio-economic classes. This suggests that the fact that offers are based on predicted rather 
than actual grades is not likely to lead to considerable bias in the results. 
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chapter. Although the evidence presented here is certainly not proof that no selection 
bias remains in the model, the findings are at least encouraging.  
3.4. Data 
The dataset used in this chapter consists of 3,537 full-time undergraduates in the UK 
who left university in 2004/05 and whose earnings were measured in 2008/09. 
Information on these students was combined from three different sources. The starting 
point was the second Longitudinal Destinations of Leavers from Higher Education 
(LDLHE) survey35 which contains key information on employment status, annual 
salary, industry and occupation of employment, additional qualifications obtained since 
graduating, as well as answers to a range of qualitative career satisfaction questions. 
The LDLHE survey was linked to student university records (held by the Higher 
Education Statistics Agency, or HESA) through unique identifiers. These records hold 
information such as the institution attended by individuals, their subject of study and 
degree attainment. Finally, individuals’ application number as recorded on the HESA 
data was used to link back to administrative records held by UCAS on the their 
applications to university and institutions’ admission decisions. Both the UCAS and the 
HESA records hold a wealth of socio-demographic information on the individual, as 
well as his/her tariff score36. 
UCAS data is available for full-time undergraduates only and, because the applications 
data obtained for this analysis only goes back to 2002 and the LDLHE surveyed the 
2004/05 graduating cohort, it was possible only to look at individuals who were on 
courses of no longer than three years (and took no more than three years to complete)37. 
Although no data was available to estimate the proportion taking longer than three years 
to complete38, full-time undergraduate qualifiers on three year-long courses represented 
73% of the entire full-time undergraduate qualifier population in the UK in 2004/05.  
It is important to emphasise that the final sample used in this chapter is not entirely 
representative of the target population, and so there may be some issues around the 
external validity of the results. The main issue is that the LDLHE only has a 26% 
response rate. In addition, only information on full-time workers is used (74% of the 
                                                 
35
 For more information about the survey, visit: www.hesa.ac.uk/index.php/content/view/112/154. 
36
 See Annex 3C for details on how the final sample was derived.  
37
 Note however, that, most undergraduate courses in the UK take three years to complete. Only some 
courses (e.g. Engineering, Medicine and certain languages) take longer than three years.  
38
 A longitudinal HESA dataset with individuals linked over time would be needed for this. 
54 
 
LDLHE sample is in full-time employment) and some individuals (14%) did not 
respond to the salary question. Finally, the identification strategy used in this chapter 
requires that individuals express both a firm an insurance choice (55% of full-time 
undergraduate applicants in 2002 did). Another 1,220 observations were dropped 
because they did not match to anyone else with the same firm and insurance choices.  
Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 below compare the characteristics of the sample with the more 
general population of 2004/05 full-time undergraduate qualifiers who applied through 
UCAS and were on courses of a length of three years or less. Table 3-1 shows that the 
individuals in the sample are more likely to be female, younger, from an ethnic minority 
background, and from less deprived areas, which is reflected in their higher tariff scores, 
as well as the more selective institutions they attend. This, combined with the fact that 
we only observe people who completed degrees within three years, means that there is 
some bias in the subject representation in the dataset. As Table 3-2 shows, there is a 
slight over-representation on highly selective courses like Physical Sciences, Law and 
Historical and Philosophical Studies, and an under-representation on longer courses 
(like Engineering) or less selective subjects (like Subjects Allied to Medicine and 
Education). Overall, however, the data still demonstrate a good spread of characteristics 
and subjects, and 117 out of the 165 higher education institutions in the UK are 
represented in the final sample.  
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Table 3-1: Descriptive Statistics – Socio-Demographic Characteristics 
  
Population Mean ‡   Sample Mean t Statistic° 
% Female            0.57             0.61             4.39  
Average Age          22.03            20.53  -32.97  
% White            0.82             0.78  -6.20  
% Black            0.03             0.05             4.96  
% Asian/Chinese            0.09             0.11             4.69  
% Mixed Ethnicity            0.02             0.04             6.00  
% Unknown Ethnicity            0.04             0.02  -7.81  
% IMD Quartile* 1 (most deprived)            0.23             0.20  -4.35  
% IMD Quartile 2            0.23             0.21  -2.02  
% IMD Quartile 3            0.23             0.22  -1.34  
% IMD Quartile 4 (least deprived)            0.22             0.27             6.88  
% IMD Unknown            0.10             0.10             0.17  
% Disabled            0.08             0.07  -3.10  
Average Individual Tariff Score†        208.09          334.73           48.81  
Average Quality of Institution Attended            0.16             0.64           27.12  
Average Tariff Score of Institution Attended        218.45          268.20           30.13  
% Achieving a "Good" Degree            0.56             0.66           12.40  
N=       151,324            3,537    
 
§ The "Population" is defined as qualifiers in the HESA 2004/05 data who were on full-time 
undergraduate courses of a length of 3 years or less, and who were recorded as having applied through 
UCAS. In addition only individuals targeted to be part of the 6-months Destinations of Leavers from 
Higher Education survey have been included. Individuals with missing tariff scores are excluded.  
* IMD quartile is assigned based on the entire population. 
† Tariff score in this table is taken from the HESA record because it was available for the entire 
population. Tariff score elsewhere in this chapter is taken mainly from the UCAS data as it is more 
reliable. 
° t Statistic of the difference between the sample and population means. 
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Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics – Subject of Study 
Subject Group Population Sample t Statistic 
Medicine and Dentistry 0.2% 0.7% 3.48 
Subjects Allied to Medicine 5.3% 3.9% -4.28 
Biological Sciences 10.4% 12.6% 3.80 
Veterinary Sciences, Agriculture and Related Subjects 1.0% 0.7% -2.29 
Physical Sciences 3.9% 6.3% 5.96 
Mathematical and Computer Sciences 5.9% 9.1% 6.55 
Engineering 2.5% 2.2% -1.27 
Technologies 0.5% 0.1% -7.43 
Architecture, Building and Planning 1.3% 1.2% -0.27 
Social Studies 9.6% 11.6% 3.59 
Law 5.0% 6.9% 4.44 
Business and Administrative Studies 9.7% 10.6% 1.70 
Mass Communications and Documentation 3.7% 2.2% -6.07 
Linguistics, Classics and Related Subjects 4.6% 5.5% 2.42 
European Languages, Literature and Related Subjects 0.1% 0.0% -2.48 
Eastern, Asiatic, African, American and Languages 0.2% 0.0% N/A 
Historical and Philosophical Studies 5.6% 7.0% 3.09 
Creative Arts and Design 12.8% 3.4% -30.52 
Education 2.6% 1.7% -4.23 
Combined Social Sciences 0.6% 0.9% 2.35 
Combined Sciences 1.4% 2.0% 2.49 
Combined Arts 4.7% 3.1% -5.71 
Social Sciences Combined with Arts 3.4% 3.6% 0.64 
Sciences Combined with Social Sciences 4.8% 4.6% -0.37 
General, Other Combined and Unknown 0.4% 0.4% -0.39 
 
Figure 3-1 shows the selectivity of firm and insurance choices of the individuals in the 
sample. As the graph illustrates, applicants tend to choose firm and insurance 
institutions of different selectivity (85% of applicants), and the majority (60%) pick a 
firm choice which is more selective than their insurance institution. For the 
identification strategy used in this chapter, it does not matter which of the institutions is 
the most selective – as long as there is variability in selectivity between the firm and 
insurance choices of applicants. Note, also, that the most selective institution need not 
be the one making the candidate the most difficult offer. 
 
  
57 
 
Figure 3-1: Selectivity of Applicants’ Firm and Insurance Choices 
 
Overall, individuals who attend their firm choice institution attend more selective 
institutions (272 average tariff score of entrants, compared to 235 for those attending 
their insurance institution). In addition, individuals who attend their firm choice 
institution have higher prior attainment on average (342 tariff points, compared to 301 
for those who attend their insurance institution) – confirming that candidates who miss 
out on their firm choice do so because they do not make the grades asked for in their 
preferred offer.  
Key to the identification strategy used in this chapter is that there is variability in 
institution attended within groups of individuals with the same firm and insurance 
offers. The 3,537 observations in the sample can be split into 837 groups of individuals 
with the same firm and insurance choices. In 230 of these groups, individuals attend 
institutions of different selectivity (totalling 1,393 observations). The average spread in 
selectivity of institution attended amongst these 230 groups is 84 tariff points. 
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3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Earnings 
Figure 3-2 illustrates the relationship between institutional selectivity and the mean 
earnings of graduates three and a half years after graduation, using locally weighted 
regression. It is clear from the upward slope that higher institutional selectivity is 
related to higher earnings in the labour market.  
 
Figure 3-2: Relationship between Mean Graduate Earnings and Institutional 
Selectivity 
 
Notes: the graph shows the relationship between institutional selectivity and average salary of graduates 
three and a half years after graduating using locally weighted regression. The graph is done at the 
institutional level, so each circle represents an institution. 
 
 
This is confirmed by the results in row (i) column (i) of Table 3-3, which shows the 
unconditional relationship between earnings and institutional selectivity: a one standard 
deviation increase in the selectivity of institution attended increases earnings by 9.7% 
three and a half year after qualifying. 
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Table 3-3: Main Results – Effect of Selectivity and Quality on Earnings 
  
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
(i) Selectivity 0.0971 0.0830 0.0705 0.0696 
(0.0101)*** (0.0136)*** (0.0140)*** (0.0135)*** 
  
N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
(ii) Quality 0.113 0.0646 0.0534 0.0501 
(0.0113)*** (0.0124)*** (0.0127)*** (0.0119)*** 
  
N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
  
Firm/Insurance Group Fixed Effects no yes yes yes 
Tariff Score no no yes yes 
  
Additional Controls† no no no yes 
  
          
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the institutional level. 
  * p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001         
 
† Additional controls include: number of choices; socio-demographic information (gender, ethnicity, area 
deprivation measures, socio-economic class, age, month of birth, disability status, domicile, and type of 
institution attended prior to starting their undergraduate course); subject and level of qualification 
achieved; degree class attained; term-time accommodation; subject and level of any additional 
qualifications attained since graduating; and an indicator for whether the individual is studying alongside 
work39.  
 
Row (i) column (ii) estimates the effect of selectivity within groups of individuals who 
had identical firm and insurance offers. This estimate can be thought of as addressing 
selection at both the application and admission stages. The point estimate is 15% lower 
than the one presented in the first column, with a standard deviation in selectivity 
leading to an 8.3% increase in earnings three and a half years after graduation. Adding 
the tariff score40 (column (iii)) addresses selection at the admission stage and reduces 
the estimate by a further 15% - suggesting that selection at the admission stage is 
significant and should not be left unaddressed. The final column adds a range of control 
variables, which barely affects the coefficient – suggesting that estimating the effect of 
selectivity within groups of individuals with the same firm and insurance offers whilst 
controlling for tariff scores adequately tackles selection into institutions. The final 
estimates suggest that a standard deviation increase in selectivity leads to a 7% increase 
in earnings three and a half years after graduation.  
                                                 
39
 Some of these control variables (e.g. degree attainment and additional qualifications obtained) may be 
considered endogenous. Regressions excluding these variables lead to almost identical findings.  
40
 This model also includes an indicator in case the tariff score is missing, which is the case for around 
13% of individuals in the sample. Rerunning the analysis on a sample excluding individuals with missing 
tariff scores leads to very similar results to the ones presented in Table 3-3.  
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To compare the results with previous estimates obtained for the UK, the models are also 
re-run using a measure of institutional “quality” instead of selectivity. The university 
“quality” index is constructed using five indicators: university selectivity; expenditure 
per student; the ratio of academic staff to the number of students; the non-continuation 
rate; and the number of applications per accepted applicant41. These are averaged across 
the three years 2002/03, 2003/04 and 2004/05, standardised to have mean zero and 
standard deviation one, and combined into a single measure using factor analysis42. 
Although we will refer to this measure as an indicator of “quality”, it is really more 
appropriate to think of it as the institution’s position in university league tables.  
The results of the analysis using the quality measure are presented in row (ii) of Table 
3-3. Once again, these estimates show that selection at all three stages (application, 
admission and enrolment) is significant, and that adding controls for observable 
characteristics has a relatively small effect on the estimates. The quality models suggest 
that a standard deviation increase in the “quality” of institution attended leads to an 
increase in earnings three and a half years after graduation of around 5%. This is very 
much in line with previous estimates obtained for the UK: e.g. Hussain et al (2009) 
conclude that a standard deviation rise in university quality leads to an increase in 
earnings of around 6% (at a point in time after graduation similar to the one considered 
in this chapter)43. 
As a further robustness check on the results obtained in Table 3-3, a series of alternative 
models were run similar to the ones in Dale and Krueger (2002) which compare 
individuals who applied to, and were accepted by, institutions of comparable selectivity. 
In practical terms, “similar” institutions are defined as institutions that are in the same 
                                                 
41
 All of these are publicly available. Total institutional expenditure and the number of academic staff are 
published annually by HESA in their “Resources of Higher Education Institutions” publications. The total 
of number of students is again published by HESA in their “Students in Higher Education Institutions” 
publication. The non-continuation rates are published by HESA in their annual “Performance Indicators 
in Higher Education in the UK”. The non-continuation rates track students in the year they enter an 
institution to the following year and provide information about whether the student is still in HE the 
following year or not. I use the non-continuation rates of young full-time first degree entrants. Finally, 
information on applications and acceptances by institution are published annually by UCAS on their 
website. 
42
 Basic summary statistics for the five components of the quality measure (averaged across the three 
years, but not standardised) are presented in annex Table 3D-1, and Table 3D-2 shows the correlation 
matrix of all the individual measures (standardised) as well as the single measure of university quality 
derived from the factor analysis.  
43
 Chevalier and Conlon (2003) estimate that graduating from a Russell Group institution adds up to 6% 
to a male graduate’s earnings compared to graduating from a modern university, and 2.5% for women. 
Chevalier (2009) finds that a graduate from a top department will earn up to 7% more than a similar 
graduate from the lowest quality department. 
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quantile of selectivity (models are run with 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64 quantiles, 
respectively). In the simplest case, this means that institutions are divided into two 
groups (high versus low selectivity) and individuals matched based upon whether they 
applied and were accepted to institutions from the top/bottom half in terms of 
selectivity. There are 145 different institutions in the sample so, in the most elaborate 
model, this means that there are 145/64 (i.e. around two) institutions per selectivity 
grouping. I also run a model where individuals are matched on the exact institutions that 
they applied to and were accepted by.  
The advantage of these models is that they are less demanding from a data perspective, 
so sample sizes tend to be larger. On the downside, these models offer less convincing 
strategies to tackle the problem of selection on unobservable characteristics. More detail 
and the results can be found in Annex 3E. To summarise, these models produce results 
very similar to the ones presented in Table 3-3, with a standard deviation in institution 
selectivity leading to an increase in earnings three and a half years after graduation of 
between 3.6% and 5.8%. 
3.5.2. Non-Earnings Outcomes 
Besides information on employment and earnings, the LDLHE survey also contains 
information from a number of qualitative questions asked to the respondents regarding 
their current job and how satisfied they are with their higher education course. This 
section explores how the selectivity of the institution attended affects the response to 
five of these questions: (i) whether graduates are currently in a job for which their 
qualification is a formal requirement; (ii) whether the current job is the type of work 
they wanted; (iii) whether, with hindsight, they would have studied at a different 
institution; (iv) whether they are satisfied with their career so far; and (v) whether they 
think their university education was value for money.  
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3-4. Each row in this table is for a 
different outcome (described in detail in the notes below the table). The columns are as 
in Table 3-3: column (i) shows the unconditional relationship between the outcome and 
institutional selectivity; column (ii) adds firm/insurance group fixed effects; column (iii) 
adds tariff score controls; and column (iv) includes a range of controls for observable 
characteristics.  
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Table 3-4: Effect of Selectivity on Non-Earnings Outcomes 
  
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Outcome 
Formal Requirement° 0.0961 0.0662 0.0374 0.0463 
(0.00788)*** (0.0201)** (0.0212) (0.0253) 
N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
  
Dream Job† -0.00393 -0.00796 -0.0141 -0.0287 
(0.00754) (0.0224) (0.0235) (0.0250) 
N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
  
Different Institution‡ -0.0762 -0.0813 -0.0884 -0.0766 
(0.00766)*** (0.0190)*** (0.0198)*** (0.0225)*** 
N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
  
Satisfied§ 0.00812 0.000671 0.00572 0.0165 
(0.00733) (0.0228) (0.0229) (0.0264) 
N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
  
Value for Money|| 0.0353 0.0339 0.0380 0.0458 
(0.0174)* (0.0209) (0.0200) (0.0202)* 
N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
  
  
Firm/Insurance Group Fixed Effects no yes yes yes 
Tariff Score no no yes yes 
  
Additional Controls no no no yes 
  
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the institutional level.     
  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001         
° Formal Requirement: question asked was: “As far as you are aware, [was the type of qualification you 
obtained] important to your employer when you gained this employment?” and possible answers were: 
“Formal requirement”, “Important”, “Not very important but helped”, “Not important”, “Don’t know”. 
The outcome variable in this regression is a dummy variable equal to one when the respondents ticked the 
first of these answers (“Formal Requirement”). 
† Dream Job: question asked was: “Why did you decide to take the job you were doing on 24 November 
2008?” A range of options were given (and more than one could be ticked), one of which was “It was 
exactly the type of work I wanted”. The outcome variable in this regression is a dummy variable equal to 
one if the respondent ticked this answer.  
‡ Different Institution: question asked was: “If you were now to choose whether or not to do the course 
leading to the qualification you obtained in 2004/05, how likely or unlikely is it that you would study at a 
different institution?” Possible answers were: “Very likely”, “Likely”, “Not very likely”, “Not likely at 
all”, “Don’t know”. A dummy variable was set to one if the respondent ticked either one of the first two 
of these answers. 
§ Satisfied: question asked was: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your career to date?” with a 
response scale ranging from “Very satisfied” to “Not at all satisfied”. The outcome variable in this 
regression is a dummy variable set to one if the respondent was very satisfied. 
|| Value for Money: question asked was: “How far do you agree or disagree with the statement about your 
overall experience of the course you completed in 2004/05: “My course was good value for money”?” 
The answers were on a five-point scale from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”. If respondents 
strongly agree, then the dummy outcome variable in this regression was set to one. 
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The results indicate that people who attended more selective institutions are less likely 
to say that they would study at a different institution if they could do it all over again, 
and more likely to say that their course was value for money. By contrast, the selectivity 
of the institution attended appears to have very little impact on whether or not 
individuals are currently in a job for which their qualification is a formal requirement, 
or which they consider to be exactly the type of work they wanted. Similarly, there 
appears to be no effect on the likelihood of being satisfied with one’s career to date. 
3.5.3. Non-Linearity 
A number of recent papers have explored the issue of non-linearity in the return to 
institutional selectivity/“quality” – i.e. whether institutional selectivity matters more at 
one end of the distribution than at the other. The general methodology employed is to 
replace the continuous measure of selectivity/“quality” by dummies indicating which 
quartile of the distribution the institution belongs to. The question is then how much 
more individuals who attended an institution in the second, third or fourth quartiles earn 
than those who attended an institution in the first quartile (the omitted category). Using 
this approach, Black et al (2005) find “some evidence of non-linearities in quality, with 
little gain from moving from the 1st to the 2nd quartile and relatively large gains 
associated with moving from the 3rd to the 4th quartile”, and Hussain et al (2009) 
conclude that “the relationship between university quality and wages is highly non-
linear, with a much higher return at the top of the distribution.” Although employing a 
slightly different methodology, Chevalier (2010) draws essentially the same 
conclusions. 
Table 3-5 below shows how the results obtained in Table 3-3 change when the 
continuous measure of selectivity is replaced by dummy variables indicating quartiles of 
institutional selectivity. 
Column (i) shows that the raw relationship between institutional selectivity and earnings 
is highly non-linear, with no return to attending an institution in the second or third 
quartiles of selectivity (as opposed to attending one in the first), but a very large return 
to attending an institution in the top quartile. These results are comparable to those 
found elsewhere in the literature. As soon as firm/insurance group fixed effects are 
introduced, however, this non-linearity disappears. Looking at the preferred model in 
column (iv) - which also includes controls for tariff score and other observable 
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characteristics - we find that there are considerable returns to attending institutions in 
the second and third quartiles as opposed to an institution in the bottom quartile.  
Table 3-5: Non-Linearity in the Return to Institutional Selectivity 
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Quartile 2 -0.00407 0.109 0.113 0.126 
(0.0317) (0.0608) (0.0580) (0.0507)* 
Quartile 3 0.0306 0.203 0.193 0.166 
(0.0434) (0.0511)*** (0.0463)*** (0.0436)*** 
Quartile 4 0.197 0.119 0.218 0.218 
(0.0353)*** (0.0272)*** (0.0478)*** (0.0478)*** 
N 3537 3537 3537 3537 
Firm/Insurance Group Fixed Effects no yes yes yes 
Tariff Score no no yes yes 
Additional Controls no no no yes 
Standard errors in parentheses. These are clustered at the institutional level.   
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001         
 
This finding goes against the conclusions drawn in the literature so far. Although it 
would be premature to conclude that the previous literature is wrong, it does raise the 
question of whether the methodology used so far to explore non-linearities in the return 
to institutional selectivity makes sense. Indeed, individuals who attend the bottom 
quartile of institutions will be very different from individuals who attend the top quartile 
of institutions, and making direct comparisons between them may be invalid. Instead, 
the approach proposed here (comparing individuals with the same firm and insurance 
choices) compares individuals who could have attended both sets of institutions. When 
comparing individuals with the same firm and insurance offers, there are relatively few 
individuals who had a firm offer from a top quartile institution and an insurance offer 
from a bottom quartile institution (132 in the sample used here) - but this is exactly why 
the approach used previously in the literature may be flawed, i.e. because there is very 
little common support for such a model44. 
                                                 
44
 Note that another limitation of this methodology is that the identification relies on comparing 
individuals who attended quartile 4/3/2 institutions to those who attended quartile 1 institutions only. So 
the model does not directly compare individuals who attend, say, quartile 3 versus quartile 2 institutions, 
or quartile 4 versus quartile 3 institutions. I have experimented with models where the analysis is re-run 
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3.6. Conclusion 
The results in this chapter suggest that it pays to attend more selective institutions. As 
mentioned above, these findings are similar to those found in previous studies for the 
UK. Most other studies in the US and elsewhere have also found positive returns to 
institutional selectivity/“quality”. The results obtained in this chapter even appear small 
in comparison to some recent estimates for the US and Columbia, where attending more 
selective institutions has been estimated to increase earnings by 20 to 25% (Hoekstra, 
2009; Saavedra, 2009).  
Yet three important studies have found no evidence of such a premium: Dale and 
Krueger (2002) conclude that “students who attended more selective colleges earned 
about the same as students of seemingly comparable ability who attended less selective 
schools”, Öckert (2010) states that his “quality estimates are [not] significantly different 
from zero” and Dale and Krueger (2011) find again that their “estimates of the return to 
college selectivity […] are generally indistinguishable from zero.” What explains this 
discrepancy in findings? 
The zero return to institutional quality found in the Öckert paper might be easily 
explained by the more compressed wage structure in countries like Sweden. The return 
to education in Sweden has generally been found to be on the low end, and Öckert 
himself finds no evidence of a return to a college education. Given this, it is perhaps not 
surprising to find that the selectivity of the college attended plays no role in explaining 
an individual’s earnings. 
The Dale and Krueger (2002, 2011) findings are more difficult to reconcile with the 
previous literature because, like in the UK, there are significant returns to education in 
the US. In addition, tuition fees at American universities are high and vary considerably 
between institutions, reflecting in part the differences in earnings of graduates from 
different institutions.  
                                                                                                                                               
on sub-samples to allow for these more “marginal” comparisons. I have also run a model where I explore 
non-linearities in the return to institutional selectivity by keeping the whole sample and a continuous 
measure of selectivity, but also adding in a squared term of selectivity. On the whole, these models are 
consistent with the results described in the main text. However, given the small sample sizes, results are 
generally unstable and estimates lack precision. So the main conclusion from this section is not 
necessarily that there are no non-linear returns to institutional selectivity, but rather that there are 
significant problems of common support with the main strategy used so far in the literature to explore 
non-linearities. 
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One possible explanation might be that Dale and Krueger measure earnings at a much 
later point in graduates’ careers (around the 15-year mark in their 2002 study, compared 
to three and a half years in this chapter). There is some evidence (Chevalier, 2009) to 
suggest that the institution you attend may act as a signal to employers (so it gets you 
higher earnings at the outset), but that the institutional premium wears off over time 
(Lang and Siniver, 2010). However Dale and Krueger (2011) themselves find that the 
return to college selectivity increases over the course of a student’s career (in models 
that do not adjust for selection), which appears to discredit this explanation. Perhaps a 
more plausible explanation for the Dale and Krueger (2002, 2011) findings is that their 
dataset only covers a narrow group of highly selective colleges covering a limited range 
of selectivity (Long, 2008), so that the effect of selectivity on earnings may be hard to 
identify. 
Either way, it is important to stress that both the Dale and Krueger papers do find some 
evidence that the institution you attend matters to your earnings. Dale and Krueger 
(2002), for instance, find that the school a student attends is systematically related to his 
or her subsequent earnings in a regression which includes dummy variables indicating 
the school of attendance. The same paper also finds that there is a substantial payoff to 
attending schools with higher net tuition, as well as some evidence that expenditure per 
student also matters to earnings – although these findings are not corroborated by the 
2011 study. In both papers, however, Dale and Krueger find that children from low-
income/less educated families earn more if they attended selective colleges, and the 
2011 study also finds positive returns to selectivity for black and Hispanic students. 
Taken together with the other papers cited, the weight of evidence now does appear to 
point to the existence of a university selectivity premium – at least for certain sub-
groups of the student population. An important unresolved issue, however, is the 
mechanism through which graduate earnings are increased and, in particular, the role of 
signalling versus that of productivity gains. This remains an important avenue for future 
research and one with important implications for student choice and university funding.  
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4. University Rankings: Do They Matter in the UK? 
4.1. Introduction 
Higher education in the UK (and in England in particular) has become increasingly 
marketised in recent years. Successive Governments have shifted the burden of costs 
from the taxpayer onto students and have encouraged more competition between 
institutions by allowing universities to charge higher fees. £1,000 tuition fees were 
introduced for home-domiciled students in England following the 1997 Dearing Report. 
They were increased to £3,000 in 2006/07 and, from 2012/13 onwards, universities will 
be allowed to charge up to £9,000 a year. More and more, students are expected to act 
like consumers in a Tiebout model: voting with their feet, and driving up quality and 
efficiency in the process. 
As in any other market, however, competition only works if consumers are well 
informed. With over half a million applicants each year, 165 higher education 
institutions to choose from (Universities UK, 2010), and a good as complex as a 
university education, consumption decisions are likely to be based on imperfect 
information.  In addition, higher education is an experience good, with quality difficult 
to observe in advance and only really ascertained upon consumption. 
Prospective students do not necessarily complain about the quantity of information 
available, but rather about how that information is presented to them. In particular, with 
an abundance of data and statistics published from a range of different sources, 
applicants often find it difficult (and spend a lot of time) finding the information that is 
useful to them (NUS, 2008). What they need is information in an easily digestible 
format which allows them to compare institutions in a straightforward way. However, 
summarising multidimensional information into a single quality measure is a complex 
process. 
In the UK (as elsewhere in the world) third parties (often newspapers) have spotted this 
gap in the market and have filled it by constructing simple indices composed of a range 
of indicators purporting to measure university quality: expenditure per student, 
student/staff ratios, teaching inspection scores, entry qualifications of students, job 
outcomes of graduates, and other measures. In the US, the most influential university 
league table is the U.S. News and World Report ranking. In the UK, the most 
commonly used league tables are the Times Good University Guide and the Guardian 
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University Guide. These have recently been joined by newer attempts at ranking 
universities: the Sunday Times and the Independent (the Complete University Guide), 
and there are now also a number of international rankings, of which the Academic 
Ranking of World Universities (ARWU, or also known as the “Shanghai Ranking”) is 
probably the most famous. The Times Higher Education (THES) World University 
Ranking is another.  
Whether or not we believe these rankings accurately reflect the quality of education on 
offer (an issue which has been hotly debated45), they are being widely used by 
applicants to university. In the UK, perhaps 1 in 5 of all applicants believe they are 
influenced by them, but a much wider group are aware of them (Roberts and Thompson, 
2007). In book form, the Times Good University Guide sells over 20,000 copies each 
year46 and has significant web and news media exposure (op. cit.). When the result is 
positive, universities are quick to post the ranking onto their websites in an attempt to 
attract applications from prospective students. 
However, despite the large number of users and anecdotal evidence on their impact on 
both applicants and institutions, there has been very little systematic analysis in the UK 
of the effect league tables have on the higher education sector. This is in contrast with 
the US, where a large volume of papers have argued that college rankings do impact on 
institutions and students (see section 4.2 below). In the UK, the little evidence that does 
exist (Elliott and Soo, 2010; Soo, 2011) suggests that league tables have either little or 
no impact on the number of applications received by universities.  
This chapter contributes to the literature by offering a more comprehensive analysis of 
how changes in rankings are related to changes in applicant and university behaviour in 
the UK. The impact of four of the most influential league tables on a wide range of 
outcomes is analysed: the number of applications received by institutions, the 
proportion of applications which are successful, the average entry qualifications of 
applicants and accepted applicants, and the socio-demographic make-up of universities’ 
applicant pools (including age, gender, ethnicity and socio-economic class). In addition, 
the impact of rankings on attracting overseas students to the UK, as well as on the fees 
                                                 
45
 See, for instance: Provan and Abercromby (2000), Clarke (2002), Eccles (2002), Yorke and Longden 
(2005), Turner (2005), Dill (2006), and Birnbaum (2007). 
46
 This is over and above the general circulation of these newspapers in print. According to recent 
statistics (Ponsford, 2011), the Guardian newspaper has a circulation of around quarter of a million, and 
the Times’ is just under half a million.  
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universities are able to charge them, is investigated. The chapter contributes to the wider 
literature on the impact of league tables on applicants and institutions because, in 
contrast to the majority of US research which focuses on top and highly selective 
colleges only, the UK data allows us to look at the entire spectrum of institutions in the 
sector.  
The results obtained in this chapter offer fairly consistent evidence of a relationship 
between rank changes and applicant behaviour in the UK – although the effects found 
are modest and suggest that other factors may play a more important role in attracting 
applicants to institutions. Universities that fall down the rankings experience small but 
statistically significant drops in the number applications received, as well as in the 
average tariff score  (a summary measure of academic attainment calculated by UCAS) 
of applicants and accepted applicants. Candidates who react most to a change in 
rankings tend to be male, young, Asian, high-attaining, from higher socio-economic 
backgrounds, and from independent schools. As a result, the effect of a change in 
rankings is found to be more significant for prestigious universities. All of these 
findings are consistent with those found for the US.  
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. The relevant literature is 
reviewed in section 4.2. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe the data and methodology used. 
Section 4.5 summarises the results, and section 4.6 concludes.  
4.2. Literature Review 
Several papers in the US have explored the effect of rankings (and the U.S. News and 
World Report rankings in particular) on the behaviour of both applicants and colleges. 
Monks and Ehrenberg (1999) were probably the first47 to carry out a systematic 
empirical investigation of the impact of rankings on potential students and academic 
institutions. Looking at 30 colleges at the very top of the undergraduate rankings for the 
11 years between 1988 and 1999 (i.e. a panel of 330 observations), they used a simple 
fixed effects model (with year and institution dummies) and found that a fall in rank: 
increases an institution’s admit rate; lowers the proportion of an institution’s admitted 
applicants accepting positions (the yield rate); leads to a decline in the average SAT 
                                                 
47
 Parker and Summers (1993) is an earlier paper which looked mainly at the effect of changes in tuition 
and fees on the matriculation rate of applicants admitted to a group of selective liberal arts colleges. 
Although they also look at college rankings, they do not explore the effect of changes in rankings. They 
find that the higher an institution’s ranking, the higher its matriculation rate. 
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score of the institution’s incoming freshman class; has no effect on tuition levels; but 
does decrease the typical expected freshman self-help contribution from students; and 
hence leads to a reduction in net tuition.  
A number of papers have since built on and extended the work by Monks and 
Ehrenberg by: looking at different rankings (Buss, Parker and Rivenburg, 2004; Griffith 
and Rask, 2007); updating the analysis with more recent data (Bowman and Bastedo, 
2009); extending the sample to include private and other types of institutions (Meredith, 
2004; Bowman and Bastedo, 2009); looking at particular subjects (Bednowitz, 2000 
looks at Business School rankings; Saunder and Lancaster, 2006 look at Law School 
rankings); investigating the effect on employers (Bednowitz, 2000); and examining 
whether rankings affect the public financing of institutions (Jin and Whalley, 2007). 
Generally, these papers reinforce the Monks and Ehrenberg results, but a few additional 
findings are worth noting. Many papers find, for instance, that the effects of rankings 
are stronger for institutions at the top (Griffith and Rask, 2007; Saunder and Lancaster, 
2006) and for private ones (Meredith, 2004). Griffith and Rask (2007) also find that 
women and minorities appear to be less sensitive, and that aided students have become 
more sensitive to rankings over time. Meredith (2004) provides some evidence that the 
socio-economic and racial demographics of universities may be affected by changes in 
rank. 
The use and impact of university rankings in the UK is less well researched. Some 
surveys have looked at which types of students most use league tables in their higher 
education choices. Roberts and Thompson (2007) summarise this evidence which 
suggests that Asians, males, young applicants, those from high income backgrounds and 
high achievers are amongst the most avid users of rankings information. There is some 
evidence also that university rankings are important to international students.  
Both Abbot and Leslie (2004) and Roberts and Thompson (2007) find that higher 
ranked institutions in the UK receive more applications, but Elliott and Soo (2010) and 
Soo (2011) are the only papers I am aware of which explore the effect of a change in 
rankings on applicant behaviour. Elliott and Soo (2010) look at the impact of the Times 
Good University Guide on applications from overseas students to Business and 
Engineering courses over the period 2002 to 2007. They find that Business Studies 
students and female Engineering students are influenced by the overall ranking of the 
university, and that Business Studies (but not Engineering) students also consider the 
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subject-specific rankings of universities. Soo (2011) uses 2005-2009 data to investigate 
the impact of the Sunday Times league table on applications to university. The author 
finds that the overall ranking has no impact on home, EU or overseas applications, but 
that it does have some effect on EU student applications to pre-92 universities48. He also 
finds that better research quality is associated with more home and EU applications in 
post-92 institutions, while it is weakly associated with fewer applications from home 
students in pre-92 universities.  
This research on the impact of league tables on applicants and institutions sits within a 
wider literature on the impact of information disclosure on consumer/producer 
behaviour. Remaining within the sphere of education, many papers have documented 
how the provision of information to parents affects school choice (Hastings and 
Weinstein, 2007; Hastings and Weinstein, 2008; Koning and van der Wiel, 2010) and 
how publishing school performance information improves test scores (Canoy and Loeb, 
2002; Hanushek and Raymond, 2004; Dee and Jacob, 2009; Burgess, Wilson and 
Worth, 2010) as well as schools’ instructional policies and practices (Rouse et al, 2007). 
Similarly, within the field of health economics, a well-developed literature has explored 
the impact of information about health care services and quality on patient choice. See, 
for instance: Wübker, Sauerland and Wübker (2008), Culler, Huckman and Landrum 
(2004), Chernew, Gowrisankaran and Scanlon (2008).  
More generally, and to quote Dranove and Jin (2010): "literally from cradle to grave, 
consumers rely on quality disclosure to make important purchases" – where quality 
disclosure is defined as “an effort by a certification agency to systematically measure 
and report product quality for a nontrivial percentage of products in a market”. In the 
case of higher education, the attempt by newspapers (and/or other entities) to measure 
university quality, rank institutions and disseminate such information in an easily 
understood format to aid prospective students in their decisions about which institutions 
to attend, is a clear case of “quality disclosure”. The present chapter thus sits within a 
wider literature on the effect of information provision on consumer demand.  
  
                                                 
48
 In 1992, many polytechnics and colleges of higher education were given university status in the UK. 
The term “pre-1992” therefore refers to institutions that already had university status prior to that date.  
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4.3. Data 
The data used in this chapter combines information from a range of different sources – 
some of which is publicly available, some of which has rarely been made available for 
research before.  
In the UK, applications to full-time undergraduate courses are channelled through a 
centralised clearing house – the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (or 
UCAS). The starting point for the dataset used in this chapter was individualised UCAS 
data (holding detailed information on every single applicant and his/her choices of 
universities, as well as universities’ admission decisions) for the years 2002 to 2009. 
This data was collapsed at the institutional level to build a time series49 of UK-
domiciled applications50, successful applications, average entry score of applicants, and 
average entry score of accepted applicants. In total this creates a dataset with 1,105 
institution/year combinations with non-missing information. 
The number of applications from UK-domiciled students could be broken down by a 
range of socio-demographic characteristics held on the UCAS data, namely: gender, 
age, ethnicity, socio-economic class, type of school attended, and academic ability of 
applicants (as measured by their tariff score). Using the same dataset, a separate time 
series at institutional level was created with the number of applications from 
international students (broken down by whether they come from the EU or other 
overseas countries51).  
For international students, it was also possible to build a time series of fees charged by 
institutions52 using Mike Reddin’s annual survey53.   
                                                 
49
 One difficulty encountered in building a time series is institutional changes – mergers in particular. The 
general approach taken was to treat institutions as separate before they merged, and then as one (separate) 
institution afterwards.  
50
 Note that each applicant in the UCAS system is entitled to a certain number of choices/applications – 
six prior to 2008/09, and five from that year onwards. The analysis in this paper will be at the level of the 
choice/application, and not the applicant level.  
51
 This distinction is important because EU students in the UK are eligible to pay the same fees as 
domestic students. Other overseas students are subject to much higher fee levels.  
52
 For the time period studied, university fees for domestic and EU students were virtually all the same. 
Only a handful of institutions briefly charged slightly lower fees when the fees cap was raised in 2006/07 
to £3,000. 
53
 The data is available from the website www.publicgoods.co.uk. Sometimes a range of fees was 
provided, and a judgment needed to be made to choose either the lower or higher fee stated to make sure 
that the time series for each institution was as consistent as possible. 
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Finally, using a range of printed and online material, the dataset was completed with 
information on universities’ rankings from the following league tables: the Times Good 
University Guide, the Guardian University Guide, the Times Higher Education (THES) 
World University Rankings, and the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU, 
or “Shanghai Ranking”). For the period 2002-2009 (for which UCAS data was 
available), the following table summarises which rankings information is included in 
the dataset, and the number of institutions for which information is available in any 
particular year. As the table shows, the number of institutions with rankings information 
varies across league table as well as over time54. As a result, the number of observations 
used in the regression analysis will fluctuate depending on the outcome/ranking 
combination looked at.  
Table 4-1: Availability of Rankings Information by Year (Number of Institutions) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 
Times 95 99 100 99 100 109 109 112 823 
Guardian 116 118 121 120 119 116 710 
THES* 30 24 28 31 29 29 171 
ARWU*   39 38 38 41 39 39 37 271 
* UK institutions only. 
 
Table 4-2 below summarises some of the key outcome variables that will be used in this 
chapter. On average, institutions receive about 12,500 applications from UK-domiciled 
students and around 2,000 from international applicants. 72% of UK-domiciled 
applications are accepted, compared to 66% of overseas applications. The average tariff 
score is 231 points for applicants and 252 for accepted applicants. Over the period 
studied, overseas students were charged an average of £8,155 for classroom-based 
courses and £9,284 for laboratory-based courses (in nominal terms).  
A priori, it is not obvious what effect (if any) a change in rank should have on the 
number of applications universities receive. Institutions that rise in the rankings (i.e. 
become better ranked)55 may attract more applications because candidates seek out the 
best universities. Equally possible, however, is that applicants shun those universities 
because they perceive their chances of being admitted to them reduced, in which case 
we would observe a fall in the number of applications received. Most of the evidence 
                                                 
54
 Although rare, there are some institutions which refuse to participate in the rankings.  
55
 Throughout this paper, the highest rank an institution can attain is 1. An institution will be considered 
to “rise” in the rankings if it moves, for example, from position 7 to 3. Vice versa, a move from rank 3 to 
7 will be described as a “drop” in the league tables. All results presented in section 4.5 will be based on a 
one place “drop” in the rankings (i.e. an increase in the actual ranking value).  
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for the US summarised in section 4.2 suggests that more highly ranked institutions do 
attract more applications. Evidence for the UK is more mixed but also suggests that, if 
there is any effect, it tends to be positive.  
Table 4-2: Summary of Key Outcome Variables 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
UK-Domiciled Applicants 
# of Applications by Institution       12,537          9,770             148        51,636  
Male       5,639        4,558  42    24,044  
Female       6,898        5,334  83    28,443  
White*       9,947        8,164  106    40,874  
Black          634           962  0       6,868  
Asian       1,229        1,525  0       7,334  
Mixed Ethnicity          332           318  0       1,705  
Young§ 
   10,773        8,749  130    46,039  
Mature       1,764        1,472  18       8,526  
Higher Socio-Economic Class*       6,999        6,091  113    33,025  
Lower Socio-Economic Class       3,226        2,438  13    12,861  
State School† 
      7,176        6,015  37    32,140  
Independent School       1,310        2,046  0    11,156  
Proportion of Applications Accepted 72% 18% 14% 100% 
Average Tariff Score of Applicants         231            83            58          476  
Average Tariff Score of Accepted Applicants         252            95            69          516  
International Applicants 
# of EU Applications by Institution            736             767  2         6,107  
Proportion of EU Applications Accepted 66% 20% 3% 100% 
# of Other Overseas Applications by Institution         1,220          1,522  1         9,604  
Proportion of Other Overseas Applications Accepted 66% 17% 6% 100% 
Average Fee for Classroom-Based Courses (£)         8,155          1,542          4,325        18,000  
Average Fee for Laboratory-Based Courses (£)         9,284          2,167          4,325        20,400  
          
* The “other ethnicity” category has been left out of the analysis. 
§ Following standard practice, young applicants are those aged 20 and below. 
° Higher socio-economic classes cover classes 1 to 3: higher managerial/professional occupations, lower 
managerial/professional occupations and intermediate occupations. Lower socio-economic classes span 
groups 4 to 7: small employers and own account workers, lower supervisory and technical occupations, 
semi-routine occupations, and routine occupations. Those with unknown socio-economic class are not 
included in the analysis. 
† The focus is on state and independent schools. Some other school types (e.g. further education colleges) 
have been left out of the analysis).  
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The effect of rank changes on applications may vary according to applicant and 
institution characteristics. Higher attaining candidates, for example, may be more likely 
to seek out better ranked institutions, which would lead to an increase in the average 
entry qualifications of applicants to institutions that move up the rankings. Section 4.2 
shows that, in the US, this is indeed the case. There is also some evidence from the US 
that changes in rankings might be associated with changes in the socio-demographic 
make-up of universities (Meredith, 2004).  
In addition, if more highly ranked institutions receive more applications, we would 
expect their admission rate (i.e. the proportion applications which are successful) to fall 
– particularly if institutions operate under capacity constraints. Similarly, we would 
expect those institutions to be more selective in their intake and accept the most 
qualified candidates only. Once again, this would lead to an increase in the average 
entry qualifications of accepted applicants.  
Finally, if moving up in the rankings means that institutions receive more applications 
from international students56, then simple economic theory would predict an increase in 
the price that those universities are able to ask for their courses. On the other hand, it is 
possible that universities would be averse to lowering their fees in reaction to a drop in 
the rankings because this might send the wrong signals to potential applicants about the 
quality of education on offer at that institution. The limited evidence from the US 
presented in section 4.2 corroborates this: institutions adjust the financial aid packages 
they offer, but not the ‘sticker price’ of courses. 
  
                                                 
56
 In the UK, the number of full-time undergraduate places available to UK-domiciled students is, to a 
large extent, fixed exogenously by the funding councils. International students do not, therefore, displace 
home students. So the proportion of international students accepted should be independent from the 
proportion of UK-domiciled students accepted.  
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4.4. Methodology 
The effect of movements in league table positions on the outcomes outlined in section 
4.3 will be analysed using the following dynamic panel model estimated by Ordinary 
Least Squares:  
Outcomex t+1 = β0 + β1 RANKx t + β2 RANKx t-1 + ∑υx Ux + ∑ ψt Yt (4i) 
Where the outcome for institution x in year t+1 will be regressed on a constant (β0), the 
institution’s current and previous rank (RANKxt and RANKxt-1), and institution (Ux) and 
year (Yt) fixed effects. In all regressions, standard errors will be clustered at the 
institutional level.  
It is assumed that applicants to university use the most recently published league tables. 
Most guides are published in late summer in time for the applications process (which 
starts in autumn) for enrolment in the following academic year. Similarly, for 
international student fees, it will be assumed that fees in any particular year are set 
based on the institution’s ranking in the previous year57. 
The inclusion of institution fixed effects means that the impact of league table changes 
will be identified using within-institution variation and that any time-invariant, 
unobserved heterogeneity at the university level will be eliminated. The inclusion of 
year fixed effects is needed to absorb any time trends common to all universities 
including, for example, the 2008/09 UCAS policy to reduce the number of choices each 
candidate can express on their application form from six to five, as well as the increase 
of tuition fees in England in 2006/07. Finally, the inclusion of the institution’s previous 
rank (which is generally published alongside the institution’s current rank) will control 
for the extent and direction of a change in ranking.  
For the above model to be able to identify the effect of rank changes on the outcomes of 
interest there needs to be sufficient annual change in institutions’ rankings. As shown in 
Table 4-3 below, this is indeed the case: nearly all institutions change rank each year 
and, in the case of some league tables, over two thirds of institutions move five or more 
places a year. The graphs and correlations matrices in Annex 4A show year-on-year 
                                                 
57
 Annex 4B provides an example of how the rankings would be matched up to the outcome variables in 
the analysis.  
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changes for each of the rankings, and confirm the considerable annual movement in 
university league tables.  
Table 4-3: Summary of Yearly Changes in Rank 
  Times Guardian THES ARWU58 
% of Institutions Changing Rank  91.2% 95.4% 96.2% 71.4% 
% of Institutions Changing Rank by 5+ Places 39.1% 68.2% 69.9% 21.0% 
Average Yearly Change in Rank 5.1 12.0 16.6 13.1 
 
 
As a further illustration of the volatility in rankings, Figure 4-1 shows shifts in ranking 
over time for universities that were ranked 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 in 2004 by the 
Guardian. As this graph shows, there is considerable movement in universities’ league 
table positions over time and much of it appears random (e.g. the University of St. 
Andrews’ ranking in 2007). 
Some rankings display more change over time than others. Often this is due to changes 
in the methodology used for constructing the rankings. Annex 4C provides more detail 
on the annual changes in the methodology for constructing the Guardian rankings, and 
this shows that there are frequent changes in variables and weights used. According to 
Roberts and Thompson (2007), “those constructing league tables have a vested interest 
in them being dynamic – annual change within rankings is good for business and for 
publicity”. Whatever the reason, these methodological adjustments generate apparently 
random changes in rankings from one year to the next, which are likely to be 
independent from changes in the actual quality of the university itself. This creates ideal 
conditions for estimating the effect of rank changes on institution and applicant 
behaviour, as rank changes appear to a large extent exogenous59.  
 
                                                 
58
 One issue with the ARWU rankings is that detailed information on an institution’s position is not 
available for every university included in the league table. Although the individual ranking is known for 
institutions in the top 100, universities outside the top 100 are ranked in groups: 101-150, 151-200, 201-
300, 301-400 and 401-500, and so changes in ranking for institutions outside the top 100 are not captured 
unless they actually change group. Throughout this chapter, the ARWU rankings are treated as a 
continuous variable (with institutions outside the top 100 given a rank of 101, 151, 201, 301 or 401). The 
robustness of the results to this assumption has been tested by re-running the analysis on a reduced 
sample of institutions appearing in the top 100 only. As for the results in the main body of the chapter, the 
ARWU rankings appear to have no or very little impact on applicant behaviour – although this finding is 
likely attributable to the small number of observations (39) available.  
59
 Unless, of course, prospective students are aware of and heed such methodological changes, in which 
case they could dismiss the information value of league tables (or, at least, sudden and large annual 
changes). 
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Figure 4-1: Changes in Rank of Universities Ranked 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 in 
2004 by the Guardian 
 
 
Annex 4C also summarises changes in the methodology for deriving the Times league 
table: although there are some changes here too, they are less frequent and less dramatic 
than in the case of the Guardian ranking. This is confirmed in the correlation matrices 
presented in Annex 4A, where year-on-year correlations for the Times rankings are 
much stronger than for the Guardian. It was not possible to document similar changes in 
methodology for either the THES or ARWU rankings.  
One final limitation of the fixed effects model outlined above is that it relies on the 
crucial assumption that time trends are common across all universities. Should there be 
heterogeneity in unobserved trends, however, then the estimates of the effect of 
rankings on the outcomes of interest would be biased. In order to test the sensitivity of 
the results to this assumption, additional regressions were run where the year fixed 
effects in equation (4i) above were replaced by a linear time trend T and interacted with 
each of the institutional dummies:  
Outcomex t+1 = β0 + β1 RANKx t + β2 RANKx t-1 + β3 T + ∑υx Ux + ∑υt Ut T (4ii) 
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The findings presented in section 4.5 below are robust to the inclusion of such 
institution-specific linear time trends – suggesting that unobserved time-varying 
heterogeneity at the university level may not be a major concern60.  
4.5. Results 
Table 4-4 shows the estimated effect of a change in rankings on the number of UK-
domiciled applications, the proportion of applications which are successful, the average 
tariff score of applicants, and the average tariff score of accepted applicants. Each time, 
the effect shown is for a one place drop in the rankings (i.e. the institution’s rank 
worsens), and the table contains the estimated coefficient, the standard error, the 
number of observations, as well as the mean of the outcome variable for that particular 
ranking/outcome combination.  
The first column investigates the effect on the number of applications received by an 
institution. Although the effect of the Times ranking is not statistically significant, it is 
similar in magnitude to that of the Guardian ranking which suggests that a ten place 
drop in the rankings leads to about 100 fewer applications. Given that institutions 
included in the Guardian ranking over the period 2004-2009 received on average 15,031 
applications per year, this equates to a 0.66% reduction61. This effect is small and may 
explain why, in the second column, we find no evidence of an impact on the proportion 
of applications that are successful.  
Columns (iii) and (iv) suggest that institutions that drop down the rankings receive 
applications from less well-qualified applicants overall which, combined with the fall in 
applications observed in column (i), also leads to a decline in the average tariff score of 
accepted applicants at those institutions. Again, however, the effect is modest: a ten 
place fall in the rankings leads to a decline in tariff score of applicants and accepted 
applicants of between 0.5% and 0.9%62.  
                                                 
60
 The only exception being that the inclusion of institution-specific time trends turns the effect of a drop 
in the ARWU rankings on international student fees positive (i.e. fees increase when an institution falls 
down the ARWU rankings) – which appears counterintuitive and is not corroborated by any of the other 
results. All results from the models with institution-specific time trends can be found in Annex 4D.  
61
 Percentage changes here and elsewhere in the chapter are calculated on the basis of the mean value for 
the institutions with non-missing rankings information.  
62
 These models assume that league tables are mutually exclusive and that students only use one of the 
rankings in deciding which universities to apply to. In practice, however, it is possible (and likely) that 
candidates consult a range of rankings and make a decision based on some weighted average of 
universities’ positions across the various league tables. To test for this, a new variable was created which 
measures an institution’s average ranking across both the Times and Guardian guides, and the main 
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Table 4-4: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on Applications, Proportion of 
Applications Accepted and Average Tariff Score of (Accepted) Applicants – UK-
Domiciled Students 
    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
    
Number of  
Applications 
% of 
Applications 
Accepted 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Applicants 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Accepted 
Applicants 
Times   Β -12.03 0.000177 -0.217 -0.248 
   s.e. (11.35) (0.000255) (0.0874)** (0.0979)** 
  N 671 671 671 671 
  X 16251 0.73 247 270 
Guardian   Β -9.923 0.000150 -0.116 -0.148 
   s.e. (4.820)** (0.000117) (0.0315)*** (0.0344)*** 
  N 565 565 565 565 
  X 15031 0.74 237 259 
THES   Β 0.416 0.000117 -0.0284 -0.0912 
   s.e. (8.455) (0.000273) (0.0839) (0.0945) 
  N 123 123 123 123 
  X 21738 0.58 350 393 
ARWU   Β -7.855 0.000128 -0.0379 -0.0395 
   s.e. (6.076) (0.000122) (0.0374) (0.0443) 
  N 170 170 170 170 
  X 19837 0.62 334 372 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01         
 
 
Table 4-5 below explores whether the effect is different for more prestigious 
universities. As a proxy for prestige, we look at institutions which belong to the Russell 
Group – a self-formed grouping of 20 research-intensive institutions in the UK63 
generally regarded as being highly selective. The results presented in the first column of 
Table 4-5 show a considerably larger effect of a fall in the rankings on the number of 
applications received by Russell Group institutions: a ten place drop in the rankings 
leads to a fall of between 2.7% (the Guardian) and 6.2% (the Times)64. This echoes 
findings from the US, where the impact of league tables was found to be strongest for 
highly ranked and private institutions. 
                                                                                                                                               
analysis from Table 4-4 was re-run. The results can be found in Annex 4E and are very similar to those 
obtained here. Annex 4E also presents results of a regression where both the Guardian and Times ranking 
were entered simultaneously. Again, the results are similar to those obtained in Table 4-4. 
63
 These are the universities of: Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, Cardiff, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Leeds, 
Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham, Oxford, Sheffield, Southampton, as well as Imperial 
College London, King’s College London, the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Queen’s University Belfast and University College London. For more information, see: 
http://www.russellgroup.ac.uk/ 
64
 The average annual change in rank for Russell Group institutions in the Times ranking is 2.7. For the 
Guardian ranking it is 4.7. 
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Table 4-5: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on Applications, Proportion of 
Applications Accepted and Average Tariff Score of (Accepted) Applicants – UK-
Domiciled Students, Russell Group Institutions 
    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
    
Number of  
Applications 
% of 
Applications 
Accepted 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Applicants 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Accepted 
Applicants 
Times   β  -156.9   0.00187   -0.707  -0.590 
   s.e.  (58.59)**   (0.00126)   (0.362)*  (0.330)* 
  n 126 126 126 126 
  X 25458 0.55 355 400 
Guardian   β -70.29 0.000411 0.178 0.125 
   s.e. (28.00)** (0.000612) (0.206) (0.248) 
  n 90 90 90 90 
  X 25764 0.54 355 401 
THES   β 1.122 0.000148 0.0182 -0.0797 
   s.e. (13.56) (0.000219) (0.0711) (0.0665) 
  n 81 81 81 81 
  X 26133 0.53 359 407 
ARWU   β -0.951 0.000153 -0.000679 -0.0353 
   s.e. (6.519) (0.000192) (0.0444) (0.0588) 
  n 89 89 89 89 
  X 25531 0.54 355 401 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01         
 
The results further suggest that a ten place drop in the Times rankings leads to a 2.0% 
fall in the average tariff score of applicants and a 1.5% fall in the average tariff score of 
accepted applicants at Russell Group institutions. As before, the two international 
rankings (THES and ARWU) appear to have no effect on the application decisions of 
home-domiciled students.  
Table 4-6, Table 4-7 and Table 4-8 explore heterogeneity in the response to rank 
changes by applicant characteristics. In particular, the tables explore whether the 
number of applications received from certain groups of students are more sensitive to a 
change in rankings than others. The results suggest that the candidates who react most 
to a change in rankings tend to be male, young, Asian, high-attaining, from higher 
socio-economic classes, and from independent schools – a finding consistent with the 
evidence presented in section 4.2 on the types of students most likely to consult 
university league tables, as well as with evidence from the US.  
The tables also suggest that the numbers of Black and mature applications increase 
rather than decrease when an institution falls in the rankings – a finding which is 
confirmed by a separate series of regressions where the outcome variable is replaced by 
the proportion of applications with a certain characteristic: institutions that experience a 
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drop in the rankings see an increase in the proportion of applications received which are 
Black and mature (see Annex 4F). This is a finding similar to that of Meredith (2004) 
who writes that “a one-rank drop in the USNWR is shown to decrease the number of 
Asians in an incoming class by 0.11%, the number of Hispanics by 0.09%.” 
Table 4-6: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on the Number of Applications by 
Gender and Ethnicity – UK-Domiciled Students 
  
  Gender Ethnicity 
    Male Female White Black Asian Mixed 
Times   β -11.67 -0.361 -8.823 3.732 -5.011 0.155 
   s.e. (5.252)** (6.632) (9.882) (2.681) (1.350)*** (0.694) 
  n 671 671 671 671 671 671 
  X 7424 8827 12838 828 1652 432 
Guardian   β -6.075 -3.848 -9.805 2.736 -1.641 0.265 
   s.e. (2.210)*** (2.898) (4.111)** (0.991)*** (0.622)*** (0.200) 
  n 565 565 565 565 565 565 
  
X 6741 8290 11872 829 1490 426 
THES   β 1.654 -1.239 -0.973 -0.147 1.501 -0.299 
   s.e. (3.814) (5.133) (6.802) (0.654) (1.095) (0.414) 
  n 123 123 123 123 123 123 
  
X 10282 11456 17535 743 2200 663 
ARWU   β -2.694 -5.161 -6.836 -0.151 -0.185 -0.122 
   s.e. (2.749) (3.635) (4.927) (0.628) (0.753) (0.261) 
  n 170 170 170 170 170 170 
  
X 9354 10484 16193 674 1870 572 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01                   
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Table 4-7: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on the Number of Applications by Age 
and Socio-Economic Class – UK-Domiciled Students 
  
  
  Age SEC 
    Young Mature High Low 
Times   β -16.58 4.548 -11.60 -0.804 
   s.e. (9.844)* (3.429) (5.965)* (3.206) 
  n 671 671 671 671 
  X 14016 2236 9143 4131 
Guardian   β -12.81 2.891 -6.999 -2.422 
   s.e. (4.307)*** (1.535)* (2.592)*** (1.455)* 
  n 565 565 565 565 
  X 12862 2168 8224 3848 
THES   β 1.322 -0.907 1.059 0.300 
   s.e. (7.804) (1.564) (5.635) (1.930) 
  n 123 123 123 123 
  X 19613 2125 14016 4254 
ARWU   β -7.428 -0.427 -5.654 -0.700 
   s.e. (5.775) (1.103) (4.083) (1.704) 
  n 170 170 170 170 
  X 17834 2003 12608 4037 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01               
 
 
Table 4-8: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on the Number of Applications by School 
Type and Prior Attainment – UK-Domiciled Students 
  
  
  School Type Prior Attainment 
    State Independent Top 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Middle Bottom 
Times   β -13.81 -6.261 -14.72 -3.098 9.458 -3.669 
   s.e. (9.355) (2.084)*** (3.969)*** (4.369) (4.797)* (4.590) 
  n 462 462 671 671 671 671 
  
X 9531 1826 4215 4165 3964 3908 
Guardian   β -10.39 -1.813 -3.006 -3.121 -4.047 0.251 
   s.e. (4.268)** (0.608)*** (1.191)** (1.588)* (2.058)* (2.331) 
  n 338 338 565 565 565 565 
  X 8712 1555 3762 3823 3709 3737 
THES   β 2.674 3.339 1.787 0.521 -1.508 -0.384 
   s.e. (4.039) (2.162) (4.752) (2.420) (2.883) (2.226) 
  n 68 68 123 123 123 123 
  X 13451 4405 10557 5776 2551 2855 
ARWU   β -0.573 -1.852 -4.724 -4.110 -0.0871 1.066 
   s.e. (4.213) (1.726) (3.241) (2.421)* (1.877) (2.048) 
  n 101 101 170 170 170 170 
  
X 12334 3647 8982 5485 2648 2722 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01                   
 
  
84 
 
Further investigation suggests that these findings may be restricted to certain institutions 
only: the Black finding, for instance, appears to be concentrated in London institutions 
and those that are consistently in the bottom tercile of the rankings65. With the fixed 
effects regression model used, the concern would be that there are underlying trends at 
those institutions which are correlated both with changes in ranking and with changes in 
the number (or proportion) of Black and mature applications. The existence of such 
unobserved trends would cause a spurious relationship between changes in rankings and 
changes in applications from certain groups. However, the findings about Black and 
mature applications are robust to the inclusion of institution-specific time trends, which 
should help in controlling for such time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. Although 
not proving the existence of a causal relationship between changes in rankings and the 
number of Black/mature applications, this suggests that the results should not be 
dismissed as a statistical artefact and that further research into the issue is warranted66. 
Finally, Table 4-9 explores the effect of a change in rankings on the number of 
applications received from EU and other overseas candidates, the proportion of these 
that are successful, and the fees charged by institutions to international students. Two 
fees columns are presented – the first is for fees charged for classroom-based courses, 
the second is for fees charged for laboratory-based courses.  
As was the case for domestic candidates, a fall in the Guardian and Times rankings is 
associated with a reduction in the number of EU and other overseas applications 
received by institutions. Again, the magnitude of a ten place drop in the rankings is 
relatively modest and ranges between 0.26% and 0.29% for EU applications, and 
between 0.19% and 0.47% for other overseas applications. The effect on the proportion 
of EU applications accepted is ambiguous, and no statistically significant effect could 
be detected on the proportion of other overseas applications accepted. Although higher 
ranked institutions may charge higher fees to international students, the results in Table 
4-9 suggest that there is no evidence that institutions adjust their fees in response to an 
annual change in rankings. This would be consistent with evidence from the US, where 
                                                 
65
 For each institution the annual Times and Guardian rankings were standardised and averaged. These 
were used to obtain an average ranking for the institution over the period 2002-2009. Using this average 
ranking over the period, the sample was split into terciles. 
66
 In the case of Black and mature applications, the simple models used in this chapter result in a within-
institution R2 of around 0.40. Although relatively large considering the parsimonious models used, it also 
suggests that a large proportion of the annual variation in applications to institutions is driven by factors 
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institutions were found not to change the sticker price of courses following a change in 
rankings (Monks and Ehrenberg, 1999). 
Table 4-9: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on Applications, the Proportion of 
Applications Accepted, and Fees Charged – International Students 
  
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
    
Number of 
EU 
Applications 
% of EU 
Applications 
Accepted 
Number of 
Other 
Overseas 
Applications 
% of Other 
Overseas 
Applications 
Accepted 
Fees 
Classroom-
Based 
Courses 
Fees 
Laboratory-
Based 
Courses 
Times   β -2.770 0.000448 -7.967 0.000422 -3.601 -4.810 
   s.e. (1.599)* (0.000487) (2.006)*** (0.000416) (2.481) (3.919) 
  n 780 692 671 671 799 799 
  X 967 0.73 1665 0.67 8573 9999 
Guardian   β -2.440 0.0000820 -2.780 0.0000963 -0.105 -1.479 
   s.e. (0.566)*** (0.000199) (0.868)*** (0.000284) (1.387) (1.809) 
  n 683 683 565 565 684 684 
  
X 952 0.74 1483 0.67 8690 10015 
THES   β -1.364 -0.000517 2.655 -0.0000973 -3.603 -4.281 
   s.e. (1.233) (0.000271)* (3.270) (0.000311) (2.240) (2.960) 
  n 160 160 123 123 130 130 
  
X 1797 0.58 3472 0.56 9886 12265 
ARWU   β 0.0910 0.000284 -0.0698 -0.0000727 1.723 2.228 
   s.e. (1.296) (0.000133)** (1.381) (0.000338) (2.040) (2.908) 
  n 214 214 170 170 220 220 
  
X 1571 0.62 2938 0.59 9800 12159 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 
  
A final observation concerns the slightly surprising result that the international rankings 
(THES, but particularly ARWU) appear to have no effect on international applicants. 
Although it is possible that international students only use rankings information once 
they have already chosen the country they wish to study in (in which case they might as 
well use domestic rankings because these cover a wider range of institutions), it is more 
likely that the lack of significant results is due to the smaller sample sizes available for 
the international rankings. Future research should therefore seek to test this result by 
building longer time series.  
4.6. Conclusion 
This chapter adds to the limited evidence on the effects of university rankings on 
institutions and applicants in the UK. The results suggest that rankings do matter in the 
UK. Overall, their effect is modest, although the impact on some types of applicants and 
institutions is stronger.  
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Comparing these results with previous findings for the US is not straightforward, as the 
US papers tend to focus on particular institutions (mainly top/elite institutions), or look 
at changes from one quartile of the rankings to another. In addition, effects are 
frequently expressed in percentage point changes, and so the actual importance of the 
change (in percentage terms) remains unclear. Nevertheless, the table in Annex 4G 
attempts to summarise some of the key findings from the US literature and suggests that 
the results found in this chapter are certainly not out of line with those found in the US. 
It is significant to find that university rankings have an impact on applicant and 
institution behaviour. However, judging by the modesty of the effects uncovered, 
rankings are clearly not the only driver of applicant choice. As Clarke (2007) notes: 
“some mix of the following factors likely influences students’ applications and 
enrolment decisions: perceived academic quality and reputation of the institution in 
general and academic program in particular, entry requirements, location, tuition costs, 
financial aid availability, infrastructure, employment prospects for graduates, social life, 
advice of significant persons, and commercially-produced materials such as guidebooks 
and ranking publications.” Soo (2011) (who concludes that the Sunday Times 
University Guide has no statistically significant impact on applications in the UK) does 
find some evidence of persistence in perceptions and applications, suggesting that 
general reputational factors are important.  
This chapter looked at the impact of rankings in the UK over the period 2002-2009, 
during which the maximum fee charged by institutions was kept artificially low. In 
England, tuition fees are set to rise to a maximum of £9,000 from September 2012 
onwards. It may be that, with the increasing marketisation of higher education in the 
UK, league tables will play an increasingly important role in applicants’ decisions in 
years to come67. In this sense, this chapter may be regarded as a baseline to compare 
future studies with.  
                                                 
67
 Although the fee cap was also raised in 2006/07, it was part of a comprehensive package of reforms to 
student finance (including the introduction of student loans to cover the cost of fees and the deferral of 
repayments until after graduation), which meant that the net upfront cost of going to university was 
actually reduced (Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness, 2010). As a result, it is unsurprising that no clear 
effect of raising the fee cap on the relationship between university ranking and applications to university 
could be detected (see Annex 4H for further detail).  
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Annex 2A: Chapter 2 Literature Review 
To the best of my knowledge, no economic studies have looked specifically at the effect 
of curriculum structure and offer on subsequent subject choice and attainment. 
However, a wider economic literature exists which addresses the issue of subject choice 
in school and higher education. This literature covers either: (i) the socio-demographic 
characteristics which are associated with the study of particular subjects; or (ii) the role 
of rates of return in subject choice. The former is predominantly descriptive in nature, 
whereas the latter attempts to uncover the intrinsic motivations behind pupils’ choice of 
subject.  
Socio-Demographic Characteristics Associated with Subject Choice 
Starting with the socio-demographic characteristics associated with subject choice in 
higher education, Chowdry et al. (2008) use a dataset similar to the one used in this 
chapter, and find that a student’s level of deprivation is not statistically associated with 
whether or not he/she chooses to study a STEM subject and that, by and large, more 
deprived students are more likely to study subjects with clear economic returns in the 
labour market (including Law). They also find that ethnic minority groups are 
significantly less likely to enrol in a STEM subject than their White counterparts, but 
more likely to enrol in high-wage-return degrees, including Law. This appears to chime 
with earlier analysis by Connor et al. (2004) who find a considerably higher 
concentration of minority ethnic students in Medicine/Dentistry, Computer Science and 
Law. By contrast, ethnic minority students are not well represented in the Physical 
Sciences, Languages, Art and Design, Humanities, Education, Veterinary Science and 
Agriculture. 
With regards to socio-economic class, Bratti (2006) also concludes that it has no effect 
on students’ undergraduate degree subject choice in the UK. Van de Werfhorst et al. 
(2003), however, find that children of the professional class were relatively more likely 
to choose Medicine and Law at university – although the authors themselves point out 
that this might be due to the specific characteristics of the cohort studied: at the time of 
the study only a very small minority of the working class entered higher education, and 
this could be considered as a very particular and selected group (e.g. in terms of 
academic ability). Van de Werfhorst et al. (2003) do find (consistent with the 
aforementioned studies) that ability/prior attainment plays a crucial role, as well young 
people’s “comparative” advantage in certain subjects (i.e. young people choose to study 
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subjects that they are relatively good at). Finally, the authors find a strong association 
between gender and subject choice.  
The above studies are the only ones I am aware of which look at subject choice in 
higher education in the UK. At secondary school level, such studies are less common 
and are often more closely affiliated with the education than with the economics 
literature (see, for instance, Ashworth and Evans, 2001; Davies et al., 2004; Bachan and 
Barrow, 2006; and Vidal Rodeiro, 2007). Mostly, these studies find effects of socio-
demographic variables and prior attainment similar to the ones discussed above in the 
context of higher education, although there are some interesting additional findings. For 
example, both Davies et al. (2004) and Ashworth and Evans (2001) find that the 
characteristics of the cohort of the students at the school (peer effects) are strongly 
associated with subject choice (e.g. proportion of students eligible for Free School 
Meals, the proportion of female students studying a particular subject, and the overall 
ability of fellow students).  
Turning to studies from outside the UK, Smyth and Hannan (2006) look at how school 
factors (such as subject provision (including time-tabling), the timing of subject choice, 
and ability grouping) influence the take-up of Biology, Physics and Chemistry at the 
upper secondary level in the Republic of Ireland. Unfortunately, the authors only look at 
the effect on immediate subject choice (i.e. whether the availability of one subject in the 
school has an effect on whether pupils take up other subjects or not), and not on later 
outcomes (which is the focus of Chapter 2 in this thesis). They find that students are 
more likely to take science subjects if they find them interesting and useful, and if they 
do well in science. The authors also conclude that the take-up of science subjects 
reflects a school’s decision about whether to provide a subject or not, along with school 
organisation and process at both lower and upper secondary levels. 
The Role of Rates of Return in Subject Choice 
This brings us onto the studies investigating the reasons behind subject choice. As 
mentioned above, these studies have tended to focus almost exclusively on the role of 
(expected) earnings on subject choice, as well as on people’s attitudes towards risk. 
Moreover, nearly all of these studies have been carried out outside the UK.  
Using Canadian data, Montmarquette et al. (2001) find that expected earnings influence 
subject choice and that the effect is twice as large for males as for females. The effect is 
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also larger for the non-white population than for the white group, but does not vary by 
socio-economic class. 
Rochat and Demeulemeester (2001) use data for Belgium and show that young people 
pay attention not only to the expected economic benefits, but also to the length of 
studies and the probability of succeeding in a chosen orientation. They find that the 
richest students do not appear to be sensitive to either the expected chances of success 
or the economic benefits linked with their orientation choice. Replicating this study 
using Italian data, Buonanno and Pozzoli (2007) also find that students take into 
account the a priori probability of success when choosing a college subject, and that 
students coming from a lower socio-economic background display more risk aversion. 
They believe that their findings can help explain an apparent paradox in the labour 
market where quantitative subjects are highly rewarded, yet the supply of suitable 
graduates does not appear to increase in response to those signals.  
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Annex 2B: Chapter 2 Variable Description 
Table 2B-1: Explanatory Variables: Individual Socio-Demographics 
Variable Description Unique Values Mean Min Max 
female Dummy for whether individual is female. 2 0,494 0 1 
fsm_reg Dummy for whether individual was on Free School Meals at age 15.  Missing values have been set to 0. 2 0,138 0 1 
fsm_missing Dummy for whether FSM information is missing. 2 0,001 0 1 
quartile1 Dummy for whether individual lived in 25% most deprived areas.  Omitted category is for individuals living in 25% 
least deprived areas. 
2 0,248 0 1 
quartile2 Dummy for whether individual lived in 25% second most deprived areas.  Omitted category is for individuals living 
in 25% least deprived areas. 
2 0,248 0 1 
quartile3 Dummy for whether individual lived in 25% second least deprived areas.  Omitted category is for individuals living 
in 25% least deprived areas. 
2 0,248 0 1 
Quartilem Dummy for whether area deprivation information was missing. 2 0,009 0 1 
eth_w_oth  Dummy for whether individual belonged to White Other ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,022 0 1 
eth_a_ind  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Asian Indian ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,025 0 1 
eth_a_pak  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Asian Pakistani ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,024 0 1 
eth_a_ban  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Asian Bangladeshi ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,009 0 1 
eth_a_oth  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Asian Other ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,003 0 1 
eth_b_car  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Black Caribbean ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,014 0 1 
eth_b_afr  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Black African ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,013 0 1 
eth_b_oth  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Black Other ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,006 0 1 
eth_chi  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Chinese ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,004 0 1 
eth_mix  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Mixed ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,009 0 1 
eth_oth  Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group. Omitted category is White UK. 2 0,057 0 1 
eth_w_oth _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,009 0 1 
eth_a_ind _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,012 0 1 
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Variable Description Unique Values Mean Min Max 
female Dummy for whether individual is female. 2 0,494 0 1 
eth_a_pak _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,012 0 1 
eth_a_ban _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,005 0 1 
eth_a_oth _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,003 0 1 
eth_b_car _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,007 0 1 
eth_b_afr _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,007 0 1 
eth_b_oth _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,002 0 1 
eth_chi _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,002 0 1 
eth_mix _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,009 0 1 
eth_oth _86 Dummy for whether individual belonged to Other ethnic group AND to the 1986 cohort. Omitted category is White 
UK. 
2 0,032 0 1 
Sen Dummy for whether individual had Special Educational Needs 2 0,160 0 1 
sen_86 Dummy for whether individual had Special Educational Needs AND belonged to the 1986 cohort. 2 0,074 0 1 
language_reg Dummy for whether individual had a mother tongue other than English. Missing values set to zero. 2 0,089 0 1 
language_missing Dummy for whether information on the individual's mother tongue was missing. 2 0,001 0 1 
 _Imob_2 Dummy for being born in February. Omitted category is January. 2 0,081 0 1 
 _Imob_3 Dummy for being born in March. Omitted category is January. 2 0,087 0 1 
 _Imob_4 Dummy for being born in April. Omitted category is January. 2 0,084 0 1 
 _Imob_5 Dummy for being born in May. Omitted category is January. 2 0,087 0 1 
 _Imob_6 Dummy for being born in June. Omitted category is January. 2 0,080 0 1 
 _Imob_7 Dummy for being born in July. Omitted category is January. 2 0,084 0 1 
 _Imob_8 Dummy for being born in August. Omitted category is January. 2 0,084 0 1 
 _Imob_9 Dummy for being born in September. Omitted category is January. 2 0,081 0 1 
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Variable Description Unique Values Mean Min Max 
female Dummy for whether individual is female. 2 0,494 0 1 
 _Imob_10 Dummy for being born in October. Omitted category is January. 2 0,083 0 1 
 _Imob_11 Dummy for being born in November. Omitted category is January. 2 0,081 0 1 
 _Imob_12 Dummy for being born in December. Omitted category is January. 2 0,082 0 1 
 
Table 2B-2: Explanatory Variables: Individual Attainment 
Variable Description Unique Values Mean Min Max 
ks2_e_level_reg  Individual attainment in KS2 English test. Missing values set to zero.                  259  3,818 0 6,58 
ks2_e_level_miss  Dummy for whether individual attainment in KS2 English test is missing.                     2  0,101 0 1 
ks2_m_level_reg  Individual attainment in KS2 Mathematics test. Missing values set to zero.                  271  3,821 0 6,90 
ks2_m_level_miss  Dummy for whether individual attainment in KS2 Mathematics test is missing.                     2  0,092 0 1 
ks2_s_level_reg  Individual attainment in KS2 Science test. Missing values set to zero.                  237  3,936 0 6,89 
ks2_s_level_miss  Dummy for whether individual attainment in KS2 Science test is missing.                     2  0,091 0 1 
ks3_e_level_reg  Individual attainment in KS3 English test. Missing values set to zero.                  240  4,954 0 9,73 
ks3_e_level_miss  Dummy for whether individual attainment in KS3 English test is missing.                     2  0,082 0 1 
ks3_m_level_reg  Individual attainment in KS3 Mathematics test. Missing values set to zero.               1 122  5,407 0 9,95 
ks3_m_level_miss  Dummy for whether individual attainment in KS3 Mathematics test is missing.                     2  0,052 0 1 
ks3_s_level_reg  Individual attainment in KS3 Science test. Missing values set to zero.                  689  5,111 0 9,78 
ks3_s_level_miss Dummy for whether individual attainment in KS3 English test is missing.                     2  0,055 0 1 
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Table 2B-3: Explanatory Variables: Year Group Socio-Demographics 
Variable Description Unique Values Mean Min Max 
class_female  Proportion of year group who are female.               2 772  0,494 0 1,00 
class_fsm_reg  Proportion of year group who are on Free School Meals. Missing values set to zero.               3 722  0,138 0 1,00 
class_fsm_miss   Dummy if FSM information for entire year group is missing.                     2  0,000 0 1 
class_q1  Proportion of year group who come from 25% most deprived areas.               4 166  0,248 0 1,00 
class_q2  Proportion of year group who come from 25% second most deprived areas.               4 216  0,248 0 1,00 
class_q3  Proportion of year group who come from 25% second least deprived areas.               4 192  0,248 0 1,00 
class_qm  Proportion of year group with missing information on area deprivation.                  950  0,009 0 1,00 
class_w_oth  Proportion of year group from White Other ethnic group. 
    
class_a_ind  Proportion of year group from Asian Indian ethnic group.               1 402  0,025 0 1,00 
class_a_pak  Proportion of year group from Asian Pakistani ethnic group.               1 322  0,024 0 0,91 
class_a_ban  Proportion of year group from Asian Bangladeshi ethnic group.                  788  0,009 0 1,00 
class_a_oth  Proportion of year group from Asian Other ethnic group.                  540  0,003 0 0,29 
class_b_car  Proportion of year group from Black Caribbean ethnic group.               1 193  0,014 0 0,82 
class_b_afr  Proportion of year group from Black African ethnic group.               1 031  0,013 0 1,00 
class_b_oth  Proportion of year group from Black Other ethnic group.                  848  0,006 0 1,00 
class_chi  Proportion of year group from Chinese ethnic group.                  606  0,004 0 0,11 
class_mix  Proportion of year group from Mixed ethnic group.               1 065  0,009 0 0,35 
class_oth  Proportion of year group from  Other ethnic group.               2 006  0,057 0 1,00 
class_sen  Proportion of year group with Special Educational Needs.               3 731  0,160 0 0,86 
class_language_reg  Proportion of year group with mother tongue other than English.               2 517  0,090 0 1,00 
class_language_miss Dummy if information on mother tongue us missing for entire year group.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
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Table 2B-4: Explanatory Variables: Year Group Attainment 
Variable Description Unique Values Mean Min Max 
class_ks2_e_reg  Average KS2 English attainment of year group.               6 216  4,238 0 5,31 
class_ks2_e_miss  Dummy for KS2 English attainment missing for entire year group.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
class_ks2_m_reg  Average KS2 Mathematics attainment of year group.               6 219  4,201 0 5,71 
class_ks2_m_miss  Dummy for KS2 Mathematics attainment missing for entire year group.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
class_ks2_s_reg  Average KS2 Science attainment of year group.               6 213  4,322 0 5,29 
class_ks2_s_miss  Dummy for KS2 Science attainment missing for entire year group.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
class_ks3_e_reg  Average KS3 English attainment of year group.               6 220  5,377 0 7,78 
class_ks3_e_miss Dummy for KS3 English attainment missing for entire year group.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
class_ks3_m_reg  Average KS3 Mathematics attainment of year group.               6 224  5,691 0 8,30 
class_ks3_m_miss  Dummy for KS3 Mathematics attainment missing for entire year group.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
class_ks3_s_reg Average KS3 Science attainment of year group.               6 223  5,393 0 7,78 
class_ks3_s_miss Dummy for KS3 Science attainment missing for entire year group.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
 
Table 2B-5: Explanatory Variables: School Resources 
Variable Description Unique Values Mean Min Max 
yr11_fte_pupils_reg  Number of Full-Time Equivalent pupils in individual's school when s/he is in year 11.               1 543  1112,5 0 2624,0 
yr11_fte_pupils_miss Dummy if information on FTE pupils in individual's school is missing.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
yr11_fte_qualteach_reg  Number of Full-Time Equivalent qualified teachers in individual's school when s/he is in year 
11. 
                 962  65,8 0 148,2 
yr11_fte_qualteach_miss  Dummy if information on FTE qualified teachers in individual's school is missing.                     2  0,000 0 1,00 
yr11_fte_othteach_reg  Number of Full-Time Equivalent other teachers in individual's school when s/he is in year 11.                  185  2,4 0 37,2 
yr11_fte_othteach_miss  Dummy if information on FTE other teachers in individual's school is missing.                     2  0,382 0 1,00 
yr11_fte_tech_reg  Number of Full-Time Equivalent technicians in individual's school when s/he is in year 11.                  146  5,1 0 21,8 
yr11_fte_tech_miss Dummy if information on FTE technicians in individual's school is missing.                     2  0,146 0 1,00 
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Table 2B-6: Dependent Variables 
Variable Description Unique Values Mean Min Max 
out_alevel  Whether individual attained equivalent of 2 Vocational or Academic A Level passes.                     2  0,328 0 1,00 
out_l3_bio  Whether individual took A Level Biology.                     2  0,050 0 1,00 
out_l3_bio_a  Whether individual attained a grade A in A Level Biology.                     2  0,011 0 1,00 
out_l3_che Whether individual took A Level Chemistry.                     2  0,036 0 1,00 
 out_l3_che_a  Whether individual attained a grade A in A Level Chemistry.                     2  0,010 0 1,00 
out_l3_mat  Whether individual took A Level Mathematics.                     2  0,052 0 1,00 
out_l3_mat_a  Whether individual attained a grade A in A Level Mathematics.                     2  0,018 0 1,00 
out_l3_phy  Whether individual took A Level Physics.                     2  0,028 0 1,00 
out_l3_phy_a  Whether individual attained a grade A in A Level Physics.                     2  0,007 0 1,00 
out_he_19  Whether individual is doing a 1st Degree at the age of 19.                     2  0,279 0 1,00 
out_russell_19  Whether the individual is studying in a Russell Group institution at 19.                     2  0,058 0 1,00 
out_stem_19  Whether the individual is studying a STEM 1st Degree at 19.                     2  0,108 0 1,00 
out_he_bio_19  Whether the individual is studying a 1st Degree in Biological Sciences at 19.                     2  0,027 0 1,00 
out_he_eng_19  Whether the individual is studying a 1st Degree in Engineering  and Technology at 19.                     2  0,011 0 1,00 
out_he_mat_19  Whether the individual is studying a 1st Degree in Mathematics and Computer Science.                     2  0,017 0 1,00 
out_he_med_19  Whether the individual is studying a 1st Degree in Medicine, Dentistry and Veterinary Science at 19.                     2  0,008 0 1,00 
out_he_phy_19 Whether the individual is studying a 1st Degree in Physical Sciences in HE at 19.                     2  0,012 0 1,00 
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Annex 2C: Identifying Schools That Offer Triple Science  
The Department for Education classifies a school as offering Triple Science if at least 
one pupil in the school is observed to enter the separate sciences. Although the same 
method employed by the Department for Education is used throughout Chapter 2, we 
cannot be absolutely sure that schools classified as not having offered Triple Science 
did not offer the programme. This is because a school might be offering Triple Science 
but no pupil chooses to take it. As a result, in schools where a switch in the science 
curriculum is observed, we may simply be observing pupil take-up of Triple Science. In 
order to test the extent to which this affects the results, two robustness checks are run.   
First, I verify whether, in schools that allegedly dropped Triple Science from their 
curriculum, there was an accompanying increase in the number of pupils taking Double 
Science (the next best alternative). Similarly, in schools that took on Triple Science, I 
check whether there was an associated drop in the number of pupils taking Double 
Science. We do indeed notice a decrease in the proportion of students attempting 
Double Science from 42.1% to 39.0% in schools that take on Triple Science. The 
proportion of pupils who take Triple Science in those schools is 4.6%. Similarly, in 
schools that initially offered Triple Science but then dropped it, we observe an increase 
in the proportion of pupils who take Double Science from 37.1% to 41.2%. The original 
proportion of pupils taking Triple Science in those schools was 3.0%. These results 
suggest that there is indeed a change in the science curriculum on offer in the schools 
looked at, and that changes in Triple Science status are not driven solely by 
measurement error. 
As a second robustness check, the threshold for identifying schools which offer and do 
not offer Triple Science is raised. Rather than classifying schools according to whether 
at least one pupil took Triple Science, they are now classified according to whether at 
least two/three/four/five/six pupils took Triple Science. So the schools which go from 
not offering to offering Triple Science will need to have zero pupils registered as taking 
Triple Science in the first year, and then two/three/four/five/six pupils in the second 
year. Similarly, in schools which initially offered Triple Science but subsequently 
dropped it, there would need to have been two/three/four/five/six pupils taking Triple 
Science in the first year, and then none in the second year.  
The analysis is re-run using these new definitions. The results are presented in Table 
2C-1, which shows the coefficients on the “Triple Science” variable from the a set of 
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regressions where the threshold for identifying schools that offer Triple Science is 
gradually increased from one to six. These results are different from the main results 
presented in Table 2-10. This was to be expected, as the effect of Triple Science is now 
being identified using variation within a different set of schools. Not only will some 
schools have dropped out of the analysis, others will now be included as “treatment” 
schools. Consider the case of a school which, in the first year, had ten pupils taking 
Triple Science, but which only had one in the second year. Previously, this school 
would have been classified as a school that offered Triple Science in both years. 
However, by raising the threshold above one, this school would now be classified as a 
school that offered Triple Science in the first year, but not in the second. 
At some thresholds, the results suggest marginally significant effects on the likelihood 
of taking Biology, Chemistry, Physics and Mathematics at A Level; as well as on the 
likelihood of doing well in A Level Physics. Interestingly, we now find very strong 
effects of offering Triple Science on the likelihood that pupils will achieve A Levels, as 
well as on the likelihood of entering higher education. Overall, however, the 
conclusions drawn in the main body of the text are not contradicted, and Triple Science 
is found to have a positive effect on both subject choice and attainment.   
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Table 2C-1: Increasing the Threshold for Identifying Schools that Offer Triple Science 
  Number of Pupils Required for the School to be Classified as Offering Triple Science 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Two A Level Passes 0.00180 0.00431 0.00509 0.00649 0.00732 0,00926 
(0.00260) (0.00322) (0.00324) (0.00326)** (0.00329)** (0.00328)*** 
Took A Level Biology (1) 0.00536 0.00697 0.00674 0.00803 0.00785 0,00671 
(0.00393) (0.00464) (0.00476) (0.00474)* (0.00482) (0.00484) 
Took A Level Chemistry (1) 0.00849 0.00682 0.00535 0.00540 0.00628 0,00658 
(0.00331)** (0.00382)* (0.00391) (0.00390) (0.00391) (0.00382)* 
Took A Level Physics (1) 0.00452 0.00360 0.00385 0.00421 0.00506 0,00378 
(0.00267)* (0.00318) (0.00323) (0.00327) (0.00329) (0.00326) 
Took A Level Mathematics (1) 0.0100 0.00720 0.00621 0.00629 0.00735 0,00616 
(0.00348)*** (0.00430)* (0.00441) (0.00439) (0.00454) (0.00448) 
Grade A in A Level Biology (2) 0.00654 -0.00597 -0.00413 -0.00222 -0.00233 -0,00244 
(0.0101) (0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0131) (0.0131) 
Grade A in A Level Chemistry (2) 0.0130 0.0131 0.00945 0.0119 0.0133 0,0115 
(0.0127) (0.0138) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0146) (0.0146) 
Grade A in A Level Physics (2) 0.0319 0.0290 0.0224 0.0257 0.0255 0,0236 
(0.0143)** (0.0170)* (0.0176) (0.0174) (0.0177) (0.0178) 
Grade A in A Level Mathematics (2) -0.00177 0.0112 0.0129 0.00949 0.00988 0,00798 
(0.0115) (0.0136) (0.0143) (0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0146) 
In HE at 19 0.00373 0.00689 0.00666 0.00712 0.00769 0,00899 
(0.00229) (0.00282)** (0.00290)** (0.00288)** (0.00292)*** (0.00295)*** 
In a Russell Group Institution at 19 (3) 0.00413 0.00330 0.00305 0.00407 0.00349 -0,000431 
(0.00448) (0.00550) (0.00568) (0.00565) (0.00571) (0.00569) 
STEM in HE at 19 (3) 0.00720 0.00515 0.00408 0.00328 0.00353 0,00307 
(0.00548) (0.00634) (0.00652) (0.00647) (0.00658) (0.0064) 
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  Number of Pupils Required for the School to be Classified as Offering Triple Science 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Biological Sciences in HE at 19 (3) -0.00173 -0.00395 -0.00422 -0.00412 -0.00524 -0,00334 
(0.00343) (0.00385) (0.00398) (0.00396) (0.00403) (0.00397) 
Medicine, Dentistry and Veterinary Sciences in HE at 19 (3) -0.000421 0.000212 0.0000591 -0.000770 -0.000622 -0,00113 
(0.00158) (0.00184) (0.00190) (0.00189) (0.00190) (0.00188) 
Physical Sciences in HE at 19 (3) 0.00160 0.000414 -0.000184 0.000921 0.00145 0,00137 
(0.00232) (0.00275) (0.00281) (0.00283) (0.00287) (0.0028) 
Engineering and Technology in HE at 19 (3) 0.00298 0.00428 0.00330 0.00274 0.00214 0,00174 
(0.00210) (0.00237)* (0.00244) (0.00240) (0.00245) (0.00233) 
Mathematics and Computer Science in HE at 19 (3) -0.000457 -0.00152 -0.00120 -0.00200 -0.00236 -0,00272 
(0.00291) (0.00324) (0.00331) (0.00328) (0.00333) (0.00335) 
Number of Schools that Take on Triple Science 192 144 138 132 129 126 
Number of Schools that Drop Triple Science 145 74 68 67 66 62 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on the “Triple Science” variable for variants of specification (vii) in Table 2-10 where the number of pupils doing Triple Science needed for the 
school to be classified as offering Triple Science is gradually increased from 1 to 6. Note that the results in the first column correspond to those in column (vii) in Table 2-10.  
* p<0.10  **<0.05  ***<0.01  
(1)  Conditional on having been entered for A Level or equivalent qualifications; (2) Conditional on having been entered for examination in the subject; (3) Conditional on being in 
HE at 19.       
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Annex 2D: Analysis on Sub-Sample of Pupils with Identical KS3 and KS4 Establishments 
Table 2D-1: Effect of Being Offered Triple Science: Sub-Sample of Pupils with Identical KS3 and KS4 Establishments 
    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
Two A Level Passes Triple Science 0.121 0.0806 0.0224 0.0161 0.00705 0.00416 0.00195 
(s.e.) (0.00687)*** (0.00516)*** (0.00240)*** (0.00232)*** (0.00216)*** (0.00213)* (0.00269) 
Took A Level Biology (1) Triple Science 0.0218 0.0209 -0.00204 -0.00299 -0.00398 -0.00429 0.00378 
(s.e.) (0.00332)*** (0.00321)*** (0.00260) (0.00264) (0.00266) (0.00267) (0.00399) 
Took A Level Chemistry (1) Triple Science 0.0256 0.0247 0.000858 0.000736 -0.000373 -0.000186 0.00697 
(s.e.) (0.00311)*** (0.00293)*** (0.00209) (0.00208) (0.00210) (0.00212) (0.00327)** 
Took A Level Physics (1) Triple Science 0.0301 0.0223 0.00461 0.00494 0.00513 0.00508 0.00409 
(s.e.) (0.00278)*** (0.00227)*** (0.00171)*** (0.00169)*** (0.00167)*** (0.00169)*** (0.00269) 
Took A Level Mathematics (1) Triple Science 0.0417 0.0336 -0.00201 -0.0000842 0.00326 0.00327 0.00991 
(s.e.) (0.00409)*** (0.00349)*** (0.00239) (0.00234) (0.00230) (0.00229) (0.00354)*** 
Grade A in A Level Biology (2) Triple Science 0.0700 0.0662 0.00890 0.00855 0.00864 0.00994 0.00618 
(s.e.) (0.00770)*** (0.00728)*** (0.00501)* (0.00489)* (0.00477)* (0.00482)** (0.0102) 
Grade A in A Level Chemistry (2) Triple Science 0.0889 0.0800 0.0209 0.0204 0.0181 0.0190 0.0112 
(s.e.) (0.00943)*** (0.00892)*** (0.00659)*** (0.00635)*** (0.00620)*** (0.00625)*** (0.0131) 
Grade A in A Level Physics (2) Triple Science 0.0843 0.0775 0.0105 0.00962 0.00957 0.0107 0.0304 
(s.e.) (0.00927)*** (0.00898)*** (0.00601)* (0.00611) (0.00597) (0.00596)* (0.0145)** 
Grade A in A Level Mathematics (2) Triple Science 0.0748 0.0682 0.00299 -0.000473 -0.000811 -0.000243 -0.00249 
(s.e.) (0.00875)*** (0.00827)*** (0.00565) (0.00569) (0.00580) (0.00583) (0.0117) 
In HE at 19 Triple Science 0.103 0.0725 0.0234 0.0167 0.00442 0.00303 0.00344 
(s.e.) (0.00631)*** (0.00481)*** (0.00238)*** (0.00223)*** (0.00191)** (0.00191) (0.00242) 
In a Russell Group Institution at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.0696 0.0571 0.0172 0.0102 0.00105 0.00132 0.00382 
(s.e.) (0.00605)*** (0.00564)*** (0.00364)*** (0.00339)*** (0.00329) (0.00327) (0.00454) 
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    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
STEM in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00882 0.00255 -0.00941 -0.00411 -0.000115 0.000837 0.00678 
(s.e.) (0.00296)*** (0.00286) (0.00285)*** (0.00279) (0.00278) (0.00278) (0.00563) 
Biological Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science -0.000369 -0.00124 -0.00312 -0.00187 -0.0000163 0.000177 -0.00185 
(s.e.) (0.00143) (0.00140) (0.00142)** (0.00145) (0.00149) (0.00149) (0.00348) 
Medicine, Dentistry and Veterinary Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00825 0.00791 0.00207 0.000895 -0.000954 -0.000698 -0.000670 
(s.e.) (0.00123)*** (0.00119)*** (0.000946)** (0.000913) (0.000919) (0.000921) (0.00158) 
Physical Sciences in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00617 0.00252 -0.00207 -0.00102 0.000126 0.000206 0.00166 
(s.e.) (0.00113)*** (0.00102)** (0.00101)** (0.00100) (0.000999) (0.00101) (0.00241) 
Engineering and Technology in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science 0.00482 0.00107 -0.000899 -0.000135 0.000472 0.000654 0.00304 
(s.e.) (0.00120)*** (0.000952) (0.000937) (0.000923) (0.000923) (0.000924) (0.00211) 
Mathematics and Computer Science in HE at 19 (3) Triple Science -0.00455 -0.00485 -0.00531 -0.00172 0.000460 0.000506 -0.00112 
  (s.e.) (0.00138)*** (0.00122)*** (0.00123)*** (0.00114) (0.00115) (0.00115) (0.00296) 
 
Notes: Table reproduces Table 2-10 on sub-sample of pupils for whom the KS3 and KS4 establishments were the same.  
* p<0.10  **<0.05  ***<0.01       
(1)  Conditional on having been entered for A Level or equivalent qualifications; (2) Conditional on having been entered for examination in the subject; (3) Conditional on being in 
HE at 19. 
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Annex 2E: Effect of Triple Science on English 
As a falsification exercise to test the robustness of the results obtained in Chapter 2, this 
annex looks at what effect offering Triple Science has on the take-up of, and attainment 
in, English at A Level (English, English Language and English Literature68).  
The effect of Triple Science on the take-up of English is relatively straightforward to 
analyse from a theoretical perspective. If offering Triple Science makes pupils more 
likely to choose science subjects at A Level, then this will have to come at the expense 
of some other subject. This could be English (in which case we would expect the effect 
of offering Triple Science on the take-up of English to be negative) or some other, more 
“marginal” subjects like History, Geography, Economics or Psychology (in which case 
the effect on English should be zero). Either way, we would not expect the effect to be 
positive: it would be counter-intuitive if offering Triple Science increased the take-up of 
English at A Level, and this would throw doubt on the results obtained in this chapter.  
The effect of offering Triple Science on attainment in English is more difficult to 
predict. It could be positive if the more intensive study of sciences increases pupils’ 
ability all-round and has positive spill-over effects on other subjects outside Science and 
Mathematics. It could also be negative if offering Triple Science leads the brightest 
students to study science at A Level, leaving the slightly lesser able ones to study 
English. A negative effect could also result from pupils having to drop non-science 
subjects in favour of science subjects, so they are less well prepared for the study of 
non-science subjects at a higher level. 
Table 2E-1 below presents the coefficients on the “Triple Science” variable in 
regressions similar to specification (vii) in Table 2-10 but where the outcome variables 
are now: (i) the likelihood of taking the various English A Levels and (ii) attainment in 
those A Levels conditional on having taken them. The results are encouraging: not one 
is statistically significant. The results on attainment in English mostly suggest no effect 
at all, although there is a marginally significant (10% confidence level) and negative 
effect on the likelihood of attaining a Grade A in English.  
  
                                                 
68
 There are three different options available for studying English at A Level: English Literature, English 
Language, or English (which is a combination of English Language and English Literature into one 
subject). 
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Table 2E-1: Effect of Triple Science on Take-up of, and Attainment in, English at 
A Level 
Took A Level English (1) Triple Science -0.00114 
(s.e.) (0.00323) 
Took A Level English Literature (1) Triple Science -0.000593 
(s.e.) (0.00459) 
Took A Level English Language (1) Triple Science -0.000428 
(s.e.) (0.00375) 
Grade A in A Level English (2) Triple Science -0.0241 
(s.e.) (0.0137)* 
Grade A in A Level English Literature (2) Triple Science -0.0132 
(s.e.) (0.00984) 
Grade A in A Level Language (2) Triple Science -0.00140 
  (s.e.) (0.0110) 
* p<0.10  **<0.05  ***<0.01 
(1) Conditional on having been entered for A Level or equivalent qualifications. 
(2) Conditional on having been entered for examination in the subject. 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients on Triple Science for a series of regressions similar to those in 
specification (vii) of Table 2-10, but where the outcome variables are now the likelihood of taking 
English A Levels, and of attaining a grade A in them. 
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Annex 3A: Typical Entry Requirements for Courses at Royal Holloway, University of London 
Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
Ancient History (V110) ABB  
Ancient History and Philosophy (VV15) ABB  
Ancient History with Philosophy (V1V5) ABB  
Applied Physics (F313) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physics 
Astrophysics (F510) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physics 
Astrophysics (F511) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physics 
Biochemistry (C700) ABB Biology at grade B and Chemistry at grade B 
Biology (C100) ABB  Biology at grade B and Any Science subject 
Biology with Psychology (C1C8) ABB  Biology at grade B and Any Science subject 
Biomedical Sciences (B990) ABB Biology at grade B and Chemistry at grade B 
Classical Studies (Q810) ABB  
Classical Studies and Drama (QW84) AAB  
Classical Studies and Italian (QR73) ABB Italian or European Language 
Classical Studies and Philosophy (QV8M) BBB  
Classical Studies with Philosophy (Q9V5) ABB  
Classics (Q800) ABB Latin at grade B or Classical Greek at grade B 
Classics and Philosophy (QV85) ABB Latin at grade B or Classical Greek at grade B 
Classics with Philosophy (Q8V5) ABB Latin at grade B or Classical Greek at grade B 
Comparative Literature & Culture and English (QQ23) ABB English at grade A 
Comparative Literature & Culture and French (QR21) ABB-BBB French at grade B 
Comparative Literature & Culture and German (QR22) ABB-BBB German at grade B 
Comparative Literature & Culture and Hispanic St (QR24)  Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Comparative Literature & Culture and Italian (QR23)  Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Comparative Literature & Culture and Philosophy (QV25) ABB-BBB Including at least one language or essay-based subject 
Comparative Literature & Culture with Film St (Q2P3) ABB-BBB Including at least one language or essay-based subject 
Comparative Literature & Culture with Philosophy (Q2V5) ABB-BBB Including at least one language or essay-based subject 
Comparative Literature and Culture (Q200) ABB-BBB Including at least one language or essay-based subject 
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Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
Computer Science (G400) ABC/BBB Including a Mathematical based Science subject 
Computer Science (Artificial Intelligence) (G4G7) ABB Including a Mathematical based Science subject 
Computer Science (Year in Industry) (G402) ABB Including a Mathematical based Science subject 
Computer Science and Mathematics (GG41) ABB Mathematics at grade A 
Computer Science with French (G4R1) ABC/BBB Including grade B in French plus grade C in a Mathematical based Science subject 
Computer Science with Management (G4N2) ABC/BBB Including a Mathematical based Science subject 
Computing and Business (GN41) ABB  Including a Mathematical based Science subject 
Criminology and Sociology (LM39) BBB  
Drama and Creative Writing (WW48) AAB   
Drama and German (WR42) ABB  German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Drama and Italian (WR43) ABB  Modern Foreign Language at grade B 
Drama and Music (WW43) ABB  Music at grade A 
Drama and Philosophy (WV45) AAB   
Drama and Theatre Studies (W440) AAB   
Drama with Philosophy (W4V5) AAB   
Ecology and Environment (C150) ABB Biology at grade B and Any Science subject 
Economics (L101)  ABB required if including Mathematics, or AAB with AS Mathematics at grade B, or AAA 
with GCSE Mathematics at grade A 
Economics and Management (LN12)  ABB required if including Mathematics, or AAB with AS Mathematics at grade B, or AAA 
with GCSE Mathematics at grade A 
Economics and Mathematics (LG11) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
Economics with French (L1R1)  Grades ABB required if including Mathematics and French, or AAB including French with 
AS Mathematics at grade B, or AAA including French with GCSE Mathematics at grade A 
Economics with German (L1R2)  Grades ABB required if including Mathematics and German (or European Language or Latin), 
or AAB including German (or European language or Latin) with AS Mathematics at grade B, 
or AAA including German (or European Language or Latin) with GCSE Mathematics at grade 
A 
Economics with Italian (L1R3)  Grades ABB required if including Mathematics and Italian (or European Language), or AAB 
including Italian (or European language) with AS Mathematics at grade B, or AAA including 
Italian (or European Language) with GCSE Mathematics at grade A 
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Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
Economics with Music (L1W3)  Grades ABB required if including Music grade A and Mathematics, or AAB including Music 
grade A with AS Mathematics at grade B, or AAA including Music grade A with GCSE 
Mathematics at grade A. 
Economics with Political Studies (L1L2)  Grades ABB required if including Mathematics, or AAB with AS Mathematics at grade B, or 
AAA with GCSE Mathematics at grade A. 
Economics with Spanish (L1R4)  Grades ABB required if including Mathematics and Spanish, or AAB including Spanish with 
AS Mathematics at grade B, or AAA including Spanish with GCSE Mathematics at grade A. 
Economics, Politics & International Relations (LL12)  Grades ABB required if including Mathematics, or AAB with AS Mathematics at grade B, or 
AAA with GCSE Mathematics at grade A. 
English (Q300) AAB English at grade A 
English and Classical Studies (QQ38) ABB English at grade A 
English and Creative Writing (QW38) AAB English at grade A 
English and Drama (QW34) AAB English at grade A 
English and French (QR31) ABB English at grade A and French at grade B 
English and German (QR32)  English at grade A and (German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at 
grade B) 
English and Italian (QR33) ABB English at grade A and European Language at grade B.  
English and Latin (QQ36) ABB English at grade A and Latin at grade B 
English and Philosophy (QV35) AAB English at grade A 
English and Spanish (QR34) ABB English at grade A and (Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade 
B) 
English with Philosophy (Q3V5) AAB English at grade A 
Environmental Geology (F630) BBB Any Science subject at grade B 
Environmental Geology with a Year in Industry (F690) BBB Any Science subject at grade B 
Environmental Geoscience (F631) ABB  Any Science subject at grade B 
Environmental Geoscience with Year in Industry (F644) ABB  Any Science subject at grade B 
European Studies (French) (R100) ABB  French at grade B 
European Studies (German) (R200) ABB  German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
European Studies (Italian) (R300) ABB  Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
European Studies (Spanish) (R401) ABB Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Film & Television Studies with Philosophy (W6V5) ABB  
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Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
Film and Television (W620) ABB  
Finance and Mathematics (NG31) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
Financial and Business Economics (L111) AAA-ABB Mathematics at grade B 
French (4 years) (R120) ABB-BBB  French at grade B 
French and Classical Studies (RQ18) ABB French at grade B 
French and Drama (RW14) ABB French at grade B 
French and German (RR12) ABB-BBB French at grade B and (German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade 
B) 
French and Greek (RQ17) ABB French at grade B and Classical Greek at grade B 
French and History (RV11) ABB French at grade B 
French and Italian (RR13) ABB-BBB French at grade B 
French and Latin (RQ16) ABB French at grade B and Latin at grade B 
French and Management (RN12) ABB French at grade B 
French and Music (RW13) ABB French at grade B and Music at grade A 
French and Philosophy (RV15) ABB-BBB French at grade B 
French and Spanish (RR14) ABB-BBB French at grade B and Spanish at grade B 
French with Film Studies (R1P3) ABB-BBB French at grade B 
French with German (R1R2) ABB-BBB French at grade B and (German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade 
B) 
French with International Relations (R1LF) ABB-BBB  French at grade B 
French with Italian (R1R3) ABB-BBB  French at grade B 
French with Mathematics (R1G1) ABB French at grade B and Mathematics at grade A 
French with Music (R1W3) ABB French at grade B and Music at grade B 
French with Philosophy (R1V5) ABB-BBB  French at grade B 
French with Political Studies (R1L2) ABB-BBB  French at grade B 
French with Spanish (R1R4) ABB-BBB  French at grade B and Spanish at grade B 
Geography (F800) ABB Geography at grade B 
Geography (L700) ABB  Geography at grade B 
Geography, Politics and International Relations (FL82) AAB  Geography at grade B 
Geology (F600) BBB  Any Science subject at grade B 
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Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
Geology with a Year in Industry (F603) BBB  Any Science subject at grade B 
Geoscience (F601) ABB  Any Science subject at grade B 
Geoscience with a Year in Industry (F642) ABB  Any Science subject at grade B 
Geoscience with A Year of International Study (F602) AAB Any Science subject 
German (R220) ABB-BBB  German at grade B 
German and Classical Studies (RQ28) ABB German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
German and Greek (RQ27) ABB  Classical Greek at grade B and (German at grade B or European Language at grade B or 
Latin at grade B) 
German and History (RV21) ABB German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
German and Italian (RR23) ABB-BBB  German at grade B and Italian at grade B. (European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B) 
German and Latin (RQ26) ABB German at grade B and Latin at grade B 
German and Management (RN22) ABB  German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
German and Music (RW23) ABB  Music at grade A and (German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade 
B) 
German and Philosophy (RV25) ABB-BBB  German at grade B 
German and Spanish (RR24) ABB-BBB  German at grade B and Spanish at grade B 
German with Film Studies (R2P3) ABB-BBB  German at grade B 
German with French (R2R1) ABB-BBB German at grade B and French at grade B 
German with History (R2V1) ABB-BBB German at grade B 
German with International Relations (R2LF) ABB-BBB German at grade B 
German with Italian (R2R3) ABB-BBB German at grade B 
German with Mathematics (R2G1) ABB  German at grade B and Mathematics at grade A 
German with Music (R2W3) ABB-BBB  German at grade B and Music at grade B 
German with Philosophy (R2V5) ABB-BBB German at grade B 
German with Political Studies (R2L2) ABB-BBB  German at grade B 
German with Spanish (R2R4) ABB-BBB German at grade B and Spanish at grade B 
Greek (Q700) ABB  Classical Greek at grade B 
Greek and Italian (QR7H) ABB  Classical Greek at grade B 
History (V100) AAB  
History and International Relations (VL12) AAB   
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Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
History and Music (VW13) ABB  Music at grade A 
History and Spanish (VR14) AAB   
History with an International Year (4 Years) (V101) AAB   
History with Spanish (V1R4) AAB  Spanish at grade B 
Human Geography (L701) ABB Geography at grade B 
International Theatre (Australia) (W423) AAB   
Italian (R310) ABB-BBB  Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Italian and Latin (RQ36) ABB  Italian or Modern Foreign Language. Latin 
Italian and Management (RN32) ABB  Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Italian and Music (RW33) ABB  Music at grade A and (Italian or European Language or Latin at grade B) 
Italian and Philosophy (RV35) ABB-BBB  Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Italian and Spanish (RR34) ABB-BBB  Spanish at grade B and Italian at grade B. (European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B) 
Italian with Film Studies (R3P3) ABB-BBB Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Italian with French (R3R1) ABB-BBB French at grade B. 
Italian with German (R3R2) ABB-BBB  German at grade B. 
Italian with International Relations (R3LF) ABB-BBB Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Italian with Mathematics (R3G1) ABB Mathematics at grade A and (Italian or European Language or Latin at grade B) 
Italian with Music (R3W3) ABB-BBB  Music and (Italian or European Language or Latin at grade B) 
Italian with Philosophy (R3V5) ABB-BBB Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Italian with Political Studies (R3L2) ABB-BBB  Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Italian with Spanish (R3R4) ABB-BBB  Spanish at grade A 
Latin (Q600) ABB Latin at grade B 
Management (N200) AAB  
Management and Spanish (NR24) ABB Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Management with Accounting (N2N4) AAB   
Management with Human Resources (N2N6) AAB   
Management with Information Systems (N2G5) AAB   
Management with International Business (N2N1) AAB  
Management with Marketing (N2N5) AAB   
Management with Mathematics (N2G1) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
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Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
Mathematics (G100) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
Mathematics (G103) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
Mathematics and Management (GN12) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
Mathematics and Music (GW13) AAB Mathematics at grade A and Music at grade A 
Mathematics and Physics (GF13) AAB Mathematics at grade A. Physics at grade A 
Mathematics and Physics (GFC3) AAB Mathematics at grade A. Physics at grade A 
Mathematics and Psychology (GC18) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
Mathematics with French (G1R1) ABB Mathematics at grade A and French at grade B. 
Mathematics with German (G1R2) ABB Mathematics at grade A and (German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at 
grade B) 
Mathematics with Italian (G1R3) ABB Mathematics at grade A and European Language at grade B. 
Mathematics with Management (G1N2) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
Mathematics with Philosophy (G1V5) ABB Mathematics at grade A 
Mathematics with Spanish (G1R4) ABB Mathematics at grade A and Spanish at grade B. 
Mathematics with Statistics (G1G3) AAB Mathematics at grade A 
Media Arts (W625) ABB  
Medical Biochemistry (C741) ABB Biology at grade B and Chemistry at grade B 
Modern History and Politics (V136) AAB  
Molecular Biology (C701) ABB Biology at grade B and Chemistry at grade B 
Multilingual St with International Relations (Q1L2) ABB-BBB Two Languages from French, German, Italian or Spanish at grade B 
Multilingual Studies (R991) ABB-BBB Two Languages from French, German, Italian or Spanish at grade B 
Multilingual Studies with Philosophy (R9VM) ABB-BBB Two Modern European Languages at grade B 
Music (W302) ABB Music at grade A. 
Music and Philosophy (WV35) ABB Music at grade A. 
Music with French (W3R1) ABB Music at grade A and French at grade B 
Music with German (W3R2) ABB Music at grade A and (German at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade 
B) 
Music with Italian (W3R3) ABB Music at grade A and (Italian at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade 
B). 
Music with Philosophy (W3V5) ABB Music at grade A 
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Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
Music with Political Studies (W3L2) ABB Music at grade A 
Music with Psychology (W3C8) ABB Music at grade A 
Music with Spanish (W3R4) ABB Music at grade A and Spanish at grade B 
Petroleum Geology (F620) BBB Any Science subject at grade B 
Petroleum Geology (F622) ABB Any Science subject at grade B 
Physical Geography (F840) ABB Geography at grade B 
Physical Geography and Geology (FF68) ABB Any Science subject at grade B 
Physics (F300) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physic 
Physics (F303) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physic 
Physics with Music (F3W3) AAB-ABB Mathematics at grade B and Physics at grade B and Music at grade A 
Physics with Particle Physics (F370) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physic 
Physics with Particle Physics (F372) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physic 
Physics with Philosophy (F3V5) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physic 
Politics (L200) AAB  
Politics and International Relations (L290) AAB  
Politics and Philosophy (LV25) ABB  
Politics with Philosophy (L2V5) AAB  
Psychology (C800) AAB  
Science Foundation - Option: Biochemistry (C708)   
Science Foundation - Option: Biological Sciences (C908)   
Science Foundation - Option: Biomedical Sciences (B908)   
Science Foundation - Option: Computer Science (G408)   
Science Foundation - Option: Geography (F808)   
Science Foundation - Option: Geology (F608)   
Science Foundation - Option: Mathematics (G108)   
Science Foundation - Option: Physics (F308)   
Science Foundation - Option: Psychology (C808)   
Spanish (R400) ABB-BBB  Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Spanish and Philosophy (RV45) ABB-BBB Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Spanish with Film Studies (R4P3) ABB-BBB  Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
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Course Grade 
Combination 
Required 
Specific Requirements 
Spanish with French (R4R1) ABB-BBB  French at grade B and Spanish at grade B 
Spanish with German (R4R2) ABB-BBB  German at grade B and Spanish at grade B 
Spanish with History (R4V1) ABB-BBB  Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B. 
Spanish with International Relations (R4L2) ABB-BBB  Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Spanish with Italian (R4R3) ABB-BBB  Spanish at grade B and Italian at grade B. (European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B) 
Spanish with Music (R4W3) ABB-BBB  Music at grade B and Spanish at grade B 
Spanish with Philosophy (R4V5) ABB-BBB  Spanish at grade B or European Language at grade B or Latin at grade B 
Theoretical Physics (F321) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physics 
Theoretical Physics (F340) AAB-ABB Mathematics and Physics 
Zoology (C300) ABB Biology at grade B and Any Science subject 
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Annex 3B: Do Observable Characteristics Predict: (i) Who 
Takes Up Their Firm Offer; and (ii) Earnings? 
Table 3B-1: Do Observable Characteristics Predict: (i) Who Takes Up Their Firm 
Offer; and (ii) Earnings? 
 
Firm Offer Log Earnings 
Tariff Score 0.000395 0.000367 
 (0.0000474)*** (0.0000581)*** 
Tariff Score Missing 0.127 0.108 
 (0.0298)*** (0.0300)*** 
University Selectivity  0.0613 
  (0.00677)*** 
Female -0.000553 -0.105 
 (0.0108) (0.0106)*** 
Ethnicity - White British 0.00600 -0.0952 
 (0.0415) (0.0405)* 
Ethnicity - White Irish 0.0225 -0.0339 
 (0.0529) (0.0515) 
Ethnicity - White Scottish -0.0494 -0.334 
 (0.112) (0.109)** 
Ethnicity - Irish Traveller 0.153 0.409 
 (0.315) (0.306) 
Ethnicity - Black Caribbean 0.0184 -0.0783 
 (0.0551) (0.0537) 
Ethnicity - Black African -0.00456 0.0102 
 (0.0536) (0.0522) 
Ethnicity - Other Black -0.138 -0.210 
 (0.118) (0.115) 
Ethnicity - Asian Indian -0.0207 0.0361 
 (0.0468) (0.0456) 
Ethnicity - Asian Pakistani -0.0221 -0.0824 
 (0.0580) (0.0565) 
Ethnicity - Asian Bangladeshi 0.0212 0.0637 
 (0.0699) (0.0681) 
Ethnicity – Asian Chinese -0.0610 0.00992 
 (0.0608) (0.0592) 
Ethnicity - Other Asian -0.0415 -0.0268 
 (0.0639) (0.0623) 
Ethnicity - Mixed White and Black Caribbean -0.0248 -0.118 
 (0.0762) (0.0742) 
Ethnicity - Mixed White and Black African 0.0516 -0.125 
 (0.0991) (0.0966) 
Ethnicity – Mixed White and Asian -0.0314 -0.123 
 (0.0580) (0.0565)* 
Ethnicity - Other Mixed -0.0775 0.0341 
 (0.0632) (0.0615) 
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Ethnicity - Not known -0.0214 -0.0584 
 (0.0539) (0.0525) 
2nd Most Deprived IMD Quartile -0.0220 0.00743 
 (0.0167) (0.0163) 
2nd Least Deprived IMD Quartile 0.00240 0.00844 
 (0.0169) (0.0165) 
Least Deprived IMD Quartile -0.0272 0.0472 
 (0.0232) (0.0226)* 
IMD Information Missing 0.0472 0.0483 
 (0.0430) (0.0419) 
SEC - Lower Managerial and Professional -0.0152 0.0137 
 (0.0146) (0.0142) 
SEC - Intermediate -0.00556 0.0143 
 (0.0179) (0.0174) 
SEC - Small Employers and Own Account Workers 0.0255 -0.0407 
 (0.0240) (0.0234) 
SEC - Lower Supervisory and Technical 0.00688 -0.00832 
 (0.0280) (0.0273) 
SEC - Semi-Routine Occupations 0.0227 0.00218 
 (0.0210) (0.0205) 
SEC - Routine 0.0223 -0.0420 
 (0.0284) (0.0278) 
SEC - Not Classified -0.0142 -0.0365 
 (0.0221) (0.0216) 
Born February 0.0168 -0.00508 
 (0.0267) (0.0260) 
Born March -0.0292 0.00682 
 (0.0258) (0.0251) 
Born April 0.0198 -0.0350 
 (0.0258) (0.0251) 
Born May -0.0397 -0.0184 
 (0.0251) (0.0245) 
Born June -0.00327 -0.0143 
 (0.0255) (0.0249) 
Born July 0.0153 -0.0157 
 (0.0251) (0.0245) 
Born August -0.0307 -0.0222 
 (0.0263) (0.0256) 
Born September -0.00183 -0.0189 
 (0.0253) (0.0247) 
Born October -0.00604 0.0152 
 (0.0266) (0.0259) 
Born November -0.0205 0.00647 
 (0.0253) (0.0247) 
Born December -0.0218 -0.0107 
 (0.0259) (0.0252) 
Disabled 0.0369 -0.0507 
 (0.0215) (0.0209)* 
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Age (Years) 0.00569 0.00725 
 (0.00225)* (0.00219)*** 
Domicile - Other UK -0.0357 -0.196 
 (0.0288) (0.0281)*** 
Domicile – Overseas -0.0333 -0.0839 
 (0.0408) (0.0397)* 
Previous Institution - Further Education 0.0456 -0.0177 
 (0.0170)** (0.0166) 
Previous Institution - Higher Education -0.0917 -0.183 
 (0.157) (0.153) 
Previous Institution - Independent School -0.0284 0.0870 
 (0.0169) (0.0167)*** 
Previous Institution - Not Known 0.0189 0.139 
 (0.0392) (0.0382)*** 
   
N 3537 3537 
  
 
Standard errors in parentheses   
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001   
 
Notes: Table shows results of a regression where the dependent variable is (i) a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if the individual has taken up his/her insurance offer; and (ii) log earnings. Omitted 
categories include: Male, Ethnicity - White Other, Most Deprived IMD Quartile, SEC - Higher 
Managerial and Professional, Born January, Non-Disabled, Domicile – England, Previous Institution – 
State School. IMD = Index of Multiple Deprivation (measure of area deprivation). SEC = Socio-
Economic Class. 
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Annex 3C: Chapter 3 Data Appendix 
This annex explains how the main sample for analysis in Chapter 3 was derived. The 
starting point was the second Longitudinal Destinations of Leavers from Higher 
Education (LDLHE) survey. This is a survey of graduates who left higher education in 
2004/05 and who were contacted in winter 2008/09. The survey contains key 
information on employment status, annual salary, industry and occupation of 
employment, additional qualifications obtained since graduating in 2004/05, as well as 
answers to a range of career satisfaction questions. Around 161,000 graduates from 158 
institutions were contacted, achieving a total of 41,397 responses (a 26% response rate).  
UCAS records for 13,223 of these could be linked on. The remaining observations 
could not be linked for the following reasons. According to their HESA record, 18,039 
individuals never applied through UCAS: 10,84569 of these were postgraduates and 
another 3,558 individuals were part-time undergraduates – neither of these apply 
through UCAS which is a system designed for full-time undergraduate students only. 
Another 3,636 individuals were recorded as not having entered through UCAS despite 
being neither a postgraduate nor a part-time undergraduate. Some of this will be due to 
error in the HESA variable which records whether the individual was a UCAS entrant 
or not. More importantly, however, it became clear from discussions with UCAS 
officials that not all full-time undergraduates do in fact apply through UCAS – 
particularly individuals who attend local institutions. No estimate of the number of full-
time undergraduates who do not apply through UCAS was available.  
Besides the 18,039 individuals who did not apply through UCAS, there were another 
10,135 individuals who did apply through UCAS, but for whom there was no UCAS 
record. The main reason for this is that I only had access to UCAS records going back 
to entry in 2002/03. Given that the LDLHE surveyed people who graduated in 2004/05, 
I could therefore only link in UCAS records for people who were on courses of a length 
no longer than three years and who completed within three years of starting. 6,917 
individuals for whom no UCAS record could be found were indeed on courses of an 
expected length longer than three years, and so could not be matched to their UCAS 
record. The remaining observations without UCAS record (n=3,218) were likely to have 
                                                 
69
 1,125 of these do apply through one of UCAS’ applications systems (the Graduate Teacher Training 
Registry) – but as these are also postgraduate students, we have no information on their undergraduate 
course or institution.  
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been individuals who had taken longer than three years to graduate and so, despite being 
in the 2004/05 leaving cohort, they had probably entered the system prior to 2002/03. 
This left 13,223 survey respondents with UCAS records matched on. Some further 
observations had to be removed: 666 observations because they had no information on 
institution applied to, and one more observation because s/he had two insurance offers. 
Only 9,292 individuals were in full-time work at the time of the survey, and I decided to 
keep an additional 791 who were in work and further study and had very similar salaries 
to those in full-time work (the results obtained in Chapter 3 do not change if those in 
work and further study are excluded from the analysis). A further 1,434 observations 
had to be deleted because of missing salary information, and the dataset was trimmed to 
include only individuals who earned between £10,000 and £100,000. Finally, all those 
attending the Scottish Agricultural College had to be deleted because of missing quality 
information (n=6) and another 659 information cases were not accepted at any of their 
institutions (but mentioned to get into higher education through a process called 
“Clearing”). This left 7,741 observations. 
The final two steps included dropping 2,984 observations without an insurance offer 
and a further 1,220 observations that could not be matched to any other observation 
with the same firm and insurance choices. This left a final sample size of 3,537 
observations. 
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Annex 3D: University Quality Measure 
Table 3D-1: Components of the Quality Index (Non-Normalised) – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Number of Institutions Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expenditure per Student 145               7.34                5.06                1.37              36.21  
Academic Staff/Student Ratio 145               0.05                0.03                0.00                0.25  
Non-Continuation Rate 145               8.42                4.51                1.30              31.30  
Applications/Acceptance Ratio 145               5.44                2.01                1.71              15.53  
Average Tariff Score of Entrants 145           195.25              89.89              12.71            485.16  
 
Table 3D-2: Components of the Quality Index (Normalised) – Correlation Matrix 
  
Expenditure per 
Student 
Academic 
Staff/Student 
Ratio 
Non-Continuation 
Rate 
Applications/Acceptance 
Ratio 
Average Tariff 
Score of Entrants Quality Index 
Expenditure per Student 1      
Academic Staff/Student Ratio 0.9377 1     
Non-Continuation Rate -0.3981 -0.4312 1    
Applications/Acceptance Ratio 0.3386 0.3691 -0.4084 1   
Average Tariff Score of Entrants 0.6331 0.6779 -0.6971 0.4793 1  
Quality Index 0.8582 0.8844 -0.7236 0.6089 0.8838 1 
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Annex 3E: Alternative Models 
As a robustness check on the main results obtained from the model where individuals 
are matched on the basis of their firm and insurance institution choices, a number of 
models similar to the “matched applicant” models of Dale and Krueger (2002) are run. 
Dale and Krueger form groups of students who applied to a similar set of schools and 
received the same admission decisions (i.e. the same combination of acceptances and 
rejections). Because there were so many colleges to which students applied, they 
considered schools equivalent if their average SAT score fell into the same 25 point 
interval. For example, if two schools had an average SAT score between 1,200 and 
1,225, the authors assumed they used the same admission cut-off. Then they formed 
groups of students who applied to, and were accepted and rejected by, “equivalent” 
schools. 
The models run in this annex are similar to these “matched applicant” models, however 
“similar” institutions are defined slightly differently as institutions that are in the same 
quantile of selectivity. Models are run with 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 and 64 quantiles, respectively. 
In the simplest case, this means that institutions are divided into two groups (high v. low 
selectivity) and individuals matched based upon whether they applied and were 
accepted to institutions from the top/bottom half in terms of selectivity. There are 145 
different institutions in my dataset, so in the most elaborate model, this means that there 
are 145/64 (i.e. around 2) institutions per selectivity grouping.  
In addition, a model is run where individuals are matched on the exact institutions that 
they applied to and were accepted to. 
As Table 3E-1 shows, these models suggest that a standard deviation increase in 
selectivity leads to an increase in earnings three and a half years after graduation of 
between 3.6% and 5.8% - findings very similar to the ones obtained in the main body of 
the text. 
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Table 3E-1: Results from the “Matched Applicant” Models 
 
  
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
Model 
(i) 2 Quantiles 0.0801 0.0763 0.0628 0.0451 
(0.00873)*** (0.0116)*** (0.0107)*** (0.00761)*** 
n 7741 7741 7741 7741 
  
(ii) 4 Quantiles 0.0802 0.0709 0.0596 0.0403 
(0.00871)*** (0.00967)*** (0.00934)*** (0.00742)*** 
n 7738 7738 7738 7738 
  
(iii) 8 Quantiles 0.0809 0.0579 0.0485 0.0361 
(0.00896)*** (0.00890)*** (0.00869)*** (0.00761)*** 
n 7326 7326 7326 7326 
  
(iv) 16 Quantiles 0.0846 0.0646 0.0564 0.0443 
(0.00940)*** (0.0111)*** (0.0109)*** (0.00996)*** 
n 5332 5332 5332 5332 
  
(v) 32 Quantiles 0.0854 0.0749 0.0708 0.0518 
(0.0109)*** (0.0143)*** (0.0138)*** (0.0119)*** 
n 3589 3589 3589 3589 
  
(vi) 64 Quantiles 0.0796 0.0983 0.0942 0.0580 
(0.0168)*** (0.0251)*** (0.0251)*** (0.0247)* 
n 2159 2159 2159 2159 
  
(vii) Exact Match 0.0508 0.0816 0.0805 0.0414 
(0.0266) (0.0278)** (0.0287)** (0.0249) 
n 1564 1564 1564 1564 
  
  
Firm/Insurance Group Fixed Effects no yes yes yes 
Tariff Score no no yes yes 
  
Additional Controls no no no yes 
  
  
Standard errors in parentheses. These are clustered at the institutional level.   
  
* p<0.05  ** p<0.01  *** p<0.001         
 
  
130 
 
Annex 4A: Year-on-Year Changes in Rank, by League Table 
Figure 4A-1: Times Rankings – Year-on-Year Changes 
 
Table 4A-1: Times Rankings – Year-on-Year Correlation Matrix 
  
Times 
2002 
Times 
2003 
Times 
2004 
Times 
2005 
Times 
2006 
Times 
2007 
Times 
2008 
Times 
2009 
Times 
2002 1        
Times 
2003 0.9811 1       
Times 
2004 0.9758 0.9834 1      
Times 
2005 0.9614 0.9703 0.9864 1     
Times 
2006 0.9615 0.9631 0.9805 0.9839 1    
Times 
2007 0.931 0.9415 0.938 0.9452 0.9455 1   
Times 
2008 0.931 0.9415 0.938 0.9452 0.9455 1 1  
Times 
2009 0.9264 0.9424 0.9319 0.9307 0.9297 0.9577 0.9577 1 
 
Explanatory note: there is no change between 2007 and 2008 in the Times rank as no 
Times league table was published in 2008. So the rankings for 2008 are assumed to be 
the same as in 2007.  
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Figure 4A-2: Guardian Rankings – Year-on-Year Changes 
 
Table 4A-2: Guardian Rankings – Year-on-Year Correlation Matrix 
  
Guardian 
2004 
Guardian 
2005 
Guardian 
2006 
Guardian 
2007 
Guardian 
2008 
Guardian 
2009 
Guardian 
2004 1           
Guardian 
2005 0.851 1     
Guardian 
2006 0.7875 0.8452 1    
Guardian 
2007 0.874 0.8593 0.8884 1   
Guardian 
2008 0.8417 0.7348 0.814 0.8532 1  
Guardian 
2009 0.8435 0.7559 0.7866 0.8293 0.955 1 
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Figure 4A-3: THES Rankings – Year-on-Year Changes 
 
Table 4A-3: THES Rankings – Year-on-Year Correlation Matrix 
  THES 2004 THES 2005 THES 2006 THES 2007 THES 2008 THES 2009 
THES 2004 1           
THES 2005 0.8373 1 
THES 2006 0.8125 0.8852 1 
THES 2007 0.6115 0.7662 0.8625 1 
THES 2008 0.655 0.7806 0.8775 0.9849 1 
THES 2009 0.6025 0.7593 0.8341 0.9736 0.9816 1 
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Figure 4A-4: ARWU Rankings – Year-on-Year Changes 
 
Table 4A-4: ARWU Rankings – Year-on-Year Correlation Matrix 
  
ARWU 
2003 
ARWU 
2004 
ARWU 
2005 
ARWU 
2006 
ARWU 
2007 
ARWU 
2008 
ARWU 
2009 
ARWU 
2003 1             
ARWU 
2004 0.879 1 
ARWU 
2005 0.8818 0.971 1 
ARWU 
2006 0.9148 0.9461 0.9557 1 
ARWU 
2007 0.8607 0.9464 0.9544 0.9836 1 
ARWU 
2008 0.8789 0.9545 0.955 0.952 0.9559 1 
ARWU 
2009 0.8909 0.9573 0.957 0.9639 0.9679 0.9857 1 
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Annex 4B: Matching Rankings to Outcomes 
The table below provides an example of how rankings are matched to outcome 
variables. As a reminder, it is assumed that applicants to university use the most 
recently published league tables. Most guides are published in late summer in time for 
the applications process (which starts in autumn) for enrolment in the following 
academic year. Similarly, for international student fees, it will be assumed that fees in 
any particular year are set based on the institution’s ranking in the previous year. 
Ranking Year Published Influences applications for  Influences fees for 
Times 2011 Summer 2010 September 2011 N/A 
Guardian 2011 Summer 2010 September 2011 N/A 
THES 2011 Summer 2010 September 2011 September 2011 
ARWU 2010 Summer 2010 September 2011 September 2011 
 
Taking an example from the table, the 2011 Times Good University Guide came out in 
late Summer 2010 and was meant to influence students who applied over the course of 
2010/2011 for enrolment in the 2011/2012 academic year.  
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Annex 4C: Methodological Changes in the Guardian and 
Times Rankings 
Explanatory note: changes on the previous year are marked in bold. 
Guardian 2004 Guardian 2005 
Variable Weighting Variable Weighting 
Teaching Inspection 40% Teaching Inspection 22% 
Entry Qualifications 10% 
Entry Qualifications (New 
Method) 15% 
Spend per Student 10% Spend per Student 15% 
Student/Staff Ratio 10% Student/Staff Ratio 15% 
Value Added 15% Value Added (New Method) 10% 
Jobs Prospects 15% Jobs Prospects (New Method) 15% 
Inclusiveness 8% 
        
Guardian 2006 Guardian 2007 
Variable Weighting Variable Weighting 
Staff Score 15% Staff Score 15% 
Entry Qualifications 20% Entry Qualifications 20% 
Spend per Student 10% Spend per Student 10% 
Student/Staff Ratio 20% Student/Staff Ratio 20% 
Value Added 10% Value Added 10% 
Jobs Prospects 17% Jobs Prospects 17% 
Inclusiveness 8% Inclusiveness 8% 
        
Guardian 2008 Guardian 2009 
Variable Weighting Variable Weighting 
Teaching Quality 10% Teaching Quality 10% 
Entry Score 17% Entry Score 17% 
Spend per Student 17% Spend per Student 17% 
Student/Staff Ratio (New 
Method) 17% Student/Staff Ratio 17% 
Value Added (New Method) 17% Value Added 17% 
Jobs Prospects 17% Jobs Prospects (New Method) 17% 
Feedback 5% Feedback 5% 
 
  
136 
 
Times 2002 Times 2003 
Variable Weighting Variable Weighting 
Teaching Assessment 2.5 Teaching Assessment 2.5 
Research Assessment 1.5 Research Assessment (New Data) 1.5 
Entry Standards 1.0 Entry Standards (New Method) 1.0 
Student Staff Ratio 1.0 Student Staff Ratio 1.0 
Library and Computer 
Spending 1.0 Library and Computer Spending 1.0 
First and Upper Seconds 1.0 
First and Upper Seconds (New 
Method) 1.0 
Facilities Spending 1.0 Facilities Spending 1.0 
Graduate Destinations 1.0 Graduate Destinations (New Method) 1.0 
Efficiency 1.0 Efficiency 1.0 
        
Times 2004 Times 2005   
Variable Weighting Variable Weighting 
Teaching Assessment 2.5 Teaching Assessment 2.5 
Research Assessment 1.5 Research Assessment 1.5 
Entry Standards 1.0 Entry Standards 1.0 
Student Staff Ratio 1.0 Student Staff Ratio 1.0 
Library and Computer 
Spending 1.0 Library and Computer Spending 1.0 
First and Upper Seconds 1.0 First and Upper Seconds 1.0 
Facilities Spending 1.0 Facilities Spending 1.0 
Graduate Destinations 1.0 Graduate Destinations 1.0 
Efficiency 1.0 Efficiency 1.0 
        
Times 2006 Times 2007 
Variable Weighting Variable Weighting 
Teaching Assessment 2.5 Teaching Assessment 2.5 
Research Assessment 1.5 Research Assessment 1.5 
Entry Standards 1.0 Entry Standards 1.0 
Student Staff Ratio 1.0 Student Staff Ratio 1.0 
Library and Computer 
Spending 1.0 Library and Computer Spending 1.0 
First and Upper Seconds 1.0 First and Upper Seconds 1.0 
Facilities Spending 1.0 Facilities Spending 1.0 
Graduate Destinations 1.0 Graduate Destinations 1.0 
Efficiency 1.0 Efficiency 1.0 
    Student Satisfaction 1.5 
Times 2009 
Variable Weighting 
Teaching Assessment 2.5 
Research Assessment 1.5 
Entry Standards 1.0 
Student Staff Ratio 1.0 
First and Upper Seconds 1.0 
Facilities Spending (New Method) 1.0 
Graduate Destinations 1.0 
Efficiency 1.0 
Student Satisfaction 1.5 
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Annex 4D: Models with Institution-Specific Time Trends 
Table 4D-1: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on Applications, Proportion of 
Applications Accepted and Average Tariff Score of (Accepted) Applicants – UK-
Domiciled Students – Institution-Specific Time Trends 
    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
    
Number of  
Applications 
% of 
Applications 
Accepted 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Applicants 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Accepted 
Applicants 
Times   β -9.432 0.000277 -0.302 -0.341 
   s.e. (12.41) (0.000298) (0.0980)*** (0.109)*** 
    n 671 671 671 671 
Guardian   β -13.66 0.000247 -0.111 -0.148 
   s.e. (5.535)** (0.000141)* (0.0403)*** (0.0448)*** 
    n 565 565 565 565 
THES   β -10.74 0.0000204 0.00513 -0.0485 
   s.e. (10.19) (0.000260) (0.0879) (0.0976) 
    n 123 123 123 123 
ARWU   β -9.746 0.0000217 -0.0157 -0.00888 
   s.e. (7.171) (0.000158) (0.0369) (0.0423) 
    n 170 170 170 170 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01         
 
Table 4D-2: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on Applications, Proportion of 
Applications Accepted and Average Tariff Score of (Accepted) Applicants – UK-
Domiciled Students, Russell Group Institutions – Institution-Specific Time Trends 
    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
    
Number of  
Applications 
% of 
Applications 
Accepted 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Applicants 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Accepted 
Applicants 
Times   β  -136.9   0.00209   -0.571  -0.501 
   s.e.  (71.14)*   (0.00113)*   (0.383)  (0.360) 
    n 126 126 126 126 
Guardian   β -60.15 -0.000189 0.311 0.312 
   s.e. (32.22)* (0.000462) (0.224) (0.231) 
    n 90 90 90 90 
THES   β -16.03 -0.0000629 0.0678 -0.0105 
   s.e. (15.43) (0.000205) (0.0878) (0.0805) 
    n 81 81 81 81 
ARWU   β -4.571 0.000234 -0.0000132 -0.0486 
   s.e. (7.285) (0.000235) (0.0794) (0.0849) 
    n 89 89 89 89 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01         
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Table 4D-3: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on the Number of Applications by 
Gender and Ethnicity – UK-Domiciled Students – Institution-Specific Time Trends 
  
  Gender Ethnicity 
    Male Female White Black Asian Mixed 
Times   β -10.56 1.130 -7.574 4.712 -4.891 0.374 
   s.e. (5.914)* (7.067) (11.00) (2.795)* (1.441)*** (0.712) 
    n 671 671 671 671 671 671 
Guardian   β -7.269 -6.392 -12.24 1.902 -1.755 0.0393 
   s.e. (2.610)*** (3.243)* (4.696)** (1.083)* (0.695)** (0.196) 
    n 565 565 565 565 565 565 
THES   β -3.965 -6.774 -9.906 -0.619 0.260 -0.730 
   s.e. (4.432) (6.207) (8.257) (0.689) (1.062) (0.470) 
    n 123 123 123 123 123 123 
ARWU   β -3.507 -6.239 -8.505 -0.129 -0.332 -0.166 
   s.e. (3.265) (4.225) (5.707) (0.755) (0.880) (0.295) 
    n 170 170 170 170 170 170 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01                   
 
Table 4D-4: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on the Number of Applications by Age 
and Socio-Economic Class – UK-Domiciled Students – Institution-Specific Time 
Trends 
  
  
  Age SEC 
    Young Mature High Low 
Times   β -14.61 5.173 -9.706 0.536 
   s.e. (10.88) (3.658) (6.825) (3.336) 
    n 671 671 671 671 
Guardian   β -15.15 1.488 -8.486 -3.868 
   s.e. (5.027)*** (1.707) (3.119)*** (1.569)** 
    n 565 565 565 565 
THES   β -10.17 -0.572 -8.246 -0.423 
   s.e. (9.205) (1.942) (6.698) (2.524) 
    n 123 123 123 123 
ARWU   β -9.790 0.0431 -7.361 -1.136 
   s.e. (6.616) (1.454) (4.656) (1.735) 
    n 170 170 170 170 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01               
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Table 4D-5: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on the Number of Applications by 
School Type and Prior Attainment – UK-Domiciled Students – Institution-Specific 
Time Trends 
  
  
  School Type Prior Attainment 
    State Independent Top 
Top 
Middle 
Bottom 
Middle Bottom 
Times   β -14.27 -5.991 -16.16 -1.883 10.44 -1.823 
   s.e. (10.44) (2.330)** (4.451)*** (4.949) (5.394)* (4.767) 
    n 462 462 671 671 671 671 
Guardian   β -11.42 -1.918 -3.653 -3.742 -4.300 -1.967 
   s.e. (5.242)** (0.790)** (1.497)** (1.771)** (2.431)* (2.614) 
    n 338 338 565 565 565 565 
THES   β 1.681 2.856 0.0542 -3.644 -3.310 -3.839 
   s.e. (6.141) (3.195) (4.578) (3.465) (3.054) (2.605) 
    n 68 68 123 123 123 123 
ARWU   β -1.363 -2.088 -3.898 -5.343 -1.060 0.555 
   s.e. (5.554) (2.352) (3.137) (2.771)* (2.580) (2.180) 
    n 101 101 170 170 170 170 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 
 
Table 4D-6: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on Applications, the Proportion of 
Applications Accepted, and Fees Charged – International Students – Institution-
Specific Time Trends 
  
  (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) 
    
Number of 
EU 
Applications 
% of EU 
Applications 
Accepted 
Number of 
Other 
Overseas 
Applications 
% of Other 
Overseas 
Applications 
Accepted 
Fees 
Classroom-
Based 
Courses 
Fees 
Laboratory-
Based 
Courses 
Times   β -3.034 0.000590 -8.233 0.000579 -3.602 -5.318 
   s.e. (1.764)* (0.000507) (2.000)*** (0.000447) (2.564) (4.100) 
    n 780 692 671 671 688 688 
Guardian   β -2.283 0.000139 -2.768 0.000417 -1.100 -1.968 
   s.e. (0.642)*** (0.000216) (0.922)*** (0.000298) (1.211) (1.596) 
    n 683 683 565 565 570 570 
THES   β -2.640 -0.000488 1.684 -0.000319 -2.922 -3.928 
   s.e. (1.337)* (0.000256)* (3.076) (0.000253) (2.168) (2.628) 
    n 160 160 123 123 130 130 
ARWU   β -0.229 0.000247 0.157 -0.000236 4.566 6.356 
   s.e. (1.268) (0.000129)* (1.322) (0.000274) (1.662)*** (1.881)*** 
  n 214 214 170 170 183 183 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 
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Annex 4E: Combined Impact of Times and Guardian 
Rankings 
Table 4E-1: Impact of a Drop in the Combined Times and Guardian Ranking on 
Applications, Proportion of Applications Accepted and Average Tariff Score of 
(Accepted) Applicants – UK-Domiciled Students 
    (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) 
    
Number of  
Applications 
% of 
Applications 
Accepted 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Applicants 
Average  
Tariff Score of 
Accepted 
Applicants 
(Times+Guardian)/2   β -18.30 0.000231 -0.138 -0.162 
   s.e. (7.397)** (0.000179) (0.0486)*** (0.0514)*** 
    n 751 751 751 751 
Times   β -18.91 0.0000921 -0.135 -0.137 
   s.e. (8.740)** (0.000240) (0.0751)* (0.0872) 
Guardian   β -5.901 0.0000821 -0.144 -0.183 
   s.e. (5.583) (0.000132) (0.0335)*** (0.0386)*** 
  
  n 485 485 485 485 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01 
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Annex 4F: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on the Socio-
Economic Make-Up of Applications to Universities 
Table 4F-1: Impact of a Drop in Rankings on the Proportion of Applications from 
Female, Black, Mature, State School, Lower SEC and Lower Attaining Candidates 
– UK-Domiciled Students 
  
  
  PROPORTION OF APPLICATIONS THAT ARE 
    Female Black Mature State Schools Low SEC 
25% 
Lowest 
Attaining 
Students 
Times   β 0.000325 0.000119 0.000351 -0.000180 0.0000465 -0.000373 
   s.e. (0.000119)*** (0.000108) (0.000131)*** (0.000130) (0.0000609) (0.000244) 
  n 671 671 671 462 671 671 
  X 0.54 0.05 0.15 0.58 0.26 0.26 
Guardian   β 0.000163 0.000160 0.000212 -0.00000498 0.0000202 0.000176 
   s.e. (0.0000638)** (0.0000532)*** (0.0000705)*** (0.0000757) (0.0000336) (0.000110) 
  n 565 565 565 338 565 565 
  X 0.56 0.06 0.15 0.58 0.27 0.27 
THES   β -0.0000894 -0.00000887 -0.0000312 0.0000124 0.0000346 0.0000112 
   s.e. (0.0000624) (0.0000237) (0.0000524) (0.0000695) (0.0000483) (0.0000870) 
  n 123 123 123 68 123 123 
  X 0.52 0.04 0.10 0.61 0.19 0.13 
ARWU   β -0.0000828 -0.00000866 -0.0000223 0.0000625 0.0000170 0.0000849 
   s.e. (0.0000604) (0.0000217) (0.0000577) (0.0000449) (0.0000449) (0.0000840) 
  n 170 170 170 101 170 170 
  X 0.52 0.04 0.10 0.62 0.21 0.14 
* 0.10 ** 0.05 *** 0.01  
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Annex 4G: The Impact of University Rankings in the US 
 Study Institutions Looked At Effect on: 
  
Number of Applications Admit Rate SAT Score Fees 
Monks and 
Ehrenberg (1999) 
Top, privately-controlled 
institutions 
  A fall of 5 positions in the 
rankings is associated with 
an increase in the admit 
rate of almost 2 percentage 
points. 
An increase in rank of 5 
positions is associated 
with an increase in 
average SAT score of 5.5 
points. 
A fall in the rankings of 
20 places results in a 3% 
reduction of net tuition. 
Meredith (2004) All schools classified as 
national doctoral 
universities 
  A school improving its 
ranking from the second to 
the first quartile increases 
its acceptance rate by 
about 1.0%. Dropping one 
rank between 26 and 50 
equates to a 0.156% 
decrease in the acceptance 
rate.  
As a public school's 
ranking drops from 
quartile one to quartile 
two, SAT scores decline 
by almost 20 points. SAT 
scores at private schools 
increase 13 points (but this 
is statistically 
insignificant).  
  
Bowman and 
Bastedo (2009) 
Top-tier institutions Moving into the top 50 
results in a 3.9% increase 
in the overall number of 
applications. Moving up 
one place in the top 25 
increases the number of 
applications by 0.95%. 
Moving up one place 
outside the top 25 has no 
significant effect. 
Moving into the top 50 
results in a 3.6% decrease 
in acceptance rate. Moving 
up one place in the top 25 
decreases the acceptance 
rate by 0.25%. Moving up 
one place outside the top 
25 has no significant 
effect. 
No significant effect of 
moving into the top 50. 
Moving up one place 
within the top 25 increases 
SAT scores by 1.4 points. 
Moving up one place 
outside the top 25 
increases average SAT 
scores by 1.4 points.  
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Annex 4H: The Impact of Fees on the Relationship between 
University Rankings and Applications to University 
Fees in English universities are set to rise to a maximum of £9,000 from 2012/13 
onwards. It is possible that this increase in the cost of a university education will lead 
applicants to pay more attention to league table information as they try to make the most 
informed choice possible about which institution to attend.  
It is not, of course, the first time the fee cap has been raised in England. In 2006/07 
significant changes to the student finance system were introduced in the various regions 
of the UK, including a raising of the fee cap in England, Wales and Northern Ireland 
from £1,000 to £3,000.  
It is important to stress, however, that although there was an increase in tuition fees paid 
by students in 2006/07, these were no longer payable upfront and most students were 
entitled to a loan to cover all of their fees. In fact, Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness 
(2011) conclude that the net result of the reforms was actually a reduction in the net 
upfront costs of going to university for students from all income groups. This would 
make the 2006/07 reforms a poor precedent to analyse what might happen when the cost 
of university increases from 2012/13 onwards.   
Bearing the above caveat in mind, the table below summarises the results from 
regressions of the number of UK-domiciled applications on: (i) a university’s ranking 
(Times or Guardian); (ii) a dummy variable set to one post-2006/07 (called “Fee”); (iii) 
regional dummies (Scotland, Wales, Ireland, with England omitted); and (iv) 
interactions of all of these. Because the number of choices that candidates were allowed 
to express was reduced from six to five in 2008/09, the sample was restricted to all 
years prior to 2008/09.  
The variable of interest is the interaction of “Fee” and “Ranking” – indicating whether 
the effect of rankings changed in England after the fee cap was raised in 2006/07. 
Further interactions of the “Fee” dummy with “Ranking” and the regional dummies 
capture how the change in effect might have varied across Scotland, Ireland and Wales.  
The results offer no evidence to suggest that rankings became more important to 
applicants in any of the regions following the raising of the fee cap in 2006/07. If 
anything, the data suggest that they may have become less important. Although 
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seemingly counter-intuitive, this finding would actually be consistent with the 
conclusion of Dearden, Fitzsimons and Wyness (2011) that the net result of the 2006/07 
reforms was a reduction in the net upfront costs of going to university. 
Table 4H-1: The Impact of Fees on the Relationship between University Rankings 
and Applications to University 
Ranking: Times Times Times Guardian Guardian 
Years: 2002-2009 2002-2007 2004-2007 2004-2009 2004-2007 
Ranking -69.96 -69.96 -64.98 -110.8 -110.8 
(16.89)*** (16.87)*** (23.87)*** (19.10)*** (19.14)*** 
Scotland -2337.5 -2337.5 -1722.1 -2542.3 -2542.3 
(2582.5) (2579.3) (3712.6) (3938.4) (3947.6) 
Wales 2198.0 2198.0 4354.2 1262.8 1262.8 
(4861.5) (4855.6) (6810.8) (5899.0) (5912.9) 
Ireland -14386.3 -14386.3 -19715.4 -21292.4 -21292.4 
(9691.0) (9679.1) (16897.4) (25462.0) (25522.0) 
Fee -1037.3 -778.8 -986.3 -1925.6 -1869.3 
(1369.5) (1685.3) (1996.0) (1572.2) (1818.0) 
Ranking*Fee 27.67 22.97 17.99 48.55 42.29 
(22.15) (27.17) (32.32) (23.09)** (26.44) 
Scotland*Ranking -68.37 -68.37 -84.21 -12.90 -12.90 
(48.65) (48.59) (68.42) (58.02) (58.16) 
Wales*Ranking -178.0 -178.0 -223.9 -75.16 -75.16 
(82.41)** (82.31)** (117.0)* (68.20) (68.36) 
Ireland*Ranking 492.4 492.4 602.4 613.4 613.4 
(221.7)** (221.4)** (370.9) (520.0) (521.2) 
Scotland*Fee 3548.6 4133.7 3518.3 1998.1 3016.1 
(3648.8) (4473.0) (5268.6) (4683.4) (5585.7) 
Wales*Fee 3673.4 6026.7 3870.4 2769.4 618.2 
(6580.3) (7977.5) (9397.3) (7026.4) (7719.3) 
Ireland*Fee -3907.8 -4832.1 497.0 9041.4 11045.7 
(15550.7) (19444.4) (24147.7) (27234.7) (28190.7) 
Scotland*Fee*Ranking -72.86 -82.90 -67.05 -81.16 -69.69 
(67.59) (84.15) (98.09) (73.57) (86.59) 
Wales*Fee*Ranking -50.04 -94.76 -48.90 -57.04 -20.14 
(110.8) (136.9) (161.9) (81.61) (88.97) 
Ireland*Fee*Ranking 76.79 135.0 25.01 -228.0 -229.4 
(357.4) (445.0) (541.7) (552.8) (568.8) 
Constant 20892.7 20892.7 21100.1 22073.2 22073.2 
  (997.0)*** (995.7)*** (1431.7)*** (1279.5)*** (1282.5)*** 
n 780 567 387 683 456 
 
